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THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 



THE PANGERMAN PLOT 
UNMASKED 

BERLIN'S FORMIDABLE PEACE -TRAP OF 
"THE DRAWN WAR" 



BY 

ANDRE CHERADAME 



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

THE EARL OF CROMER, O.M. 



WITH MAPS 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
1917 






Copyright, 1916, by 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

Published January, 1917 

Reprinted February, March, April, June, 1917 



All Rights Reserved 



By eaeohansro 
AUG 1 7 It 



Amy & Hav^^Iub 







PUBLISHER'S NOTE 

•^ As will be understood from the author's preface, 

5^ M. Cheradame's book was published in Paris in the 
summer of this year, before the important occur- 
rences in the Balkans accompanying and following 
Roumania's entrance into the war. In issuing this 
translation no consideration of these events has been 
added; but their bearing on M. Cheradame's fore- 
cast will be noted by the reader. 

The maps have been reproduced direct from the 
French edition, without translating the names into 
English, as they answer their purpose perfectly well 
in their present form. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction by Lord Cromer ------ xm 

Author's Preface .-_------ xix 



PROLOGUE 

Pangermanism and William II. ------ 

I. The Pangerman Doctrine, p. i.— II. The Kaiser as originator 
of the Pangerman plan, p. $. 



CHAPTER I 

The Pangerman Plan _" 

I. The Pangerman plan of 191 1, p. 11.— II. The stages by which 
it has been effected, p. 16.— III. Why it has been ignored, p. 19. 



CHAPTER II 

The Causes of the War 26 

I. Why the Treaty of Bukarest suddenly raised a formidable 
obstacle to the Pangerman plan, p. 26.— II. How it was that 
the internal state of Austria-Himgary drove Germany to let 
loose the dogs of war, p. 31.— HI. General view of the causes 
of the war, p. 37. 



CHAPTER in 

How far the Pangerman plan was carried out at the begin- 
ning OF 1916 ---------45 

I. German pretensions in the West, p. 45-— H- German preten- 
sions in the East, p. 52. — III. German pretensions in the South 
and South-East, p. 56.— IV. General view of the execution of 
the Pangerman plan from 1911 to the beginning of 1916, p. 62. 
vii 



viii PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

CHAPTER IV 

PAGE 

Special features given to the war by the Pangerman plan 66 

I. All the great political questions of the old world are raised and 
must be solved, p. 67. — II. As the war is made by Germany 
in order to achieve a gigantic scheme of slavery, it follows that 
it is waged by her in flagrant violation of international law, 
p. 69. — III. A struggle of tenacity and of duplicity on the side 
of Berlin versus constancy and solidarity on the side of the 
Allies, p. 71. 

CHAPTER V 

The Dodge of the "Drawn Game" and the scheme "from 

HAMBtniG TO the PERSIAN GtJLF" ----- 77 

I. What would really be the outcome of the dodge called the 
"Drawn Game," p. 78. — II. The financial consequences for 
the Allies of this so-called "Drawn Game," p. 83. — III. The 
Allies and the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," 
p. 88. — IV. Panislamic and Asiatic consequences of the 
achievement of the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian 
Giilf," p. 94. — V. Consequences for the world of the achieve- 
ment of the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," 
p. 100. 



CHAPTER VI 

The crucial point of the whole problem . - . - io8 

I. The obligation which the threat of the scheme "from Ham- 
biu-g to the Persian Gulf," imposes on the Allies, p. 108. — 
II. The capital importance of the question of Austria-Hvm- 
gary, p. 114. — III. AH the racial elements necessary for the 
destruction of the Pangerman plan exist in Central Europe, 
p. 121. 



CHAPTER VII 

The Balkans and the Pangerman Plan - - - - - 131 

I. The connexion between the Pangerman plan and the plan, of 
Bulgarian supremacy, p. 132. — II. Greece and Pangerman 
ambitions, p. 146. — III. Roumania and the Pangerman plan, 
p. 152. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS ix 

CHAPTER VIII 

PAGE 

Geeman manceuvres to play the Allies the trick of the 
"Drawn Game," that is, to secure the accomplishment 
OF THE "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" scheme as the 
minimum result of the war - - - - - -158 

I. The exceptional importance of the economic union of the Cen- 
tral Empires, and the danger for the Allies of estabhshing a 
connexion between that union and their own economic mea- 
sures after the war, p. 159. — II. Reasons for the Turko-German 
dodge of making a separate peace between the Ottoman em- 
pire and the Allies, p. 167. — III. Why a separate and prema- 
ture peace with Bulgaria would play the Pangerman game, 
p. 174- 



CHAPTER IX 

The still neutral States whose independence would be 
directly threatened by the achievement of the "Ham- 
burg to the Persian Gulf" scheme and therefore by 
Germany's capture of Austria-Hungary - - - - 

I. The example of Portugal, p. 183. — II. Holland, p. 187. — III. 
Switzerland, p. 191. — IV. The States of South America, p. 193. 
— V. The United States, p. 198. 



CONCLUSIONS 

What has been set forth in the preceding nine chapters appears 
to justify the following conclusions ------ 213 



MAPS 

PAGE 

The Poles in the East of Germany ______ i 

The Danes in Prussia - - - - - - -- -2 

The Germans and the non-Germans in Austria-Hungary - - -3 

The Pangerman plan of 1911 ------- 12 

The Antigermanic barrier in the Balkans after the treaty of Bu- 

karest (loth August, 1913) -------28 

The nationalities in Austria-Hungary - - - - - -32 

The three barriers of Antigermanic peoples in the Balkans and in 

Austria-Hungary ---------43 

The German claims in the West (beginning of 1916) - - - 46 

The German claims in the East -------53 

The German claims in the South and South-East - - - - 57 

The plan of 191 1 and the extent of its execution at the beginning of 

1916 ---------__ 64 

The great political questions raised by the war - - - - 68 

The German fortress at the beginning of 1916 - - - - 72 

The consequences of the dodge called "The Drawn Game" - - 79 

Asiatic consequences of the accomplishment of the scheme "From 

Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" ------ 95 

World-wide consequences of the "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" 

scheme, as provided for by the plan of 191 1 - - - - loi 

The crucial point of the European problem - - - - -113 

Great Bulgaria -----_--_- 133 

Serbian Macedonia _________ 137 

Greece after the treaty of Bukarest ______ 147 

Great Roumania -----____- 153 

The nationalities in Turkey - - - - - - - -170 

Encroachments planned by Bulgaria on neighbouring States - - 181 

Portugal and Colonial Pangermanism ------ 185 



PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED xi 



PAGE 



The Neutral States of Europe and Pangermanism _ - _ i88 

Colonial Pangermanism and South America ----- 194 

Distribution of German-bom Germans in the United States - - 201 

Relation between the Pangerman plan of 191 1 and the Pangerman 
gains at the beginning of 1916 ------ 217 

The Pangerman gains at the beginning of 1916 - - - - 223 

European States interested in the solution of the Austro-Hungarian 
question --.---.... 231 

The States of Asia and America, interested in the solution of the 
Austro-Hungarian question - - - - - - - 23,3 



INTRODUCTION. 

By the Earl of Cromer, O.M. 

My reasons for commending M. Cheradame's 
most instructive work to the earnest attention of 
my countrymen and countrywomen are three-fold. 

In the first place, M. Cheradame stands con- 
spicuous amongst that very small body of politi- 
cians who warned Europe betimes of the German 
danger. The fact that in the past he proved a true 
prophet gives him a special claim to be heard when 
he states his views as regards the present and the 
future. 

In the second place, I entertain a strong opinion 
that M. Cheradame's diagnosis of the present 
situation is, in all its main features, correct. 

In the third place, in spite of the voluminous war 
literature which already exists, I greatly doubt 
whether the special aspect of the case which M,. 
Cheradame wishes to present to the public is fully 
understood in this country; neither should I be 
surprised to hear from those who are more qualified 
than myself to speak on the subject that the same 
remark applies, though possibly in a less degree, to 
the public opinion of France. 

It is essential that, before the terms of peace are 
discussed, a clear idea should be formed of the 
reasons which led the German Government to pro- 
voke this war. It is well that, if such a course be at 



xiv PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

all possible, those who are personally responsible 
for the numerous acts of barbarity committed by 
the Germans should receive adequate punishment. 
But attention to points of this sort, however rational 
and meritorious, should not in any degree be allowed 
to obscure the vital importance of the permanent 
political issues which call loudly for settlement. 
Otherwise, it is quite conceivable that a peace may 
be patched up, which may have some specious 
appearance of being favourable to the Allies, but 
which would at the same time virtually concede to 
the Germans all they require in order, after time 
had been allowed for recuperation, to renew, with 
increased hope of success, their attempts to shatter 
modern civilization and to secure the domination of 
the world. 

M. Cheradame explains — and I believe with 
perfect accuracy — the nature of the German objec- 
tive. It is, in his opinion, to lay secure and stable 
foundations for the system known as Pan- German- 
ism. What is Pan- Germanism ? It may be 
doubted whether all that is implied in that term is 
fully realized in this country. One interpretation 
may be given to the word, which is not merely 
innocuous, but which may even reasonably appeal 
to the sympathies of those who approve of the new 
map of Europe being constituted with a view to 
applying that nationalist principle, which finds 
almost universal favour in all democratic countries. 
It cannot be too distinctly understood that the 
political programme now advocated by Germany 
has no sort of affinity with a plan of this sort. The 
Germans contend not only that all those who are 
generally denominated Germans by the rest of the 
world should be united, but that all who are of 
what is termed ''German origin" should be brought 
into the German fold. Moreover, they give to 
this latter phrase an expansion and a signification 



INTRODUCTION xv 

which Is condemned and derided by all who have 
paid serious attention to ethnological studies. This, 
however, is far from stating the whole case. The 
object of the German Government is to effect the 
whole or partial Germanization of countries in- 
habited by races which cannot, by any conceivable 
ethnological process of reasoning, be held to be of 
German stock. In fact, M. Cheradame very 
correctly describes Pan- Germanism when he says 
that its object is to disregard all questions of racial 
and linguistic affinity and to absorb huge tracts of 
country the possession of which is considered useful 
to advance Hohenzollern interests. In. other words, 
what they wish is to establish, under the name of 
Pan- Germanism, a world system whose leading and 
most immediate feature is the creation of an 
empire stretching from the Persian Gulf to the 
North Sea. 

That this project has for a long while past been 
in course of preparation by the Kaiser and his 
megalomaniac advisers cannot for a moment be 
doubted. When, in November, 1898, William II. 
pronounced his famous speech at Damascus, in 
which he stated that all the three hundred millions 
of Mohammedans in the world could rely upon him 
as their true friend, the world was inclined to regard 
the utterance as mere rhodomontade. It was 
nothing of the sort. It involved the declaration of 
a definite and far-reaching policy, the execution of 
which was delayed until a favourable moment 
occurred and, notably, until the Kiel Canal was' 
completed. The whole conspiracy very nearly 
succeeded. In spite of their careful attention to 
detail, their talent for organization, and their 
elaborate preparations to meet what appears to 
them every contingency which may occur, the 
Germans seem to have a constitutional inability 
to grasp the motives which guide the inhabitants of 



xvi PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

other countries. A very close analogy to the mis- 
take made by the Kaiser is to be found in an incident 
of recent English history. It is alleged, I know not 
with what truth, that when, in 1886, Lord Ran- 
dolph Churchill resigned his position as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in Lord Salisbury's administra- 
tion, he ''forgot Goschen," who, as it will be 
remembered, was speedily nominated to succeed 
him. The Kaiser forgot England. For various 
reasons, which are too well-known to require 
repetition, he and his advisers were firmly convinced 
that England would not join in the war. The 
programme was, first, to destroy the power of 
France and Russia, and then, after that had been 
done, to fall upon England. In one sense it was 
fortunate that the Germans committed the gross 
international crime of invading Belgium. Had 
they not done so, it is quite possible that the Eng- 
lish nation would not have woke up to the realities 
of the situation. As it was, however, it became 
clear, even to the most extreme pacificists, that 
honour and interest alike pointed to the necessity 
of decisive action. Thus as M. Cheradame indi- 
cates, the original German plan was completely 
upset. The advance on Paris had to be stayed. 
But the programme, which was the result of long 
and deliberate contemplation, has by no means 
been abandoned. On the contrary, with the 
adhesion of the Bulgarians, who will eventually, 
unless the Allies secure a decisive victory, become 
the victims of Pan- Germanism, and also that of the 
Turks, who were manoeuvred into the war by an 
adroit and absolutely unscrupulous diplomacy, a 
very considerable portion of the plan has already 
been put into execution. 

M. Cheradame states with great reason that 
France, Italy, Russia, England, and all the minor 
Powers are vitally interested in frustrating the 



INTRODUCTION xvii 

German project of establishing their dominion 
from the Persian Gulf to the North Sea. He also 
warns us against making a separate peace with 
either Austria-Hungary or Turkey, both of these 
Powers being merely vassals of Germany. He is 
very clearly of opinion that the mere cession of 
Alsace-Lorraine to France and the rehabilitation 
of Belgium cannot form the foundations of a durable 
peace. If peace were concluded on this basis, the 
Germans would have achieved their main object, 
and, as Herr Harden pointed out last February, 
even if Germany was obliged, under pressure, to 
cede Alsace-Lorraine, there would still be seventy 
millions of Germans firmly determined to regain 
possession of those provinces at the first suitable 
opportunity. In fact, the realization of the Ger- 
man project, although accompanied by certain 
temporary disabilities from the German point of 
view, would eventually enable Germany to strangle 
Europe. 

I need not dwell upon all the proposals set forth 
by M. Cheradame with a view to the frustration of 
this plan, but the corner-stone of his programme is 
similar to that advocated with great ability in this 
country by Mr. Wickham Steed and Mr. Seton 
Watson. It is to create a Southern Slav State, 
which will afford an effectual barrier to German 
advance towards the East. It is essential that 
the immense importance of dealing with the terri- 
tories of the Hapsburgs as a prehminary to a final 
settlement of all the larger aspects of the Eastern 
question should be fully realized. It constitutes 
the key of the whole situation. 

For these reasons, I hope that M. Cheradame's 
work, which develops more fully the arguments 
which I have very briefly stated above, will receive 
in this country the attention which it certainly 
merits. I should add that the book is written in a 



xviii PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

popular style, and that M. Cheradame's arguments 
can be easily followed by those who have no special 
acquaintance either with Eastern policy or with 
the tortuous windings of Austrian and German 
diplomacy during the last quarter of a century. 

Cromer. 

September 4, 1916. 



PREFACE. 

The Pangerman plot is the only cause of the war. 
It is, in fact, the cause at once of its outbreak and 
of its prolongation till that victory of the Allies 
has been won which is indispensable to the liberty 
of the world. In this book I propose to demon- 
strate this truth by a series of documents, precise, 
clear, and intelligible to all. The fate of every man 
in the allied countries, and even in some of the 
countries which are still neutral, really depends on 
the issue of the formidable war now being waged. 
This cataclysm, unprecedented in history, let loose 
by Prussianized Germany, will have infinite rever- 
berations in every sphere, reverberations which 
will affect every one of us individually for good or, 
alas ! too often for ill. Every one, therefore, has 
a direct interest in knowing clearly why these in- 
evitable reverberations of the immense struggle 
will be produced, and on what fundamental 
conditions those of them which bode ill for the 
Allies, and are yet but imperfectly understood, can 
and must be avoided. Hence every one of the 
Allies should acquire an exact notion of the present 
realities. Once fortified by the evidence, his 
opinion will become a force for the Allied Govern- 
ments; it will then contribute to the victory and 
to the imposition of the conditions necessary for 
the peace. 

In writing this popular book my aim has been to 
bring home, even to those who are least versed in 
foreign affairs, the formidable problems raised by the 
war. In my opinion this work is addressed to women 



XX PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

quite as much as to men. The reading of it may 
perhaps bring not only instruction but consolation 
to those whose affections have been so cruelly 
wounded. When they comprehend better by what 
an atrocious plan of slavery the world is threatened, 
they will understand more fully for what a sublime, 
what a stupendous cause their husbands, their 
sons, their plighted lovers, are fighting or dying 
with such heroic self-sacrifice. May that larger 
understanding of the formidable events now occur- 
ring yield to the women of the Allies at least some 
alleviation of their sufferings. 

But if this book is a popular work, I beg my 
readers to remark that it is not the result of a 
hasty effort, vamped up by a mere desire to treat 
of the moving, the tragic subject of the hour. The 
book is, indeed, the logical conclusion of a labour 
on which I have been engaged for twenty-one 
years. As my readers have an interest in knowing 
how far they may trust me, they will allow me to 
explain to them how I was led to concentrate my 
studies on the Pangerman policy of Germany, what 
has been the result of my efforts, and how they are 
linked together. 

* * 

In former days I was the pupil of Albert Sorel at 
the Free School of Political Science. That great 
master was good enough to admit me to his inti- 
macy; and he brought to light and maturity the 
latent and instinctive propensity which I had for 
foreign politics. My practical studies abroad led 
me to Germany in 1894, just at the time when the 
Pangerman movement had begun. As the move- 
ment was manifestly the modern development of 
the Prussianism of the Hohenzollerns, I was then 
extremely struck by its importance. The move- 
ment appeared to me so threatening for the future 
that I resolved to follow all the developments of 



PREFACE xxi 

the Pangerman plot, which was already the 
consequence of the movement, and which from 
1895 onward had taken definite shape. The task 
which I thus laid on myself was at once arduous, 
vast, and thrilling, for from that time it was certain 
that the Germans based their political and military 
Pangerman plan on a study of all the political, 
ethnographical, economic, social, military and naval 
problems not only of Europe but of the whole 
world. In truth, the intense labour accomplished 
in the cause of Pangermanism by the Germans in 
the last twenty-one years has been colossal. They 
have carried it out everywhere with a formidable 
tenacity and a methodical thoroughness which will 
be the astonishment of history. Indisputably, the 
Pangerman plan, which is the result of this gigantic 
effort, is the most extraordinary plot which the 
world has ever witnessed. 

I made the study of that plot for twenty-one 
years the work of my life, convinced as I was, in 
spite of the scepticism which long greeted my 
efforts to give warning of the peril, that the study 
would serve a useful purpose one day. 

The study has necessitated very many and very 
long journeys of inquiry. I was obliged in fact to 
go and learn, on the spot, at least the essential 
elements of the complex problems mentioned 
above, which have been the base of the Pangerman 
plan, in order that I might be able to grasp the 
most distant ramifications of the Prussian pro- 
gramme for dominating the world. 

This obligation led me to sojourn in very different 
countries. That the reader may have an idea of 
at least the material extent of my inquiries, I will 
indicate the number of the towns in which I have 
been led to work for the purpose of discovering the 
constituent elements, direct and indirect, of the 
Pangerman plan. 



xxii PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

The United States, 14 ; Canada, 11 ; Japan, 11 ; 
Corea, 4 ; China, 11 ; Indo- China, 19; British 
India, 24 ; Spain, i ; Italy, 4 ; Belgium, 6 ; 
Luxemburg, i ; Holland, 5 ; Switzerland, 4 ; 
England, 8; Greece, 2; Bulgaria,' 4; Roumania, 3; 
Serbia, 8 ; Turkey, 3 ; Germany, 16 ; Austro- 
Hungary, 18. 

In these towns, according to the requirement of 
my studies, I passed days, weeks, or months, often 
on repeated occasions. I endeavoured, so far as 
the opportunities and the time admitted of it, to 
enter into direct relations with the acting ministers, 
the leaders of the various political parties, the 
diplomatists and the consuls, both French and 
foreign, some heads of states, influential journalists, 
officers of repute, military and naval attaches, 
well-informed merchaiLts and manufacturers. It 
was thus that, by means of information of many 
sorts drawn from the most diverse sources, and 
checked by ccrmparison with each other, I have 
attempted to set forth the Pangerman political and 
military plan. 

Since 1898 I have endeavoured to draw the 
attention of the public to the immense danger 
which that plan was laying up for the world, as my 
former works testify, particularly VEurope et la 
Question d' Autriche au seuil du XXe Siecle, which 
appeared in 1901, therefore fifteen years ago, and 
contained an exposition, as precise as it was then 
possible to make it, of the Pangerman plan of 
1895, summed up in the formula "Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf" ; also Le Chemin de fer de Bagdad, 
published in 1903, wherein I set forth the danger 
of that co-operation between Germany and Turkey, 
which was then only nascent, but which we see 
full-fledged to-day. 

I attempted also by numerous lectures to diffuse 
among the public some notion of the Pangerman 



PREFACE 



XXlll 



peril. I did not content myself with warning my 
countrymen. I am proud to have been one of the 
first Frenchmen to preach a cordial understanding 
between France and England at a time when there 
was perhaps some merit in doing so. I deemed it, 
therefore, a duty to inform the British public, so far 
as it lay in my power, that the Pangerman peril 
concerned Great Britain quite as much as France. 
In 1909 the Franco-Scottish Society kindly invited 
me to lecture to its members at Edinburgh, Glasgow 
and Aberdeen. I seized the opportunity, and took 
for the subject of my lectures, "The problem of 
Central Europe and universal politics." 

The Aberdeen Free Press, of May 8th, 1909, 
summed up very exactly as follows the substance 
of what I said, seven years ago, to my British 
hearers: 

" . . . . The lecturer attached enormous im- 
portance to the Pan- German movement, which he 
regarded as the decisive factor in the situation, and 
he pointed out that the propaganda which had 
gone on in Germany and in Austria was part of a 
great policy to extend the boundaries of the German 
State and dominate middle and south-eastern 
Europe. The rapport personnel established in 
recent years between Berlin and Vienna pointed, he 
said, to the conclusion that Germany and Austria 
were working hand in hand. In the recent Balkan 
crisis he described Aehrenthal as playing a partie 
de poker, in which his bluff had been crowned with 
success. The off-set to the Pan-German movement 
was to be found in the Triple Entente between 
England, France and Russia, and it followed from 
a consideration of European poHtics that the 
questions confronting England with regard to the 
supremacy of the sea were intimately bound up 
with the question which concerned the land powers 
of Europe. In particular, the speaker thought that 



xxiv PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

the Pan- German aspirations would be effectually 
combatted by the growing social and political 
development of the various minor Slav peoples in 
the south-east of Europe. The development of 
these peoples was a thing which it was with the 
interests of England, France and Russia to encour- 
age to the utmost." 

My Scottish hearers gave me a very kind recep- 
tion, of which I have preserved a lively recollection. 
But truth compels me to declare that I had the 
impression that the great majority of them did not 
believe me. I strongly suspect that they then saw 
in me simply a Frenchman, who, moved by the 
spirit of revenge, tried above all to stir up the 
British public against Germany. The impression 
did not discourage me any more than many 
similar instances of want of success. In 191 1 the 
Central Asian Society did me the honour of inviting 
me to express my views in London (22nd March) 
on the Bagdad railway. I used this fresh oppor- 
tunity to expound a method of Franco-English 
co-operation which seemed to me necessary to 
parry the dangers of the near future. 

"Such is," I then said, "broadly speaking, the 
affair of Bagdad. The most moderate conclusion 
which, in my judgment, inevitably follows is that 
from beginning to end the logical and methodical 
spirit of Germany has got the better of the French, 
English, and Russian interests, which have been 
compromised by our slowness to grasp the import- 
ance of the problem confronting us, and by the 
lamentable want of cohesion between the diplo- 
macies of the three countries. 

"The lesson apparently to be drawn from these 
considerations is, that for the future we ought no 
longer to be satisfied with a hand-to-mouth policy 
and with seeking solutions only when the difficulties 
take an acute form. 



PREFACE XXV 

"If we wish to serve and defend our interests 
effectually, we must, as Talleyrand said, keep the 
future in mind, and learn something of that German 
method of which the good results are incontestable. 

"So far as the eye can range to the visible 
political horizon, the essential interests of England, 
France, and Russia are in agreement; it is, there- 
fore, to all appearance, absolutely necessary that 
the men who exercise an influence on public 
opinion in this country, in France, and in Russia, 
should enter into personal relations in order to 
discuss the great national interests which they have 
in common, and to adopt a useful line of conduct, 
while there is yet time. Such a course would be 
effectual, because it would be determined before 
the decisive events instead of after them, that is to 
say, when it is too late." 

"Were we to adopt this method, which after all 
is very simple, the future attempts of our adversaries 
against our interests would encounter effectual ob- 
stacles, and we should no longer have to regret mis- 
carriages such as those of which the Bagdad affair is 
an example." 

Has the method thus recommended been fol- 
lowed? Apparently not; otherwise could France 
and England have been surprised by the war? 

My propaganda having had little practical result, 
I endeavoured at least to keep myself well informed 
of the events that were happening. 

In December, 1913, and January, February, and 
March, 1914, I made new and minute inquiries in 
Central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey, and 
these inquiries were of particular value to me. 
The truth is, that the treaty of Bukarest of August 
loth, 1913, by reason of its far-reaching and im- 
portant consequences, had completely upset the 
former state of affairs, so much so that without my 
journey of 1914, I should certainly have been 



xxvi PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

unable to understand the new situation. In the 
course of my journey I set myself to apply, with 
great rigour, my method of research, which consists 
essentially in trying to see the situations as they 
are, without preconceived ideas, while listening to 
all opinions in order to compare them afterwards 
and extract, if possible, the average truth. In 
Serbia, in Greece, in Turkey, in Roumania, in 
Bulgaria, where for a long time I had been in 
personal relations with people of many different 
sorts, I was able to have long talks with persons 
in the most diverse walks of life. In particular, I 
had the good fortune to be graciously received by 
the sovereigns and princes of the Balkans: King 
Peter of Serbia (23rd December, 1913), Prince 
Alexander, heir of Serbia (December, 19 13), King 
Constantine (25th January, 1914), Prince Nicholas 
of Greece (28th January), King Charles of 
Roumania (i8th February), Tsar Ferdinand (28th 
February), Prince Boris, heir of Bulgaria (29th 
February). If I record the audiences which these 
high personages were so good as to grant me, it is 
because they were really not commonplace. These 
sovereigns and princes knew that I had long 
studied their country impartially, and they con- 
sented to speak with me of the great interests 
which guided their policies. During these various 
audiences, which lasted from half an hour to two 
hours, I heard many points of view of real import- 
ance set forth. No doubt each of my various 
interlocutors only said to me what he wished to say; 
but, thanks to the multiplicity of the opinions 
expressed and to the variety of my sources of 
information, I was able at least to construct a 
general picture of the true Balkan situation, and to 
connect it afterwards with the problem of Central 
Europe and the general policy of Germany. 



PREFACE xxvii 

This inquiry, which in returning I completed in 
Hungary and Austria, convinced me that, contrary 
to the opinion which has been held down to quite 
recent times in many Allied circles, the treaty of 
Bukarest by no means constituted an injustice, as 
the Allies have supposed — a belief which has been 
the source of most of their mistakes in the Balkans 
in 191 5. On the contrary, the treaty of Bukarest, 
particularly because it for the first time drew 
Roumania out of the German orbit, appeared to me 
the most astonishingly favourable event which had 
happened on the Continent since 1870, and which was 
entirely in accordance with the interests of France, 
England, and Russia. The consequences of this 
treaty formed in fact, as we shall see, the most 
effectual arrangement that could be conceived for 
arresting the Pangerman danger and maintaining 
peace in Europe. But this pacific dam to keep back 
the Pangerman flood was only possible on condition 
that the Entente powers held themselves ready for 
war, which would probably have sufficed to prevent 
it, and that at the same time they resolutely and 
unanimously supported Greece, Roumania, and 
Serbia. 

On the other hand, the check which the treaty of 
Bukarest gave to the Pangerman plan in Europe, 
appeared to me so pregnant with consequences that 
I considered it highly probable that the Govern- 
ment of Vienna, instigated by that of Berlin, would 
not shrink from war for the purpose of undoing the 
treaty of Bukarest, with its far-reaching effects, 
at the earliest possible moment, unless the other 
powers put themselves on their guard. On my 
return to France I tried to explain the imminence 
of the danger, but no one would believe it. 

In truth, German aggression caught the present 
Allied countries napping for the following funda- 
mental reason. No doubt, before the war, Pan- 



xxviii PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

germanism, as a doctrine, was well enough known 
in some circles, but the political and military 
Pangerman plan, the application of which has been 
pursued methodically by the government of Berlin 
since the opening of hostilities, had not been 
studied and taken very seriously except by an 
extremely small number of private persons in 
France, England, and Russia. 

The efforts made by these private persons to 
convince the men at the helm in the now Allied 
countries of the awful danger ahead, were vain. The 
principal reason why their warnings fell unheeded 
was this. When by the help of documents they 
explained that William II.'s ultimate aim was the 
establishment of German supremacy on the ruins 
of all the great powers, they were taken for crazy 
dreamers, so chimerical did such formidable projects 
appear. 

That is why among the Allies the political and 
military Pangerman plot was ignored in its true 
character and its extent, down to the outbreak of 
war. This lack of knowledge in France is proved 
by a statement in Le Temps of i6th December, 
191 5, Before the war, ''we did not believe in the 
possibility of a war, and we took no pains to prepare 
for that redoubtable event." It was absolutely the 
same in England, as was demonstrated by the 
complete surprise of Great Britain at the German 
aggression. 

More than that, the Kaiser's entire plan has 
continued to be misunderstood in the Allied 
countries down to a date which seems quite recent. 
In fact. Sir Edward Carson, when explaining his 
resignation in the House of Commons, November 
2nd, 191 5, said: ''I hope that the new plan of 
campaign has been definitely settled, for while I 
was a member of the Cabinet, the Cabinet had no 
plan" (quoted by Le Temps, 4th November, 1915). 



PREFACE xxix 

But if the Pangerman plan had been known in 
London, the English and consequently the French 
would certainly have long ago adopted the counter- 
plan which could not have failed to destroy it; for 
the Pangerman plan consists of such definite and 
precise elements that the mere recognition of them 
at once suggests the means of frustrating it; in 
particular, the advantages and the necessity of the 
Salonika expedition, which has been so sharply 
opposed and so tardily undertaken, would have 
been understood from the beginning of 1915, when 
M. Briand recommended it in principle. Besides, as 
anybody may convince himself, if the Pangerman 
plan had been fully known, it is highly probable 
that the Allies would never have perpetrated the 
blunders which they have committed in the 
Balkans, the Dardanelles, and Serbia. It appears 
that the magnitude of the Pangerman plan, and 
particularly the part which is masked behind the 
pretended "drawn game," has not even yet been 
clearly apprehended in many circles which imagine 
themselves well acquainted with the aims pursued 
by Germany in the war. In fact, quite recently, 
in France and in England, certain important 
organs, though not, it is true, of an official character, 
have argued that since Germany means to extend 
her ZoUverein to Austria-Hungary, the Allies ought 
to form a powerful economic league with the 
view of combatting the Austro- German union 
after the war. But as we shall see, the question 
really could not, except by some deplorable in- 
advertence, be stated in these terms in the Allied 
countries. No connexion should be voluntarily 
established by them between the economic union 
of the Allies, however natural it may be, and the 
economic union of Central Europe. In truth, to 
permit the future extension of the German 
ZoUverein to Austria-Hungary, in other words, to 



XXX PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

acquiesce in that economic alliance, under any form, 
between the two Central empires, which has formed 
the base and condition of the whole Pangerman 
plot for twenty-one years (the plot of 1895), would 
be to permit implicitly the seizure by Germany of 
fifty millions of inhabitants, of whom nearly three- 
fourths are not Germans; the inevitable conse- 
quence, as I shall prove, would be to accept the 
German supremacy over the Balkans and Turkey. 
Now it is manifest that such results would be in 
absolute contradiction to the declarations of the 
Allied governments, which have proclaimed that 
their object in waging the war has been to destroy 
Prussian militarism and not, consequently, to 
allow such a new state of things as the seizure, 
direct or indirect, of Austria-Hungary by Germany, 
which would multiply her power ten-fold. 

The fact that such "inadvertences" can still 
be committed, after twenty months of war, in 
circles which, though not ofEcial, are nevertheless 
important, suflSices to prove that the widest possible 
publicity of the Pangerman plot throughout the 
great masses of the enlightened public in the 
Allied countries is really needful, if not indispens- 
able. It is also extremely desirable that neutrals 
should know exactly what the Pangerman plot is in 
its nature and in its extent. In particular, those 
Americans who imagine that they can stand aloof 
from the present formidable conflict, will then 
clearly understand that their future liberty really 
depends on the victory of the Allied soldiers, who 
are fighting not only for their own independence, 
but in reality for the independence of the whole 
civilized world, and particularly for that of the 
United States. 

I earnestly trust that the English edition of this 
book may contribute to bring about this result. 
Its object is to inform public opinion exactly, so far 



PREFACE xxxi 

as the English tongue is spoken, as to the Berlin 
plot for the domination of the globe. Moreover, 
an exact knowledge of the Pangerman political and 
military plot throws a flood of light on all the 
essential problems of the war: it brings out the deep- 
seated cause of the war; it explains the immediate 
causes, which are still almost unknown; it shows 
why it is indispensable to the freedom of the world 
that the Allies should achieve, not a hollow and 
treacherous peace, but a complete victory resulting 
in the destruction of Prussian militarism, which 
alone can put an end to the great armaments in 
Europe and ensure a really lasting peace. 

In order that the demonstration may be as 
convincing as possible, I shall refrain, as far as I 
can, from giving my readers my own personal 
opinions and impressions. I shall do my utmost, 
above all, to lay before them exact documents and 
arguments intelligible to all, thus furnishing them 
with facts which will enable them to form a judg- 
ment for themselves. 

In any case, this work has no other aim than to 
speak the truth, and to serve a cause the justice of 
which will appear more and more manifest to a 
world long deceived by the energetic and astute 
propaganda of Germany. 

$tk August, 1 91 6. 



PROLOGUE. 

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II. 

I. The Pangerman Doctrine. 
II. The Kaiser as originator of the Pangerman plan. 

The Germans are truly methodical people. In 
every department of life their plans are based on a 
theory; it may be a true one or a false one, but 
once they have conceived it they forge ahead with 
bull-dog tenacity. It is therefore necessary for us 
to grasp the exact meaning of the Pangerman 
doctrine, for the whole universal Pangerman plot, 
both political and military, springs from that tenet. 



I. 

It might be supposed that the expression Pan- 
germanism embodies the theory in virtue of which 




^ Polonais 

100 200 300*?' 



Uerlin < Jr-vvv$^ 

^-^s^^i VarsoJfe .\ 



Vi/na 
o 




C H 



THE POLES IN THE EAST OF GERMANY. 

the Germans claim to annex only the regions in- 
habited by dense masses of Germans, on the borders 



2 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

of the Empire, which, after all, would be in accord- 
ance with the principle of nationalities. 

But Pangermanism has by no means such a re- 
stricted and legitimate aim. Again, it might be 
thought that its object was to gather within the 
same political fold the peoples who are more or less 
Germanic by origin. Such a claim would of itself 
be quite inadmissible. But Pangermanism is more 




THE DANES IN PRUSSIA. 



than that. It is really the doctrine, of purely 
Prussian origin, which aims at annexing all the 
various regions, irrespective of race or language, of 
which the possession is deemed useful to the 
power of the Hohenzollerns. 

It was in the name of Pangermanism, a theory 
bred of cupidity and wanton greed, that Prussia 



PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM 11. 3 

charged the Parliament of Frankfort to claim as 
German lands the Eastern Provinces, where in 
reality the Slavs predominate to such an extent, 
that they still contain a population of about four 
million Poles. 

It was in the name of Pangermanism that in 1864 
Prussia seized that part of Schleswig which was 
entirely Danish. 



^^^^^^K'^^~^\7~%^l 




I I Allemands 
^%^ Non Allemands 

100 200 



THE GERMANS AND THE NON-GERMANS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 



It is in the name of Pangermanism that Austria- 
Hungary has been for long the object of German 
covetousness, although the Germans in that country 
are in a very small minority. Statistics show 12 
millions of Germans against 38 millions of non- 
Germans, and that must be above the mark, for 
we have to remember that German statistics 
systematically exaggerate the number of Germans 
dwelling in the Hapsburg Monarchy. 



4 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Already in 1859 the Augsburg Gazette avowed the 
object of Germany's designs on Austria with 
absolute cynicism: 

*'We loudly declare that if Austria* were not a 
member of the Confederation ; if it were not 
Austria who happened to be the legitimate owner 
of these non- German regions, it would be the duty 
of the German nation to conquer them at all costs, 
because they are absolutely necessary for her 
development and for her position as a great power." 

The future Marshal von Moltke, also inspired by 
Pangermanism, had written, as far back as 1844: 
"We hope that Austria will uphold the rights and 
protect the future of the Danube lands, and that 
Germany will finally succeed in keeping open the 
mouth of her great rivers" (see V. Moltke Schriften, 
t. IL, p. 313). 

The author of a pamphlet published in 1895, i.e. 
exactly twenty-one years ago, inspired by this 
doctrine of fraud and protected by the Alldeutscher 
Verband, the most powerful Pangerman Society, 
after expounding the main plan of future annexa- 
tions, concludes with simple effrontery thus: 

No doubt the newly-constituted Empires will not 
be peopled merely by Germans, but: "Germans 
alone will govern; they alone will exercise political 
rights; they alone will serve in the Army and in the 
Navy; they alone will have the right to become 
landowners; thus they will acquire the conviction 
that, as in the Middle Ages, the Germans are a 
people of rulers. However, they will condescend 
so far as to delegate inferior tasks to foreign subjects 
subservient to Germany" (see Grossdeutschland und 
Mitieleuropa um das Jahr 1950, published by Thormann 
und Goetsch, Berlin, p. 48). 



* A.t that date the designation Austria was comprehensive of 
what we now call Austria-Hungary. 



PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II. 5 

^ Identity of race and language served for a long 
time to justify Pangermanism; but the facts we 
have shown and the explicit declarations we have 
quoted prove clearly that race and language were 
merely a pretext for the diffusion of the Pangerman 
doctrine inspired by Prussia. If we dissect this 
doctrine we find it is composed of cupidity both 
poHtical and economic. The truth is that Pan- 
germanism is a scheme of piracy to be carried on 
for the benefit of the Prussian monarchy. Its 
object is, by successive and indefinite expansions of 
territory to include within the same boundaries, 
at first economic but afterwards political, such lands 
and such peoples as are likely to prove a profitable 
possession to the HohenzoUerns themselves and to 
their main support, the German aristocracy. 

To sum up, Pangermanism is a doctrine of 
international burglary, and therefore it is exactly 
the reverse of the principle of nationahty, that 
noble idea ushered into the world by the French 
Revolution. 

II. 

From the Pangerman doctrine the military and 
political Pangerman plot was bred and stage- 
managed by William II. Outside of Germany, the 
Kaiser was looked upon, for a long time, as a peace- 
loving monarch. It is difiicult to explain how such 
a very serious error could have arisen. Shortly 
after his accession in 1888, WiUiam II. was secretly 
hatching that plot which so recently has caused 
the European conflagration, and subsequently, by 
his pubhc utterances, he has clearly showed his 
Pangerman tendencies. 

On August 28th, 1898, in reply to the Burgo- 
master^ of Mayence's speech, the Kaiser declared 
that his wish was to keep inviolate the heritage 
bequeathed by his "immortal grandfather." ''But," 



6 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

added William, "I can only reach that goal if our 
authority firmly keeps sway over our neighbours. 
For this object the unity and the co-operation of 
every German tribe is required." On the 4th 
October, 1900, William II., on laying the founda- 
tion stone of the Roman Museum of Saalburg, 
again said: 

''May our German Fatherland become in the 
future as strongly united, as powerful, as wonderful 
as was the Roman universal empire; may this 
end be attained by the united co-operation of 
our princes, of our peoples, of our armies and of 
our citizens, in order that in the times to come it 
may be said of us as it used to be said of yore: 
Civis Romanus sum." 

On the 28th October, 1900, speaking at an 
officers' mess, William II. affirmed: ''My highest 
aim is to remove whatever separates our great 
German people." Now, in September, 1900, at 
Stettin, the Kaiser had just declared: "I have 
no fear of the future. I am convinced that my 
plan will prove successful." In the Kaiser's mind 
the whole matter was summed up in the chief 
formula of Pangerman domination: From Ham-^ 
burg to the Persian Gulf. To accomplish this ob- 
ject the Kaiser had decided to forge closer and 
still closer links between Austria-Hungary and 
Germany. In order to consolidate his supremacy 
over the Balkan peoples he reckoned on the co- 
operation of such of their Kings as were Germanic 
by origin (Bulgaria and Roumania), or on others 
who were strongly influenced by Germany — in 
reality by himself. 

Thus he arranged the marriage of his own sister, 
Sophia, in 1889, with the heir of the Thrdne of 
Greece, King Constantine of to-day. Finally, al- 
most immediately after his accession he had begun 
to think of showering his Imperial favours on the 



PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM 11. 7 

Turks and the Musulmans; this was with the 
object of seizing the Ottoman Empire, later on, and 
of making use of the Mahometans of the whole 
world as a mighty lever against all other powers. 

On November 8th, 1898, at Damascus, William 
II. pronounced the famous words, the full sig- 
nificance of which is only made clear now that we 
have seen the German action develop in Turkey and 
Persia, and that we have learnt about William's 
endeavours to cause an agitation among the 
Musulmans of Egypt, India and China: 

"May His Majesty the Sultan, as well as the 
three hundred millions of Musulmans who venerate 
him as their Khalifa, be assured that the German 
Emperor is their friend for ever." 

The adulation of the sanguinary Sultan Abdul- 
Hamid proved of practical use to WilHam II. He 
obtained on the 27th November, 1899, the first 
concession of the Bagdad railway; now that rail- 
way, although still unfinished, has just been 
utilized by the German offensive both against 
Russia and England. 

All over his Empire William II. had encouraged 
the formation of military and naval leagues — 
which number millions of members who, for the 
last twenty years have carried on an incessant 
propaganda in favour of such German armaments 
by land and sea — as were wanted by the Kaiser. 

Again, William II. encouraged the creation of the 
Alldeutscher Verband. This association or Pangerman 
Union, counts among its members a large number 
of important and influential persons, and at 
the door of this society must be laid the most 
overwhelming responsibility for the outbreak of 
the war. Founded in 1894, it has organized 
thousands of lectures besides scattering broad- 
cast millions of pamphlets to spread Pangerman 
notions and to get the masses of the people to 



8 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

favour schemes of aggrandizement. It was due to 
the Alldeutscher Verband that all the Germans 
living outside the Empire were formed into a 
systematic organization for the present war; this 
being specially the case in Austria and in the 
United States. 

Is it possible to believe that such an autocrat 
as William II. had not desired this end? How 
could three powerful associations, with ever-growing 
means of action, have carried on a most costly, as 
well as a most violent propaganda, in a police- 
ridden country like Germany, unless they had been 
approved of by the authorities usually so meddle- 
some or so vigilant? 

* 
* * 

As to the hour of the war, who set the clock 
going, if it were not the Kaiser? As a matter of 
fact he put the hands of the dial forward (see 
Chapter II). 

From November, 1913, onward, the Kaiser was 
busy preparing for early hostilities; he was aware 
that the enlargement of the Kiel Canal would be 
complete by July, 19 14 — therefore he arranged to be 
ready by that date, and as we know war was 
declared on August ist, i.e., a few days after the 
completion of the Kiel Canal. The Arch-Duke 
Francis-Ferdinand, the heir to the Austria-Hun- 
garian throne, tempted by the Kaiser, is dazzled by 
the mirage of great profits which were to accrue 
from a joint action of the Central Powers. In 
April, 1914, the Kaiser goes on a visit to the Arch- 
duke at Miramar, near Trieste. Again he meets 
him at Konopischt in June, 1914, and is then 
accompanied by von Tirpitz, that notorious- Chief 
of Pirates, that submarine Corsair. Now comes 
the right moment for drafting the bold main lines 
of the combined action of the German and Austrian 



PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM 11. 9 

forces by land and sea. The murder of the Arch- 
Duke Ferdinand, on June 28th, 1914, made no 
change in the Kaiser's plans, it merely precipitated 
events by furnishing an excellent pretext for 
intervention against Serbia. Thus the criminal 
action of the Kaiser stands revealed; for twenty- 
five years he had been elaborating the Pangerman 
plan. 

According to Baron de Beyens, who before the 
war was Belgian Minister at Berlin, ''it has been 
maintained that William II. was an unconscious 
tool in the hands of a caste and of a party who 
needed war in order to assert their own power. 
William has, indeed, listened to them, but he has 
lent them an ear because their designs chimed in 
with his own. In the judgment of history it is he 
who is doomed to bear the responsibility for the 
disasters by which Europe has been overwhelmed" 
(Baron Beyens, U Allemagne avant la guerre, p. 41, 
G. Van Oest, Paris). 



For twenty-five years, and by order of the Kaiser, 
a violent Pangerman propaganda had been carried 
on throughout the Empire; therefore, let there be no 
mistake, William II., in declaring war, was sup- 
ported in his decision, not only by the influential 
circles of German opinion, but by the large majority 
of the German people. A very notorious German, 
Maximilian Harden, has explicitly acknowledged 
this fact in his review Zukunft of November, 19 14: 

"This war has not been forced on us by surprise; 
we have desired it, and it was our bounden duty 
thus to desire it. Germany wages war because of 
her immutable conviction that greater world ex- 
pansion and freer outlets are due to her by right 
of her own works" (quoted by Le Temps, 20th 
November, 19 14). 



lo PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Having thus formed and perfected for twenty 
years the Pangerman plot of a European conflagra- 
tion, William II. had the prodigious audacity to 
declare, in his Manifesto to the German people 
(August I St, 191 5), after drenching Europe with 
streams of blood for a whole year: "Before God 
and before History, I swear that my conscience is 
clear. I did not desire war." 



CHAPTER I. 

THE PANGEEMAN PLAN. 

I. The Pangerman plan of 191 1. 
II. The stages by which it has been effected. 
III. Why it has been ignored. 

The Pangerman plot in its broad outlines was 
laid as early as 1895, but since that date events 
have happened throughout the world, which en- 
couraged Pangermans to enlarge the structure of 
their scheme. 

In 1898 the Fashoda incident almost caused a 
breach between France and England. In 1905 
Japan compelled Russia to sign peace after a long 
war which exhausted all the Tsar's military 
resources and disturbed the balance of power in 
Europe for a long time to the advantage of Ger- 
many. In 1909 the Vienna Government, under 
cover of the veiled ultimatum which Berlin sent to 
the Tsar, carried out the annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, countries which are almost entirely 
peopled by Serbians. This seizure of a huge Slav 
territory was a great triumph for Germanism. On 
November 3rd, 1910, at the Potsdam meeting, the 
Kaiser obtained from the Tsar's Government the 
abandonment of all opposition to the completion 
of the Bagdad railway. England and France took 
up the same attitude. On July ist, 191 1, the 
Kaiser ventured on the Agadir episode, which was 
clearly an attempt to force a quarrel on France. It 
led to the Franco- German treaty of November 4th, 



12 



PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 



1911, which ceded to Germany 275,000 square 
kilometres of the French Congo, while at the same 
time the commerce of Morocco was heavily mort- 
gaged in favour of Germany. 

These various events deeply injured the interests 
of France, England and Russia; but these powers 
preferred to submit to the hardest sacrifices rather 
than undertake the dreadful responsibility of 
letting loose a fearful war on Europe. The Pan- 
germans misread this attitude as a sign of weakness, 
and of a desire to keep the peace at all costs; and 
accordingly they were encouraged to entertain high 
hopes of huge success in a near future. That is why 
the original Pangerman plan of 1895, considerably 
altered, became the perfected plan of 191 1. 





Balro 


grad 


s 

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> — s ^ 


^4, ■-.^Ofc^^ '^ ^^^"""^p"* ■'■'A 




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-^ \ — -—^ }^^r-S^^^ 

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'^--;t:^v^ V£=^ 




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V-p- 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN OF 1911. 



This plan of 191 1 {see map) provided in Europe 
and in Western Asia: 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 



13 



1°. The establishment, under German rule, of a 
vast Confederation of Central Europe, comprising: 





Square 
Kilometres. 


Inhabitants. 


In the West: 

HoUand 

Belgium 

Luxemburg 

Switzerland* 
The Departments of the North of 
France to the N.E. of a line drawn 
from the S. of Belfort to the 
mouth of the Somme . . about 

Total 

To the East: 
Russian Poland 
Baltic Provinces, Esthonia, 

Livonia, Courland 
The three Russian Governments 

of Kovno, Vilna, Grodno 

Total 

To the South-East: 
Austria-Hungaryt 


38,141 

29,451 

2,586 

41,324 
50,271 


6,114,000 

7,500,000 

260,000 

3,800,000 

5,768,000 


161,773 


23,442,000 


127,320 

94,564 
121,840 


12,467,000 
2,686,000 
5,728,000 


343,724 


20,881,000 


676,616 


50,000,000 


These three groups form a grand total of 1,182,113 Square 
Kilometres and 94,323,000 inhabitants. 



This confederation was thus to group under German 
supremacy 

Square 

Kilometres. Inhabitants. 

Actual German Empire . . . . 540,858 68,000,000 

New territories of the Confederation 1,182,113 94,000,000 



Total 



1,722,971 162,000,000 



of whom only 77 millions are Germans and 85 
millions non- Germans. 

* Minus eventually the French and Italian Cantons which the Pangermans declare 
that they do not care to annex. 

t Minus the Italian regions of the Trentino, which Berlin decided to cede (at the ex- 
pense of Austria) to Italy as the price of her neutrality. 



14 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

2°. The absolute subordination of the Balkan 
countries (containing 499,275 square kilometres and 
22 millions of non- Germans) to the Great Central 
European Confederation. The Balkan States to 
become mere satellites of Berlin. 

3°. Germany's political and military seizure of 
Turkey, which was afterwards to be enlarged by the 
annexation of Egypt and Persia. It was provided 
that Turkey should be dealt with in two successive 
stages. During the first, the handful of "Young 
Turks" who have ruled the Ottoman Empire since 
1908, and who play the German game, were to 
remain in power merely as figure-heads. Turkey 
was to retain a nominal independence during this 
phase, though in reality she was to have been tied 
to Germany by a treaty of military alliance. Under 
pretence of effecting reforms, numerous German 
officials were to be placed at the head of all the 
Ottoman administrations, and that would have 
paved the way for the second stage. The latter 
had for its aim the putting of Turkey, with her 
1,792,000 square kilometres and her 20 millions of 
non- German inhabitants, under the strict protec- 
torate of Germany, to say nothing of the subject 
provinces, Egypt and Persia. 



The Germanic Confederation of Central Europe 
was to form a huge Zollverein or Customs Union. 
Treaties of Commerce of a special character im- 
posed on the Balkan States and on subjected 
Turkey would have provided for Great Germany 
an economic outlet and reserved for her exclusively 
those vast regions. 

Finally, we can sum up the Pangerman plan of 
191 1 in four formulas: 

Berlin — Calais ; Berlin — Riga ; Hamburg — 
Salonika ; Hamburg — Persian Gulf. 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 15 

The union of the three groupings — Central Europe, 
Balkan States and Turkey — would have placed 
under the predominating influence of Berlin 4,015,146 
square kilometres and 204 millions of inhabitants, 
of whom 127 millions were to be ruled directly or 
indirectly by merely 77 millions of Germans. 

This continental Pangerman plan of 191 1 was to 
have been completed by colonial conquests of great 
magnitude, of which an account is given at the end 
of Chapter V. 

William II. was well aware that such a project 
could only become an enduring reality if all other 
great powers disappeared from the face of the earth. 
The Kaiser had therefore positively resolved, when 
hatching his Pangerman plot, to accomplish the 
destruction of five great powers. It is necessary 
to grasp fully this fundamental truth, if we wish 
to understand the nature of the present war. It 
was foreseen that Austria-Hungary would disappear 
by her absorption under cover of entrance into the 
German ZoUverein. France and Russia were to 
have been totally ruined by means of a furious 
preventive war which would entirely destroy their 
military forces. England was to be put out of 
action by a subsequent operation, which would 
have been an easy matter when once France and 
Russia had been dismembered and reduced to utter 
impotence. As to Italy — destined to become a 
vassal state — she was not considered as being 
capable of hindering in the least the Pangerman 
ambitions. One of the Kaiser's agents for prop- 
agating this scheme wrote in 1900 : ''Italy cannot 
be looked upon as a rival for she is too incompetent 
in warfare " (Deutschland hei Beginn des 20 Jahr- 
hunderts, p. 53. Military publishers, R. Felix, 
Berlin^ 1900). 

It must be added that the Pangerman plot of 
191 1 did not include war with England. When he 



i6 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

declared hostilities in August, 19 14, William II. 
was convinced that England would take no share 
in them, at least not immediately. The Kaiser 
had laid every conceivable kind of trap to add 
fuel to the flames of all internal English disturb- 
ances and to deceive the London Cabinet. At one 
moment he almost succeeded in his endeavours. 
England's decision to participate without delay in 
the struggle only hung by a thread, but that thread 
was broken. If England had tarried, if she had 
tarried only for a few days, German landings in 
Normandy, Brittany, and as far as Bordeaux would 
have been effected. France being thus rendered 
quickly powerless on all sides, the English inter- 
vention would have proved futile at a later stage, 
and the Pangerman plan of 191 1 would thus have 
been fully achieved. But in going to war just at 
the right moment and in controlKng the sea. Great 
Britain has, while saving herself, furnished to 
civilized humanity the means of avoiding the Prus- 
sian yoke. The initial German plan has truly been 
upset by English intervention following on the 
respite gained by the splendid resistance of Belgium 
in arms. 

But the Germans are clever, they are stubborn 
and crafty. Adapting themselves to new condi- 
tions thrust on them^ the}^ are still endeavouring to 
make an enormous profit out of the war. We must, 
therefore, try to understand what operations they 
have devised for carrying out, even now, the Pan- 
german plot almost in its entirety. 

II. 

As it is necessary to open the eyes of neutrals, 
many of whom have been misled by the German 
propaganda, we must try to expose very clearly the 
inner workings of the Pangerman plot as it is 
revealed to us in the searchlight of facts. 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 17 

From 1892 down to the outbreak of the War, 
that is to say, for twenty-two years, the Pangerman 
movement has developed with ever growing in- 
tensity ; a multitude of publications, giving full 
details of the plan, were scattered among the Ger- 
man people, in order to excite in them the greed 
of conquest and so prepare them for the struggle 
through the allurement of plunder. Of these pub- 
lications two are of special importance: first, the 
pamphlet published under the auspices of the 
Alldeutscher Verband : namely, Grossdeutschland 
und Miiteleuropa um das Jahr 1950 (Thormann 
und Goetsch, Berlin, 1895), which gives the Pan- 
german plan of 1895 : second, the book of Otto 
Richard Tannenberg : Grossdeutschland, die Arbeit 
des 2oten Jakrhundcrts (Bruno Volger, Leipzig- 
Gohhs, 191 1), which gives all suitable details 
of the plan of 1911. 

Unfortunately, although this Pangerman litera- 
ture is very considerable, full of documentary 
evidence and spread broadcast among the masses 
by most powerful associations, whose patrons are 
the highest authorities in the land, few people out- 
side of Germany would beheve in its extreme im- 
portance. But now the facts speak for themselves. 
The reality, the extent, and the successive stages 
of the Pangerman plan of 191 1 are shown by: 

1°. The course which Germany has taken since 
August ist, 1 9 14, in her political and military 
operations which have for their object not, as many 
have supposed, the obtaining of securities, but the 
annexation of territories in the manner set forth in 
Tannenberg's book, and more or less in accordance 
with the plan of 191 1. 

2°. The memorial delivered on May 20th, 
1915, to the German Chancellor by the League of 
Agriculturists, the League of German Peasants, 
the Provisional Association of Christian German 



i8 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Peasants, now called the Westphalian Peasants' 
Association, the Central German Manufacturers' 
Union, the League of Manufacturers, and the 
Middle-Class Union of the Empire {see Le Temps, 
i2th August, 1915). The importance of this docu- 
ment cannot be overrated, for it is issued by the 
most powerful associations of the Empire, including 
all the influential elements of the German nation, 
specially the agrarians and the iniquitous Prussian 
squires. Now the purport of that memorial, as will 
be shown, is to demand all such annexations men- 
tioned in the Pangerman plan of 191 1, as the 
development of military operations has so far 
rendered feasible. Any one who knows Germany 
can hardly doubt that this memorial was not 
handed in to Bethmann-Hollweg without a 
previous understanding with him. Doubtless it 
was intended that this document should seem to 
exercise an overmastering pressure of public opinion 
on William II.'s government. But if the ideas ex- 
pressed in this memorial reflect, as they certainly 
do, the wishes of influential German circles, it is 
also unquestionable that they correspond very 
closely to the scheme of aggrandizement, which 
William 11. has been nursing for over twenty 
years. 

3°. The declarations made at the sitting of the 
Reichstag of the nth December, 191 5, prove the 
exactitude of this statement. The Imperial Chan- 
cellor said: 

"' If our enemies will not submit now, they will 
be obliged to do so later on. . . When our enemies 
shall offer us such peace proposals as are compatible 
with the dignity and security of Germany we shall 
be ready to discuss them. . . But our enemies must 
understand that the more unrelentingly they wage 
war, the higher will be the guarantees exacted." 

Bethmann-Hollweg could hardly have spoken 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 19 

more explicitly, but his diplomatic game was 
naturally to unmask Germany's enormous preten- 
sions only bit by bit, in order that the eyes of 
neutrals should not be opened to the Pangerman 
monster in all its horror until the last moment. But 
hardly had the Chancellor finished his speech than 
the Deputy Spahn explained the real drift of it 
with great precision: 

*'We await," said Herr Spahn, ''the hour which 
will allow of peace negotiations which will safe- 
guard in a permanent way and by all means, 
including the needful territorial annexations, all 
military economic and political interests of Ger- 
many in its total extent." 

The thundering applause which greeted these 
words proves that they echoed the sentiments of 
the overwhelming majority of the German deputies, 
who at that moment still believed that it was 
possible for Germany to achieve enormous annexa- 
tions. 

III. 

The preparation of the Pangerman plan has 
required for over twenty years a huge propaganda 
among the German masses as well as a world-wide 
organization. How is it that this plan has been 
ignored in its nature and in its extent by the 
diplomats of France, England and Russia? Such, 
however, has been the case, for otherwise the war 
could not have come upon these three powers as a 
surprise. We deal here with a matter which at 
first sight seems improbable and which, therefore, 
needs explanation. 

The diplomatic agents of the Allies are certainly 
not inferior personally to those of William II., but 
the Kaiser's foreign service, as a whole, includes 
novel instruments of observation and influence 



20 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

by which, for the last twenty years, the Govern- 
ment of Berlin has seconded its official diplo- 
macy without allowing the connexion between it 
and them to transpire. None of the Allied 
countries have employed similar instruments, the 
result being that the Entente is considerably 
inferior in this department of foreign policy. 



The Pangerman plan is founded on a very exact 
knowledge of all political, ethnographical, economic, 
social, military and naval problems, not only of 
Europe, but of the whole world; the Germans have 
acquired that knowledge by means of an intense 
labour of over twenty-five years. But this task has 
not been performed by the official German diplomats; 
it has been carried out either by the members of the 
Alldeutscher Verband, the Pangerman Union, or 
by the agents of the German secret service, which 
has been enormously extended. These agents 
might be called connecting links between the 
regular spies and the official diplomats; Baron von 
Schenk, who worked at Athens from 1915-1916, is a 
sample of that category of agents who have studied 
methodically all the root questions of the Pangerman 
plan, who have prepared means to delude the 
minds of neutrals, to paralyze the revolt of the 
Slavs in Austria-Hungary, to corrupt all such 
neutral individuals or neutral newspapers as were 
susceptible of corruption, etc. After these numer- 
ous agents had made their reports, and when once 
these had been examined and summarized, they 
were sent to the Wilhelmstrasse, to the great 
German General Staff, whose concerted operations 
are always so combined as to answer both to political 
and to military needs. At the same time the re- 
ports reached William II.'s private study, and his 
brain was thus able to store up all technical means 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 21 

necessary for the achievement of his plan of 
domination. 

Was the diplomatic corps of the Allies so well 
served that it could grasp in its universal signifi- 
cance the immense work of preparation accom- 
plished by the secret Pangerman agents? Indeed, 
they were not properly supplied with the right 
tools for such a task, and we shall see why it was so. 

First of all it is necessary to dispel a false notion 
which "the man in the street" has of diplomacy. 
He fondly thinks that diplomats, while preparing 
clever and mysterious combinations, fashion His- 
tory. Now the experience of centuries shows that 
as a general rule diplomats merely chronicle 
History but do not make it. My teacher, Albert 
Sorel, neatly expressed that truth by saying: 
"Diplomats are History's attorneys." In fact, the 
diplomacy of any country helps to prepare and to 
fashion history only when there happens to be at 
its head a great man of large and just ideas, who 
knows how to apply these ideas by all the means 
available in his time. 

It is a strange fact and worthy of notice, that 
such a great man is rarely, if ever, a professional 
diplomat. For example, Richelieu, Napoleon, 
Palmerston, Disraeli, Cavour, Bismarck, who all 
prepared and fashioned History, were not trained 
diplomatists. Unfortunately, it does not seem that 
Fortune has endowed any of our Allied countries, 
either before or since the war, with a head capable 
of leading, on grand lines, the diplomatic affairs of 
the Entente. The latter therefore has been only 
served by those diplomats who are mere officials, 
and who as such await instructions from higher 
quarters, and these instructions are very often 
found wanting. 

Besides, the diplomacy of the Allies, not being 
seconded, like that of Germany, by novel means of 



22 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

observation, can only obtain the information it 
needs by methods still so old-fashioned that they 
are almost identical with those used a century ago. 
They are totally inadequate to point out the 
sequence of ideas or the rapid development of 
events which in Central Europe and the Balkans 
have been, as will be seen, the immediate causes 
of the war; nor are the means employed by our 
diplomats at all sufficient if they wish to recognize 
what forms the whole chain of the Pangerman 
organization. Just because this organization is 
huge, just because it is so complex, its total im- 
portance cannot be properly gauged unless the 
connecting links between the varied elements are 
clearly perceived. 

The typical professional diplomat lives in a 
world of his own. Either his information comes 
from the office or it is second-hand; it rarely is 
reached by direct observation of people or facts. 
The secretaries at the Embassies divide their time 
between office work, copying documents in copper 
plate hand, or social functions, pleasant enough 
but confined to a particular and narrow set. Few 
of the secretaries know the language of the country 
in which they reside, fewer still travel in the 
interior of the land in order to study it. 

The events which have led to the European 
conflagration spring from two main causes: the 
stupendous scope of the German ambitions and the 
progress of the Austro-Hungarian and Balkan 
nationalities. Now both these factors have been 
revealed on many occasions, by purely local events 
which, to a keen observer, would have betrayed 
most significantly the end in view, but they have 
occurred for the most part in places far removed 
from capital cities, and to appreciate fully their 
importance would have needed direct observation 
on the spot. 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 23 

This is quite contrary to the tradition followed by 
official diplomats. Those of the Entente had not, 
at their disposal, agents who could go and, for 
instance, hear the numerous lectures given by the 
Pangerman propaganda, and who could have pro- 
cured and translated for them the illuminating 
pamphlets of the Alldeutscher Verhand. Also they 
had no means of getting into personal touch with 
the party leaders, either Slav or Latin, of Austria- 
Hungary; often these leaders were men without a 
place in parliament, frequently without fortune or 
social rank; all they had was their national ideal, 
their strength of conviction, but they were real 
and novel forces, for they acted on the popular 
masses with whom they were in complete intellec- 
tual sympathy. 

As the diplomatic corps of the Entente was not 
provided with that indispensable aid — an organiza- 
tion of secondary agents of observation — they have 
been reduced to accept information of a superficial 
and incomplete nature. Often it was merely 
provided by press cuttings and even those were 
frequently from papers written in a tongue which 
the diplomats could not read; at best these cuttings 
were without any connecting link and quite in- 
sufficient to warn them of the approach of a great 
peril. We must add that in diplomatic circles of 
all periods — unless they are led by some eminent 
man — there are certain formulas current, such as: 
"No fuss," "it is necessary to wait and see," 
"we must not believe that it has happened," 
which have had a baneful influence. The result 
has been a sceptical attitude which in diplomatical 
circles passes for essential and in good taste. If we 
add to this frame of mind the absence of varied, 
direct and coherent information, we can understand 
how it was that before the war, when any one tried 
to persuade a professional diplomatist that William 



24 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

II.'s political aim was nothing short of the estab- 
lishment of German supremacy over the whole 
world, he was soon set down as a visionary with a 
head stuffed full of groundless suspicions. 

Finally, we must realize that the system by which 
a diplomat is sent from pillar to post, often to the 
antipodes, every four or five years, is not conducive 
to the acquirement of a general and exact know- 
ledge, founded on documentary evidence, of events 
still in progress, in a wide zone, so complex and so 
difficult to study as Central Europe and the Balkans. 

These various considerations help us to under- 
stand why, during the twenty-five years which 
preceded the war, no diplomat of the Allies has 
been able to grasp the total Pangerman plan in its 
nature and in its extent, though possibly a few of 
them may have indicated in their reports now and 
then some local Pangerman act which aroused 
suspicion. These considerations explain also, at 
least in part, the failure of the diplomatic corps 
of the Entente in the Balkans. 



To sum up, allied official diplomats are not 
personally inferior to German official diplomats, but 
the latter have an enormous advantage over their 
colleagues of the Entente in knowing the general 
plan of the Berlin policy, in knowing, each in his 
own post, in what direction to proceed and what 
must be done or prevented in order to attain the final 
end. During the last twenty-five years the Kaiser's 
foreign policy has been constructive and framed on 
a definite plan, while the diplomats of the Allies, 
reflecting the policy of their Governments without 
concrete plans, have been hampered, because they 
believed obstinately in Peace, in a vague and stag- 
nant defensive. 

On the other hand, the allied diplomacy, regarded 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 25 

as an instrument of observation, confined to old- 
fashioned methods, is like an ordinary magnifying 
glass which shows nothing but the largest objects. 
On the contrary, the German foreign policy, thanks 
to the new, busy and secret organs, by which the 
German diplomacy has been seconded, may be com- 
pared to a workshop provided with powerful micro- 
scopes by which facts can be studied not only in 
their general aspect, but also in their most minute 
details, details which often are not without their 
importance. 

Finally, the allied diplomacy, regarded as an 
instrument of action, still clinging to antiquated 
traditional methods, may be compared to an army 
which possesses only field guns, while the foreign 
diplomacy of Germany, in its totality, is comparable 
to an army equipped both with heavy and with 
field artillery. 



CHAPTER IL 

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 

I. Why the Treaty of Bukarest suddenly raised a fonnidable 

obstacle to the Pangerman plan. 

II. How it was that the internal state of Austria-Hungary 

drove Germany to let loose the dogs of war. 
III. General view of the causes of the war. 

Although the Pangerman plan is unquestionably 
the chief ultimate cause of the war, yet when 
William II. started it in August, 19 14, he did so for 
nearer and for secondary reasons which we must 
examine carefully if we wish to have a clear view 
of events. 



Up to 191 1, when Tannenberg published the 
programme of annexations, all previous great 
events had favoured William II. 's aims; but from 
191 2 onward events suddenly raised very serious 
and quite unexpected obstacles to the execution of 
the Pangerman plan. 

In 191 2, Italy conquered Libya at the cost of 
Turkey and against the will and pleasure of Berlin. 
Again in 191 2 Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and 
Bulgaria became united against the Ottoman 
Empire; this also was contrary to the will and 
pleasure of Berlin. What was quite unexpected 
by the Kaiser's Staff was the victory of the Balkan 
peoples over the Turks. As Germany had upheld 
the latter she felt profoundly humiliated. Then, 
in order to hinder the foundation of an efficient 
Balkanic Confederation — that is, one constituted 

26 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 27 

on the principle of a fair balance — Vienna, and 
above all, Berlin, used as their tool the Tsar Ferdi- 
nand's well-known ambition to establish Bulgarian 
supremacy in the peninsula. Accordingly insti- 
gated by the Germanic powers, the Bulgarians in 
June, 1913, attacked their allies, the Serbians and 
Greeks. But once more the Kaiser's calculations 
were upset. Roumania, escaping for the first 
time from German leading strings, intervened 
against Bulgaria, which was struggling with her 
former allies, and thus Bulgaria was vanquished. 
Now, the new condition of things which arose from 
the Bukarest treaty of August loth, 1913, suddenly 
formed a formidable obstacle to the Pangerman 
scheme in the East, and this is the reason: 

The treaty of Bukarest created in the peninsula 
two groups of states sharply opposed to each other. 
The first was formed of the beaten and sullen 
participants in the Balkan wars, Bulgaria and 
Turkey. The second group was composed of those 
peoples who had benefited by the wars and were 
satisfied with the result, to wit, Roumania, Serbia, 
Montenegro and Greece. These four last states, 
seeing that their vital interests had become closely 
bound together by the territorial annexations 
made at the cost of the common enemy, had joined 
all their forces to insure the maintenance of the 
Bukarest treaty which they considered inviolable. 

On the other hand, this sharp division of the 
Balkan States into two groups whose interests were 
diametrically opposed, reacted deeply on general 
European politics. The force of events led the 
conquered states of 19 12 and 1913, Turkey and 
Bulgaria, to support Germanism in the Balkans; 
on the contrary, Roumania, as well as Serbia, 
Montenegro and Greece, because of their recent 
acquisitions, were leaning more and more towards 
the Triple Entente, quite contrary to the views of 



28 



PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 



Berlin and at the cost of Turkey, which even then 
was bound hand and foot to Germany. 




THE ANTIGERMANIC BARRIER IN THE BALKANS AFTER THE 
.TREATY OF BUKAREST (10th August, 1913). 

Previous to the Balkan wars the Triple Entente 
enjoyed an influence in the peninsula, vastly 
inferior to that of Germany; after the treaty of 
Bukarest, however, the Entente found support 
in that group of states which was most powerfully 
organized and which presented (see map) a very 
solid barrier to the accomplishment of Pangerman 
designs in the East. 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 



29 



This new order of things lashed Berlin into a fury 
which though outwardly restrained was none the 
less intense because the only group (Turkey and 
Bulgaria) which was still under German influence, 
was bound to remain for a very long time to come 
practically impotent and powerless to make singly 
any attempt against the other group which favoured 
the Entente. 

Indeed, Turkey, which in her defeats had lost 
almost the whole of her military stores, could 
hardly, at the beginning of 1914, put 250,000 men 
under arms. Her financial difficulties were such 
that, if left to her own resources, it would have 
taken her many years to replace her military power 
on a solid basis. 

Bulgaria was in a similar financial predicament. 
Besides, if she had taken action it would have been 
at great risk to herself, in as much as those states 
which profited by the Bukarest Treaty (Roumania, 
Serbia and Greece), surrounding as they do (see the 
arrows of the map) Bulgaria on three sides, could 
then have delivered a concentric attack on Sofia. 

Finally, great was the disproportion of men 
eligible for the army or capable of bearing arms 
between the two groups. 



Germanophile Group. 
Turkey . . . . 250,000 

Bulgaria . . . . 550,000 



800,000 



Group of the Entente. 



Greece 
Serbia 
Montenegro 
Roumania . 



400,000 

400,000 

50,000 

600,000 

1,450,000 



These figures, taken in conjunction with the 
geographical situation, show clearly that, left to its 
own resources, the Germanophile group could 
attempt no attack on the Entente group. 



30 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

The new balance of military forces in the Balkans 
which was the outcome of the Bukarest treaty, 
therefore reduced almost to naught Germany's 
power of intrigue in the Peninsula. 

Had peace reigned for a few years, the new 
Balkan situation would have been consolidated 
and the obstacle to Pangerman ambition in the 
East would have been still more serious. It was 
for these varied reasons that Berlin decided to 
intervene directly. Without doubt Serbia was 
the pivot on which turned the new Balkanic 
equilibrium. It was therefore decided to destroy 
her without delay, kindling at the same time the 
European conflagration, and thus by one single 
blow to accomplish the plan of 191 1. 

The Bukarest treaty was signed on the tenth of 

August, 1913. On November 6th, 1913, King 

Albert of Belgium was at Potsdam, and the Kaiser 

said to him that in his opinion war with France 

was near and unavoidable (see Baron Beyen's 

L'Allemagne avant la Guerre, p. 24). 

* 
* * 

From this survey it follows that, if the treaty of 
Bukarest, through its consequences, proved dis- 
astrous to the Pangerman aims, it was, on the 
contrary, extremely advantageous to the powers of 
the Triple Entente, for it brought to their side the 
majority of the Balkanic forces. 

Unfortunately the diplomacy of the Entente 
had not even a notion how favourable the situation 
was to them. This ignorance was due to the old- 
fashioned methods of observation still used by 
diplomats which prevented them from believing 
in the Pangerman scheme, and which also hindered 
them from entertaining general and correct viiews of 
the varied problems which form such a tangle in 
that large territorial zone. Indeed, though one of 
the immediate causes of the war was Germany's 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 31 

wish to upset the Bukarest treaty, because the 
consequences of that treaty ruined the Pangerman 
aims in the East, the Triple Entente powers were 
no sooner at war with Germany than they did all 
in their power during ten months to cancel in like 
manner the consequences of the Bukarest treaty; 
for that was in fact the result of the Entente's 
ingenuous wish to satisfy Bulgaria at all costs. 
Theoretically, the attempt inspired by the noble 
thought of avoiding the horrors of war in the 
Balkans, was just, but in practice it was an im- 
possibility owing to the fierce hatred the Bulgarians 
entertain towards their conquerors of 1913, and 
above all towards the Serbians. 

What is certain is that the diplomacy of the 
Allies, during the first year of war, followed such a 
policy in the Balkans that, evidently without 
knowing it, they played entirely into the hands of 
Berlin. 

II. 

Not only were the consequences of the Bukarest 
treaty disastrous to Pangerman ambitions in the 
Balkan peninsula, they also, to the boundless fury 
of William II., considerably accelerated that inter- 
nal political evolution of Austria-Hungary which 
of itself had already threatened to upset all his 
plans. 

Unfortunately the notions held about Austria- 
Hungary in France, and above all, in England, have 
far too long been of a very vague nature. Public 
opinion in France and England was totally unable 
to grasp the situation, when war broke out. It was 
incapable of seeing the important part played 
during the war, and to be played after the war, by 
the populations living in the Hapsburg Monarchy. 
The vast majority of these peoples devoutly pray 
for the victory of the Triple Entente, for they only 



32 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

fight against it because they are forcibly constrained 
to do so. At heart they look to the victory of the 
Allies for deliverance from a hateful yoke which has 
weighed on them heavily for centuries. That is 
why it is of the utmost importance to educate public 
opinion in the allied countries as to the actual racial 
facts in Austria-Hungary. Then it will be clearly 



HORD 



V///A Tcheques et Shvaqucs 

Serbo . Creates 
li'i!:;:'! Slovenes 

Polonsis 

Ruthe/ies 

Roumams 

Italiens 




THE NATIONALITIES IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 



understood of what abominable treason Francis 
Joseph was guilty against his peoples; then it 
will be clearly understood also that as these peoples 
were more and more inclined, before the war, to lean 
to the side of France and England, quite as much 
as to that of Russia, William 11. had a strong 
additional motive for precipitating hostilities. 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 



33 



The nine different nationalities who live in the 
Hapsburg Monarchy can be divided into four races: 



Germanic. 




Magyar. 


Germans 


12,000,000 


Magyars . . . . 10,000,000 
(peculiar race of 
Asiatic origin) 


Latin. 




Slav. 


Italians 


1,000,000 


Czecks and 


Rovimanian 


3,000,000 


Slovak . . 8,500,000 

J Poles . . . . 5,000,000 

1 Ruthenes . . 3,500,000 

Slovenes . . 1,000,000 

Serbo-Croats . . 6,000,000 


4,000,000 


24,000,000 



In a political sense the Germans and Magyars, 
forming a total of 22 millions, have agreed since 
1867 to exercise and maintain for their own profit 
the supremacy over the Slavs and Latins, although 
these latter form the majority of the subjects of 
the Monarchy, since they constitute a group of 
28 million inhabitants. 

Now, it is needful to note and it is important to 
remember, that the figures which I quote, are in- 
correct, because they are those furnished by the 
Government statistics at Vienna and at Budapest 
by German and Magyar officials. These have their 
instructions to use various artful tricks for falsifying 
systematically the true statistics in favour of their 
own races, in order to contribute by that stratagem 
to the maintenance, as long as possible, of the 
supremacy held by the Germans and the Magyars. 
In truth, there are in Austria-Hungary far less 
than 22 million Germans and Magyars, and far more 
than 28 Slavs and Latins. What again is certain, 
is that for centuries the Slavs and Latins have been 
oppressed in Austria-Hungary in the most odious 
fashion by a feudal aristocracy, who engross enor- 



34 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

mous landed properties, and who exercise in the 
Hapsburg Monarchy as baneful a social influence 
as that of the Junkers in Prussia. 

With the exception of the Polish aristocracy of 
Galicia and a small group of Ruthenes, who since 
1867 joined hands with the Germans, all these Slavs 
and Latins have been endeavouring to the very 
utmost, especially for the last thirty years, to obtain, 
in accordance with modern justice, such political 
rights as are proportionate to their numbers. In 
that way they hope to win for themselves in the 
Monarchy the legal majority that is their due, by 
reason of their being human flesh and blood liable 
to be taxed and to be called on for service at the 
will of the Government. 

These tendencies have long excited extreme 
alarm in William 11. and his Pangermans. This 
is readily understood, for, if the political power, in 
the Hapsburg Monarchy, were vested, as justice 
demands, in the Slavs and Latins, who hate 
Prussianism, that in itself would have been the 
ruin of the Kaiser's plan for the economic absorp- 
tion of Austria-Hungary. Yet this very absorption 
is indispensable to William II. if he is to carry 
out his inadmissible plans of exclusive influence 
in the Balkans and in the East. His game has 
therefore been, especially since 1890, to say, in the 
main, to Francis Joseph and to the Magyars: 
''Above all, do not concede the claims of your Slav 
and Latin subjects. Keep up absolutely the 
Germano-Magyar supremacy. I will uphold you, 
with all my power, in your struggle with the Slav- 
Latin elements." For a long time these tactics of 
the Kaiser were successful but they were on the 
point of breaking down a short time before the 
war. 

In spite of the most ingenious and cynical 
obstacles raised by the Germans and Magyars the 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR ss 

culture of the Slavs and Latins kept growing; their 
national organizations kept progressing; also they 
were much more prolific than their political rivals. 
All these conditions together gave Francis Joseph 
and his henchmen at Budapest increasing trouble 
in their efforts to resist the enlarged demands of 
their Latin and Slav subjects. Berlin had already 
become anxious on that score, when the mental 
effervescence stirred up among the Slavs and Latins 
of Austria-Hungary by the result of the Bukarest 
treaty suddenly changed for the worse the out- 
look of the Pangerman scheme. 

As a matter of fact, almost the whole of the 28 
million Slav and Latin subjects of the Hapsburgs 
had been roused to enthusiasm by the victories 
of the Slavs in the Balkans in 1912, and by the 
success of Roumania in 1913; for they saw, above 
all, in these events, the triumph of the principle of 
nationality, that is, their very own cause. Hence 
they became more than ever determined in their 
endeavours to obtain from Vienna and Budapest 
those political rights, proportionate to their number, 
which the Germano-Magyars persisted in refusing, 
although of late years that refusal had lost much 
of its energy. 

If peace had been maintained, the effect of the 
Bukarest treaty on Austria-Hungary would have 
lent irresistible force to the claims of the Slav and 
Latin subjects of Francis Joseph. On the other 
hand, Roumania, exulting in her annexation of the 
Bulgarian Dobrudja, cast longing eyes on Transyl- 
vania, and hoped to secure it at the expense of 
Hungary. The moment appeared opportune when 
a thorough transformation of the Hapsburg Mon- 
archy might be effected, and that transformation 
seemed relatively so near that Roumania already 
looked upon Transylvania as a ripe fruit which 
merely needed gathering. 



36 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

If this new order of things resulting from the 
treaty of Bukarest had been allowed to develop 
fully, the influence of Germanism would have been 
infallibly ruined in the Hapsburg Monarchy, just as 
had happened in the Balkans. Under the growing 
pressure of her Slav and Latin elements the partition, 
or at any rate, the evolution towards federation 
of Austria-Hungary would have become a necessity. 
This federalism would not have affected the frontiers 
of the Hapsburg Dominions, but it would neces- 
sarily, and without doubt, have given political pre- 
ponderance to the Slav and Latin elements, which 
were the most numerous and the most prolific. 
Now, those elements form an enormous majority, 
which was and is resolutely hostile to any alliance 
with Germany. Thus, progressively, the Hapsburg 
Monarchy in evolution would have become more 
and more independent of Berlin in regard to her 
foreign policy, and as it gradually shook itself free 
from its bondage to Berlin, it would, as a necessary 
consequence, have drawn closer and closer to 
Russia, France and England. Thus Germany 
would have been deprived of the artificial prop 
which she has found at Vienna and at Budapest 
ever since the days of Sadowa through the Germano- 
Magyar predominance. Finally, as a result of 
peaceful development, William II. would have been 
confronted by a state of things in Austria-Hungary 
which would have opposed a far more formidable 
barrier to his oriental ambitions, than that which 
was created in 1913 in the Balkans, as a consequence 
of the treaty of Bukarest. 

If we bear in mind the powerful and extra- 
ordinarily important series of after-effects which 
must have followed on the new situation produced 
by the treaty of Bukarest and its inevitable in- 
fluence on the 28 million Slavs and Latins of Austria- 
Hungary, we can readily understand that had 



,Cv 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 37 

the European peace been maintained, the chances 
of executing the Pangerman plan would have been 
totally and simultaneously ruined in Turkey, in 
the Balkans, and in Austria-Hungary; that is to 
say in the three territorial zones which, as will be 
seen from Chapter III, constituted by far the most 
important part of the regions mapped out for 
Pangerman operations in the plan of 191 1. 

Thus we see how the internal evolution of Austria- 
Hungary had reached a point at which, as the 
result of the treaty of Bukarest, it was just about to 
escape for ever from the influence of Berlin; this 
would have broken the pivot on which all the Pan- 
german combinations revolved. It was that con- 
sideration which decided William II. to make war at,/ 

once. ■J < f:^ (X p\^„-u\.i;^i W- ' ^""^ >.' ^^__,'-^'. 

The Allies will, in accordance with the general 
principles of justice, bring Germany to account for 
her unheard of crimes, and will exact a full repara- 
tion for the enormous moral and material injuries 
which she has done them. Therefore it is necessary 
to set forth the causes of the war by a general 
survey of the facts, to the end that in the eyes of the 
civilized world, it may be clearly demonstrated that 
Germany must pay, and legitimately so, the price 
of a responsibility which, in all justice, should rest 
on her and on her alone. 

To understand the practical necessity of such a 
survey, if we are to influence the opinion of neutrals, 
it is needful to bear in mind that all discussions 
which, so far, have been held on the causes of war, 
have been merely based on diplomatic documents 
published by the various belligerents, and that these 
documents merely refer to facts which preceded 
the outbreak of war only by a few weeks. But 
in a discussion which turns on a multitude of texts, 



;> n 1 



38 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

belonging to different dates, all more or less near 
each other, and therefore liable to be confused, 
nothing is easier than for subtle, interested and 
dishonest reasoners like the Germans, to interpret 
the same facts in different ways, and so to arrive 
at conclusions diametrically opposed to the truth. 
In fact, this is exactly what has happened. 



Thanks to its intense intellectual mobilization, 
which has been foreseen and carried out as power- 
fully as its military mobilization, Germany has suc- 
ceeded, by fallacious interpretations of diplomatic 
documents, in profoundly misleading neutrals, 
even honest neutrals, as to the real responsibility 
for the outbreak of war. Nothing could give a 
better idea of the effect thus produced by Germany 
than the following remarks of the Swiss Colonel 
Gortsch published in the Intelligenzblatt of Berne: 

"The events which happened at the end of July 
have convinced every reasonable man that Germany 
has been provoked to war, and that the Emperor 
William II, has waited long before he took up this 
challenge. History will lay the main guilt of the 
war and its intellectual responsibility on England; 
Russia and France will be considered as her accom- 
plices. ... It is the British policy, openly and 
selfishly free from any scruples, which has caused 
the World- War" (quoted by the Echo de Paris, 
3rd January, 19 16). 

This is exactly the proposition which Bethmann- 
Hollweg wishes neutrals to believe. It is an absurd 
proposition to be entertained by any one who knew 
England intimately in the years before the war. 
During that period the leaders of the British 
Government were led by the one guiding thought — 
pleasant enough in itself, but entirely inaccurate 
— that war would not occur, since Great Britain did 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 39 

not wish war. The whole foreign policy of Great 
Britain has been inspired by this conception. It 
explains the attitude of extreme conciliation taken 
by the London Cabinet towards Germany at the 
time of the annexation of Bosnia and of Herzegovina 
(1909), during the Balkan wars (1912-1913), and 
also when it came to the question of the Bagdad 
railway, which most obviously threatened the road 
to India. The Liberal Cabinet of London reflected 
the dominant British opinion, which believed 
implicitly in Lord Haldane's assurances. He was 
considered, though quite wrongly so, to have 
a most perfect knowledge of Germany, and in a 
speech at Tranent he affirmed to his countrymen: 
*' Germany has not the slightest intention of invading 
us" (quoted by the Morning Post, i6th December, 
1915). Up to the declaration of war. Sir Edward 
Grey, always inclined to believe in the acumen of 
his friend Lord Haldane, had resorted to every 
conceivable combination which might have allowed 
peace to be maintained if William 11. had really 
wished to maintain it. Finally, does not the total 
unpreparedness of England for a continental war, 
which has been evident since the outbreak of 
hostilities, furnish the best proof of her sincerely 
pacific intentions before the war? 

* 

V * 

Other neutrals, and even some Frenchmen, still 
think that the struggle is a result of the so-called 
Delcasse policy. They say: "The Emperor 
William frequently tried to show himself friendly 
to France. If his advances had been accepted, war 
would have been avoided." It is undeniable that 
at certain moments William II. has tried to draw 
France into his own orbit, but it was precisely in 
order the better to insure the accomplishment of 
the Pangerman plan, which has been his main 



40 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

pre-occupation ever since his accession. The 
present military events show clearly that if France 
had been beguiled by the smile of the Berhn tempter, 
any further efficient coalition of the great powers 
against Germany would have been a sheer impossi- 
bility. As to France, if she had believed in William 
11. she would not have suffered from war, for war 
would have been useless for German ends. Indeed, 
without a struggle, France would have practically 
been reduced to such a state of absolute slavery as 
has never yet been achieved in history except as 
the result of a totally ruinous war. Facts which 
have come to light enable us to convince ourselves 
by the most indisputable evidence, that such would 
have been the outcome of a "reconciliation" 
between France and Germany. We now know to 
what extent the Germans had already gained a 
footing in the greater part of the organic structure 
of French finance and industry. If the Paris 
Government had come to terms with Berlin nothing 
could have stopped the total pacific permeation of 
France by Germany. Little by little France would 
have ceased to be her own mistress; at the end of 
a few years she would have been exactly in the 
same position as Austria-Hungary, unable to free 
herself unaided from the Prussian hug. 

Finally, can we believe for a moment that, had 
France carried out such a policy of "conciliation" 
with Berlin, it would have induced William 11. to 
relinquish his dreams of domination? On the 
contrary, his easy capture of France in full enjoy- 
ment of peace, would merely have whetted the 
hereditary appetites of the Hohenzollerns. Had 
France once been disposed of by reason of her 
pacific permeation by Germany, the bulwark which 
she now forms against the Prussian domination 
would have been broken. The execution of the rest 
of the Pangerman plan, at the expense of Russia 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 41 

and England, could then have been effected with- 
out encountering any insuperable obstacle. 

It is therefore not the policy called after 
M. Delcasse which has caused the war, M. Delcasse 
will have quite enough to answer for in regard to 
the application of his policy before and during war, 
without being reproached for a general principle 
which evidently was theoretically sound. 

In upholding the alliance with Russia, in bringing 
about the slackening of tension with Italy, in 
achieving the Entente Cordiale, M. Delcasse has 
followed a policy, the principles of which are just. 
Actual events prove it convincingly. 



Having laid bare the fallacy of the German 
argument, let us now, for the benefit of honest 
neutrals, attempt to give a general view of the true 
causes of the war, and to indicate their sequence. 
Let us distinguish between the deep-seated and 
the immediate causes of the struggle. 

The war can be traced to a single deep and remote 
cause, namely, the will of William II. to achieve the 
Pangerman plan; all secondary causes, that is 
to say, the economic ones, spring from it. One 
aim of the Pangerman plan was actually to put an 
end to the enormous difficulties which Germany 
had created for herself by the hypertrophy of her 
industries, and by thus upsetting the proper balance 
which had formerly existed between her agri- 
cultural and her industrial productions. 

The truth of this deep-seated and unique cause 
of the war is demonstrated by: 

1°. The intellectual preparation, in all domains, 
of the Pangerman plan for twenty-five years. 

2°. Such explicit and ancient avowals as the 
following. In 1898 Rear- Admiral von Goetzen, an 
intimate friend of the Kaiser, being at Manilla, 



42 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

said to the American, Admiral Dewey, who had just 
destroyed the Spanish fleet before Manilla: ''You 
will not believe me, but in about fifteen years my 
country will begin war. At the end of two months 
we shall hold Paris; but that will only form one step 
towards our real goal — the overthrow of England. 
Every event will happen exactly at its proper time, 
for we shall be ready and our enemies will not" 
(quoted by the Echo de Paris, 24th September, 
1 91 5, from the Naval and Military Record). 

3°. The material facts of world-wide prepara- 
tion, obviously for war, made several months 
previous to its outbreak, but not till the Kaiser had 
decided to start it, that is, towards November, 1913. 
(Proofs: declaration of William 11. on 6th Novem- 
ber, 1 9 13, to King Albert of Belgium; interview of 
the Kaiser with the Arch-Duke Ferdinand, April, 
1914, at Miramar, and in June, 1914, at Konopischt, 
where Admiral Tirpitz accompanied the Kaiser.) 

These material facts are endless, but it will 
suffice to recall the following as truly significant, 
because they have required a long and compli- 
cated effort: first, the organization for the victualling 
of the piratical German cruisers on all the seas of 
the globe, in view of a long war of piracy; and 
second, the preparation of the revolt against 
England in South Africa. 

The immediate causes which decided William II. 
to precipitate the war are: 

1°. The defeat of Turkey in 191 2 by Italy and 
the Balkan peoples — a defeat which, by threatening 
Berlin influence in Constantinople, endangered 
the hold which Germany already had on the Otto- 
man Empire. 

2°. The consequences of the Bukarest treaty, 
which in 19 13 had erected automatically a formid- 
able barrier against the Pangerman pretensions in 
the Balkans. 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 



43 



3°. The internal evolution of Austria-Hungary, 
which, because of the steady progress made by the 
Latin and Slav subjects of Francis Joseph, threat- 
ened shortly to free the Hapsburg Monarchy from 
the tutelage of Berlin. 




» „. f'* oVarsovie 

>Namar . ^ 




-^ A J^^£- <C2=r)=> 



THE THREE BARRIERS OF ANTIGERMANIC PEOPLES IN THE 
BALKANS AND IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 



The facts of the last two groups would have 
completed in Central Europe and in the Balkans 



44 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

the three an ti- German barriers indicated on the 
map (see p. 43) by deep black lines. Now, these 
barriers would have hindered once and for ever the 
achievement of the Pangerman plan. 

To parry these blows only one resource remained 
to William II., and that was war — "the national 
industry of Prussia," as Mirabeau used to say, and 
his very pithy and apt remark has been too long 
forgotten. 




CHAPTER III. 

HOW FAR THE PANGERMAN PLAN WAS CARRIED OUT AT 
THE BEGINNING OF I916. 

I. German pretensions in the West. 

II. German pretensions in the East. 

III. German pretensions in the South and South-East. 

IV. General view of the execution of the Pangerman plan from 

191 1 to the beginning of 1916. 

In this chapter we shall inquire what relation 
existed between the actual gains and the pre- 
tensions of the Pangermans at the beginning of 
1916, and those which were foreseen in the 191 1 
plan. In order to be quite explicit we shall analyse 
successively those gains and pretensions in the 
west, east, south, and south-west. This analysis 
will enable us finally to present a general view of 
the execution of the Pangerman plan at the period 
under consideration. 



The map (p. 46) sums up Prussianized Germany's 
pretensions which she still expected to carry out 
west of the Rhine at the beginning of 19 16. 

The best way to prove this intention is by means 
of extracts from the memorial sent by the most 
powerful German associations on May 20th, 191 5, 
to the Imperial Chancellor (quoted by Le Temps, 
12th August, 1 91 5). I have mentioned {see page 
18) why this document must be looked upon as of 
extremely exceptional importance. 

As to what concerns Belgium the memorial says: 

"Because it is needful to insure our credit on 
sea and our military and economic situation for 

45 



46 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

the future in face of England, because the Belgian 
territory, which is of the greatest economic impor- 
tance, is closely linked to our principal industrial 
territory, Belgium must be subjected to the 



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THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE WEST (Beginning of 1916). 

legislation of the Empire in monetary, financial 
and postal matters. Her railways and her water 
courses must be closely connected with our com- 
munications. By constituting a Walloon territory 
and a Flemish territory with a preponderance of 
the Flemish, and by putting into German hands 
the properties and the economic undertakings which 
are of vital importance for dominating the country, 
we shall organize the government and the adminis- 
tration in such a manner that the inhabitants 



BEGINNING OF 1916 47 

will not be able to acquire any influence over the 
political destiny of the German Empire/' 

In a word, it is slavery that is promised to the 
Belgians. In order to prove clearly that this 
means exactly the achievement of the plan Berlin 
had elaborated for twenty-five years, it is impor- 
tant to notice that the fate of the annexed popula- 
tions, meted out in the above memorial, is exactly 
the same fate mentioned in the pamphlet pub- 
lished under the auspices of > the Alldeutscher Ver- 
band, the Pangerman Union, wherein the Panger- 
man plan of 1895 is set forth {see the text already 
quoted, p. 4). 

The only difference to be noticed in the evolution 
of the Pangerman ideas between 1895 and 1916 is 
that after their experience with the Slavs and Latins 
of Austria-Hungary, the Germans deem it possible 
and advantageous, by an application of Prussian 
methods of terrorism, to compel non- Germans to 
fight for the benefit of Pangermany; true, these 
people shudder with horror at the notion, but 
stiffened by a strong infusion of Germans, they are 
forced to march to the shambles in order to secure 
slavery and bread for their families under the 
German yoke. 

"As to France," continues the memorial of 
the 20th May, 191 5, to the Imperial Chancellor, 
''always in consideration of our position towards 
England, it is of vital interest for us, in respect of 
our future on the seas, that we should own the 
coast which borders on Belgium more or less up to 
the Somme, which would give us an outlet on the 
Atlantic Ocean. The Hinterland, which it is 
necessary to annex at the same time, must be of 
such an extent that economically and strategically 
the ports, where the canals terminate, can be utilized 
to the utmost. Any other territorial conquest in 
France, beyond the necessary annexation of the 



48 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

mining basins of Briey, should only be made in 
virtue of considerations of military strategy. In 
this connection, after the experience of this war, it 
is only natural that we should not expose our 
frontiers to fresh enemy invasions by leaving to the 
adversary fortresses which threaten us, especially 
Verdun and Belfort and the Western buttresses of 
the Vosges, which are situated between those two 
fortresses. By the conquest of the line of the Meuse 
and of the French coast, with the mouths of the 
canals, we should acquire, besides the iron districts 
of Briey already mentioned, the coal districts of the 
departments of the Nord and of the Pas de Calais. 
This expansion of territory, quite an obvious matter 
after the experience obtained in Alsace-Lorraine, 
presupposes that the populations of the annexed 
districts shall not be able to obtain a political 
influence on the destiny of the German Empire, 
and that all means of economic power which exist 
on these territories, including landed property, both 
large and middling, will pass into German hands; 
France will receive and compensate the land- 
owners." 

In order to justify these formidable annexations 
the memorial of the 20th May, in harmony 
with the frank cynicism of the Pangerman doctrine, 
adduces no argument but the convenience of Prussia 
and the profitableness of the booty to be got. 

"If the fortress of Longwy, with the numerous 
blast furnaces of the region, were returned to the 
French, and if a new war broke out, with a few long 
range guns the German furnaces of Luxemburg 
(list of which is given) would be paralyzed in a few 
hours. . . . Thus about 20% of the production of 
crude iron and of German steel would be lost.-. . . 

''Let us say, bye the bye, that the high produc- 
tion of steel derived from the iron-ore gives to 
German agriculture the only chance of obtaining 



BEGINNING OF 1916 49 

the phosphoric acid needed when the importation 
of phosphates is blockaded. 

*'The security of the German Empire, in a future 
war, requires therefore imperatively the ownership 
of all mines of iron-ore including the fortresses of 
Longwy and of Verdun, which are necessary to 
defend the region." 

These various declarations, made on high authority 
enable us to affirm, that on the whole the annexations 
which the Pangermans intended to make in the 
West would have extended in France more or less 
to a line drawn from the South of Belfort to the 
mouth of the Somme, that is, so far as concerns 
France, they would comprise a total area of 50,271 
square kilometres, which, before the war, held 
5,768,000 inhabitants. 

Further, as regards France, the intended 
annexations were, according to Pangerman con- 
ceptions, to have had a double effect. 

1°. By taking over the richest industrial and 
mining French regions, Germany would secure an 
enormous booty. 

2°. Deprived of her most productive depart- 
ments, which bear the main burden of taxes, and 
which hold mining elements indispensable to eco- 
nomic life, France would have been maimed and 
reduced to a state from which it would have been a 
sheer impossibility for her to recover or ever again 
to become a power capable of thwarting in any 
shape whatsoever the future determinations of 
Germany. 

A few figures will enable us to verify this forecast. 
At the beginning of 191 6 the Germans were holding 
138,000 hectares of the coal basin of the department 
of the Nord, being 41% of the total superficies 
worked in France (337,000 hectares), or about 
three-fourths of the total French production. The 
Germans also occupied 63,000 hectares of the iron-ore 



50 PANGERMAN PLOT, UNMASKED 

basin of Lorraine which represents 75% of the 
superficies of all the iron beds worked in France 
(83,000 hectares), and nine-tenths of the total 
production. It is clear, that were such a state of 
things to continue, economic and therefore national 
life would be made radically impossible in France, 
shorn of her vital organs. In reality France 
would be in a position of entire dependence on 
Germany in accordance with the Pangerman 
schemes for the future. 

It is still necessary to mention that in the 
territories occupied by Germany in the West, as 
well as everywhere else, the measures already taken 
by the Germans in 191 6 were not merely measures 
of military defence, but measures for the organiza- 
tion and permanent possession of the said terri- 
tories. These measures to ensure permanent pos- 
session may be classed in the following categories: 

Measures of terrorism applied in Prussian fashion 
so as to bring into subjection all refractory elements. 

Measures of division, such as in Belgium, the 
Germans take in order to rouse, by all possible 
means, opposition between the Flemish and the 
Walloons for the purpose of neutralizing the one by 
the other. 

Measures of strict and regular administration in 
order, by the bait of some external or economic 
advantages, to accustom to the German yoke those 
elements of the population whose moral resistance, 
in the opinion of Berlin, can be most easily broken. 

Measures tending to prepare the German coloniza- 
tion of the new territories. These have mostly 
consisted in applying the Pangerman theory of 
Evacuation, that is, by systematically transporting 
the unfortunate women or old people whom Germany 
considers absolutely useless in her future possessions. 
She found it, for instance, very convenient to rid her- 
self without delay of these poor creatures especially 



BEGINNING OF 1916 51 

when the question of feeding them cropped up; so 
these "useless mouths" were promptly transferred 
to the shoulders of the enemy, whom Germany 
already looked upon as vanquished. That is the 
theory of Evacuation, which explains to a large 
extent why th-e German authorities have sent back 
to France that part of the populations of the 
occupied territories in France and Belgium whom, 
on exact inquiry, they regarded as human wastage. 



No doubt, as is shown on map (p. 46), Germany 
did not at the beginning of 191 6 occupy quite all the 
territories she coveted. She missed Calais, Belfort, 
and Verdun, but it is easy to see that she did so only 
by a hair's breadth. 

The Western territories which were to enter 
into the Germanic Confederation of the 191 1 plan 
include: 

Square Kilometres. 

Holland 38,141 

Belgium 29,451 

Luxemburg 2,586 

French Departments 50,271 



Total 



120,449 



Now Luxemburg and Belgium were entirely 
occupied (excepting a patch of Belgium). If 
Germany was to hold Belgium, Holland, which is 
not occupied, but which is geographically invested, 
would inevitably be forced to enter into the 
Germanic Confederation. We must, therefore, con- 
sider Holland as being virtually under Germany's 
thumb. As, on the other hand, out of 50,271 square 
kilometres which she wished to annex at the expense 
of France, Germany, at the beginning of 19 16, 
occupied 20,300, we conclude that the German 
enterprises in the West, which, according to pro- 
gramme, ought to have comprised 120,449 square 



52 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

kilometres, in point of fact extended directly or 
indirectly over 90,478 square kilometres. 

Germany therefore, early in 191 6, had achieved 
in the West an occupation foreseen by the plan of 
191 1 and at the expense of non- Germans in the 
proportion of 76% or three-fourths. 



II. 

The Pangerman plan of 191 1 had provided for the 
permanent exclusion of Russia as a great power 
by means of two measures: 

1 °. To carve out of the Empire of the Tsars 
and annex to the German Confederation a slice of 
territory large enough to cut off Russia entirely 
from the West. 

2 °. To constitute at the expense of Russia, thus 
reduced, new States which should bow the knee to 
Berlin. 

Mr. Dietrich Schaefer, the well-known historian, 
in the Review Panther, affirmed, early in February, 
191 5: ''It is absolutely necessary for us to expand 
the sphere of our power, especially eastward . . . 
the immense Russian force must recede behind 
the Dnieper" (quoted by V Information, 5th 
February, 191 5). 

A Swedish pamphlet, ascribed to the Germano- 
phile, Adrian Molin, explained, also early in 191 5, 
that Germany, with the help of Sweden, was to 
have given the finishing stroke in separating Russia 
from Europe by means of a barrier formed of 
Buffer-States, to wit, Finland and the Ukraine. 
Now, for the last twenty-five years in particular, 
the Pangerman agents have endeavoured to sow 
the seeds of rebellion among the 20 millions of 
Small-Russians who live in the Russian Govern- 
ments grouped around Kieff. Finally, the Moslem 
regions of Russia (Caucasus, Central Asia, etc.) 



BEGINNING OF 1916 53 

were to form special States under the sway of 
Turkish suzerainty, and, through that channel, to 
bear the yoke of German influence. 

Such were the means elaborated at Berlin to 
bring about the annihilation of Russia as a great 




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THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE EAST. 



power, when once her armies had been destroyed; 
and this might have happened perhaps, if the English 
intervention, by enabling France to make a stand, 
had not prevented Germany from first smashing 



54 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

France and then concentrating all her forces against 
the Empire of the Tsar, in accordance with the 
plan of the General Staff of Berlin. 

We can form an estimate of the annexations 
which Germany, as late as the beginning of 1916, 
still hoped to effect at the cost of Russia by examin- 
ing the memorial of May 20th, 191 5, addressed to 
the Imperial Chancellor; although the phraseology 
in which it is drawn up aims at concealing the full 
extent of the Pangerman demands, it yet tallies, in 
its tendencies, with the programme published by 
Tannenberg in 191 1: 

"With regard to the East," says that memorial, 
"the following consideration must guide us: 
For the great increase of industrial power which we 
expect in the West we must secure a counterpoise 
by the annexation of an agricultural territory of 
equal value in the East. It is necessary to strengthen 
the agricultural basis of our national economy; to 
secure room for the expansion of a great German 
agricultural settlement; to restore to our Empire 
the German peasants living in a foreign land, 
particularly in Russia, who are now actually 
without the protection of the law; finally, we 
must increase considerably the number of our 
fellow countrymen able to bear arms; all these 
matters require an important extension of the 
frontiers of the Empire and of Prussia towards the 
East through the annexation of at least some parts 
of the Baltic provinces and of territories to the 
South of them, while keeping in view the necessity 
of a military defence of the Eastern German 
frontier. 

"As to what political rights to give to the 
inhabitants of the new territories and as to what 
guarantees are necessary to further German in- 
fluence and economics, we will merely refer to what 
we have said about France. The war indemnity 



BEGINNING OF 1916 55 

to be exacted from Russia should to a large extent 
consist in the surrender of territory" (see Le Temps, 
12th August, 1915). 

In his speech of nth December, 1915, William II. 's 
Chancellor, in a sentence full of significance, gave 
his hearers to understand that such were indeed the 
pretensions of Germany: ,, ^ 

''Our troops," said he, ''in conjunction with the 
Austro-Hungarian, are taking up strongly fortified 
positions of defence far within the Russian terri-; 
tory. They are ready to resume their forward 
march." 

Just as in the West, all the measures taken by the 
Germans in the East have been not only for defence, 
but for organization in view of keeping the occupied 
territories. These measures come under the various 
heads I indicated. {See p. 50.) 

With the Poles, the Germans used the same 
tactics as with the Flemish people of Belgium. 
After having terrorized the Poles, the Prussian 
authorities granted them, in the use of their own 
language for scholastic purposes, certain privileges 
which compare advantageously with the former 
state of things resulting from that detestable 
bureaucratic regime of Russia, which, with a 
complete lack of foresight, had by its vexatious 
measures seriously imperilled in Poland the true 
interests of the empire of the Tsars. Again, in the 
East the Germans promoted husbandry. They 
constructed railroads and coach roads. No doubt 
all these steps were taken mainly in the interest of 
Germany. It is quite clear that the advantages 
conceded to the Poles can only be considered as 
temporary. This is proved sufiiciently by the 
Prussian system so long pursued in Posen. However, 
the Germans flatter themselves that by these 
measures they favourably impress some portion of 
the Poles, who are simple enough to imagine that 



56 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Germany will reconstitute a Polish State of 20 
millions of inhabitants in order to give this State to 
the Poles at the expense of Russia. It was with 
such an end in view that Berlin thought of pro- 
claiming the autonomy of Poland. At the same 
time Germany reckons on establishing in Poland a 
system of conscription so as to utilize, by force if 
necessary, the Polish recruits, just as she has done 
with the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, in the interest 
of Pangermany. 



From the territorial standpoint the Pangerman 
pretensions of the 191 1 plan in the East are sum- 
marized in the following table: 

Square 
Kilometres. Inhabitants. 
The ten Governments of Russian 

Poland . . . . . . . . 127,320 12,467,000 

Three Baltic Provinces (Esthonia, 

Livonia, Courland) . . . . 94,564 2,686,000 

The three Russian Governments 
at the South of the Baltic Pro- 
vinces (Kovno, Vihia, Grodno) 121,840 5,728,000 



Total . . . . . . . . 343,724 20,881,000 

Now at the beginning of 191 6, out of these 
343,724 square kilometres, as the map will show, 
the Germans occupied about 260,000. They there- 
fore had carried out in the East the plan of 191 1 at 
the cost of non- German populations to the extent 
of 75%, or three-fourths. 



III. 

The zones of absolute influence, whether direct or 
indirect, which Germany, in accordance with the 
191 1 plan, has tried to secure for herself in the 
South and South-East of her present frontiers, 



BEGINNING OF 1916 57 

comprise three totally distinct groups of terri- 
tory: Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey. 
It is therefore advisable to examine separately how 
at the beginning of 19 16 Germany stood in respect 
of each of these three groups. 



Berlin ,- t*.^;;' 

& / Varsovia 




THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST. 



1°. Austria-Hungary. 

Let us make no mistake, Austria-Hungary is 
actually as much under William II. 's domination as 
is Belgium. The European conflict has enabled 
Germany artfully to occupy the Empire of the Haps- 
burgs under the pretence of defending it, in fact to 
seize it as provided for by the plan of 1911. Since 
the beginning of 191 5 all the troops of Francis 
Joseph have been entirely under the orders of the 
Berhn General Staff. Even if Austria-Hungary 
wished to make a separate peace, she could not do so, 
for all her motive power, diplomatic and military, is 
exclusively controlled by the Kaiser's agents. The 



58 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Austro- German alliance is merely a piece of stage 
scenery. The much-talked of device of smuggling 
the Hapsburg Empire into Germany by a back door, 
that is, by her entrance into the Zollverein or 
Customs Union, is a broad farce. It can merely 
deceive those, alas still too numerous, who are 
insufficiently informed of the true facts in Austria- 
Hungary. The Austro- German fusion in the shape 
of a Customs Union is besides no novelty. The 
process of absorbing Austria-Hungary was fore- 
seen and described in detail in the Pangerman 
pamphlet of 1895, showing the fundamental lines 
of the plan of that date. All the fuss made at the 
beginning of 191 6 by the German Press about the 
so-called wishes of the Austro-Hungarians to enter 
into the Zollverein has been the most "Kolossal" 
and the most dishonest of bluffs. In truth, nearly 
three-fourths of the populations at present subject 
to Francis Joseph do not want to be absorbed into 
Germany at any price, neither in a political, nor in 
an economic fashion. All the stir made in the 
Central Empires about the entrance of the Haps- 
burg Monarchy into the Zollverein^ has been the 
doing of Pangerman bear leaders at Berlin or 
Vienna and of the Magyar aristocracy, and not at 
all of the Magyar people, which is not the same 
thing. Let us therefore not be duped by the bluff 
of the German press on the Zollverein question. The 
microscopic minority who wish it in Austria- 
Hungary plays the Berlin game. What is undeniable 
is that at present Austria-Hungary is entirely 
under the Prussian thumb. 

2°. The Balkans. 

The whole of Serbia has been overrun by the 
Germans. The predicament of the Serbian popula- 
tion is extremely cruel. Either they have been 
massacred, or systematically famished or deported 
to Germany to work in the factories or on the 



BEGINNING OF 1916 59 

German land. These appalling measures of coercion 
have not prevented the Kaiser from addressing a 
manifesto : "To my noble and heroic Serbian 
People." The aim was, by fine words, to disarm 
morally the remainder of the Serbian population, 
terrorized by a series of sufferings unsurpassed in 
history. As to Serbia, the Kaiser offered part of it 
to Austria, always in accordance with the plan of 
1895 which provided for this solution; for to give a 
fraction of Serbia to Austria as a member of the 
Zollverein, is practically to put it under the direct 
domination of Germany. 

As to Bulgaria, the ally of Germany, she is en- 
tirely absorbed, and the Germans there behave as 
rulers so far as they possibly can. Heroic Monte- 
negro has suffered exactly the same fate as Serbia, 
one part of Albania is also occupied. If the Allies 
had been fatuous enough not to understand, at the 
eleventh hour, the importance of Salonika, Greece 
and Roumania, where Germanophile elements are 
not numerous but very influential, would already 
have obeyed to the letter the orders of Berlin. 

Supposing, for argument's sake, that there 
were a German victory, we would immediately 
see Germany constituting a Balkan Confederation 
under the headship of Austria, considered as a 
Balkan power, simply because, under the name of 
Austria, it would really be Germany who would 
impose her will on the future confederation. 

3°, Turkey. 

At the beginning of 191 6, before the Russian 
advance in Armenia, the Ottoman Empire through- 
out its entire length was subjected to the influence 
of Germany; that influence had even spread to 
Persia. We have here an event which would have 
had an extreme importance for the development of 
the Panislamic movement directed simultaneously 
against Russia, France and England, if the Anglo- 



6o PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Russian attitude had not recently put a stopper on 
German intrigues in the Shah's Empire. 

"The establishment of direct relations with 
Turkey is of inestimable military value," said the 
German Chancellor in his speech of December nth, 
1 91 5, "while on the economic side the possibility 
of importing goods from the Balkan States and 
from Turkey will increase our supplies in a most 
satisfactory way" (see Le Temps, nth December, 
191 5). It would be a mistake to see in these 
words the result of a mere bluff, of which the 
Germans are so often lavish. If the Allies left 
Germany time to draw from Turkey all the military 
and economic resources expected from her at 
Berlin, future events would evidently prove that 
the Imperial Chancellor's words deserve to be taken 
seriously. 



To sum up, the Pangerman plan of 1911 provided 
in the South and South-East for: 





Square 
Kilometres. 


Inhabitants. 


The absorption of Austria-Hungary 
The establishment of immediate 

and absolute German influence on 

the Balkan States 
The establishment of exclusive 

German influence on Turkey- 
Total 


676,616 

490,27s 
1,792,900 


50,000,000 

22,000,000 
20,000,000 


2,959,791 


92,000,000 



Now, at the beginning of 1916, the plan of 191 1 
was carried out in the following proportions: 

Austria-Hungary had her 676,616 square kilo- 
metres occupied (minus the small area in the hands 
of the Italians), being more or less 100%. 



BEGINNING OF 1916 61 

ill the Balkans, at the same date, under direct 
German influence, we have: 

Square Kilometres. 
Bulgaria .. •• _ _ .. 87,300 



Serbia 
Montenegro 



14,180 



Total 215,585 

equalling 43% of the total of the Balkan States' territory. 

In Turkey the German influence was exerted over 
almost the entire territory, therefore in the pro- 
portion of 100%. . 

If we now add the figures belongmg to the three 
territorial groups aimed at by the 191 1 plan m the 
South and South-East we shall see that Germany has 
carried out her programme on 

Square Kilometres. 

Austria-Hungary 676,616 

Balkans .IJA^ 

Turkey ^'792,9°o 

Total 2,685,101 

As the total plan aimed at the German direct or 
indirect seizure of 2,968,791 square kilometres, we 
see that, considered in that light, the goal of the 191 1 
plan has been reached in the South and South-East 
in the proportion of 89%, being roughly mne- 

tenths. ^. , ^ ^ 

Now I have shown (pp. 52 and 56) that Germany 
occupied or controlled early in 191 6: 

In the West over 90,478 square kilometres. 
In the East over 260,000 square kilometres. 
We have just seen that in the South and South- 
East the German plan has been achieved over 
2,685,101 square kilometres. . , , , . ^i, - 

Of course all the territories included in that 
last figure are far from having the same^ value, 
especially those of part of Turkey, but m that 
figure Austria-Hungary alone claims 676,616 square 



62 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

kilometres, that is, she alone represents a seizure, 
disguised it may be, yet not less real, which is 
infinitely more considerable than the German 
occupations in the West and East. 

From these calculations it clearly follows that the 
part of the Pangerman plan which concerns Austria- 
Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey, that is, Central 
Europe and the East, forms by far the main part 
of the Pangerman scheme. That is an observation 
of extreme importance for the Allies and for 
Neutrals, because of the world-wide consequences 
which flow from the scheme summed up in the 
formula, ''From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." 
These consequences will be stated in Chapter V. 

IV. 

The Pangerman plan of 191 1 (see map, p. 12) 
included : 

1°. The formation of a great German Confedera- 
tion which was to put under the absolute supremacy 
of the present German Empire (540,858 square 
kilometres and 68 million inhabitants) foreign 
territories situated around Germany, which form a 
superficies of 1,182,113 square kilometres and hold 
94 million inhabitants. 

The figures given (pp. 52, 56 and 61) suffice to 
prove that the German seizure of these territories 
extended at the beginning of 191 6: 

Square Kilometres. 

To the West 90,478 

To the East 260,000 

To the South (Austria-Hungary) . . . . 676,616 

Total 1,027,094 

Germany has therefore, so far as concern's the 
territories to be absorbed into the Germanic 
Confederation, achieved her programme in the 
proportion of 86%, or about nine-tenths. 



BEGINNING OF 1916 



(>3 



2°. The absolute subordination to Germany of 
all the Balkan States, whose superficies is 499,275 
square kilometres, holding 22 million inhabitants. 
We have seen above {p. 61), that the German 
seizure actually extends over 215,585 square kilo- 
metres. The German programme, therefore, as re- 
gards the Balkans, has been achieved in the pro- 
portion of 43%. 

3°. The more or less veiled seizure by Germany 
of the Ottoman Empire, being 1,792,900 square 
kilometres, holding 20 million inhabitants. Now, 
early in 191 6 the exclusive German influence was 
felt over the whole of Turkey. As regards her the 
German plan had therefore been achieved in the 
proportion of 100%. 

Let us now group the figures which will enable us 
to show in what proportion the whole Pangerman 
plan of 191 1 has been actually achieved by Ger- 
many: 





Provisions 

of the 191 1 

plan. Square 

Kilometres. 


Actual 
achievements 

Square 
Kilometres. 


1. Territories to be absorbed in the 

great Germanic Confederation . . 

2. Balkans 

3. Turkey 

Total 


1,182,113 

499,275 
1,792,900 


1,027,094 

215,585 
1,792,900 


3,474,288 


3,035,579 



These figures prove to demonstration that early 
in 1916 Germany had achieved the Pangerman plan 
of 191 1 in the enormous proportion of 87%, or 
about nine-tenths. 

This figure is graphically confirmed by the 
annexed map; we can see at a glance the geo- 
graphical as well as superficial relations which 
exist between the boundaries of the plan of 191 1 



64 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

and the fronts occupied early in 191 6 by armies 
exclusively subordinate to Berlin. 

These geographical and mathematical con- 
siderations, the importance of which cannot escape 
us, explain why and under what conditions Germany 




THE PLAN OF 1911 AND THE EXTENT OF ITS EXECUTION 
AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916. 



wished to make peace. She wished it simply 
because, as the Frankfurter Zeitung owned, with- 
out mincing matters, in December, 1915, the goal 
of the war had been reached. 

Nine-tenths of the whole of the Pangerman plan 
of 1 911 having been practically achieved, in spite 
of England's intervention, which, however, had 
upset the German Staff's plan, it is absolutely clear 
that the results obtained by Germany have. been 
considerable in the extreme. Nothing could there- 
fore be more to her advantage now than to succeed 
in putting an end to the war at a time when German 



BEGINNING OF 1916 6$ 

influence extends unchecked over almost the whole 
of the invaded territories. 

These statements again explain why Berlin has 
for such a long time been occupied with the most 
subtle and most complex manoeuvres for the 
opening of peace negotiations — attempts at a 
separate agreement with Russia, efforts to obtain 
the Pope's intervention, advances made by the 
pseudo-socialists of the Kaiser towards their former 
comrades of belligerent countries, incitements to 
pacificists of all neutral countries, etc. Germany 
would have concluded peace at the moment which 
was most favourable to her, so as to be able to impose 
on the territories which she has either conquered or 
controls the special status provided for each of 
them by the Pangerman plan. But of course 
Germany would only have made such treaties as 
were compatible with her retention of all the 
regions she occupied at the time. As Major Moraht 
said very clearly in the Berliner Tagehlatt: ''Our 
military chiefs are not in the habit of giving back 
what we have acquired at the price of blood and of 
sacrifice" {Le Matin, 27th December, 191 5). 

Lastly, the chief reason why Berlin wanted 
peace is that the prolongation of the war can only 
compromise and finally ruin all the results obtained 
by Germany. 



CHAPTER IV. 

SPECIAL FEATURES GIVEN TO THE WAR BY THE 
PANGERMAN PLAN. 

I. All the great political questions of the old world are raised 

and must be solved. 
II. As the war is made by Germany in order to achieve a 
gigantic scheme of slavery, it follows that it is waged by 
her in flagrant violation of international law. 
III. A struggle of tenacity and of duplicity on the side of Berlin 
versus constancy and solidarity on the side of the Allies. 

The Diplomatic Corps, having ignored the Pan- 
german plan for reasons already shown (pp. 19 et seq.), 
it is quite natural that the General Staffs and the 
public opinion of Allied countries should have been 
equally ignorant. From this general absence of 
knowledge there has resulted a vagueness and in- 
adequacy in the view taken of the ultimate aims 
of Germany in the war; and in consequence the 
co-ordination of the Allied efforts has remained for 
a long while very imperfect. Each of the Allied 
nations, in fact, was at first so taken up with its 
own interests that they all lost sight of what ought 
to have been the common object of their common 
action. 

The Russians entered into the struggle against 
the Germans especially to prevent Serbia from 
being crushed, and at the same time to put an end 
to those veiled but profoundly humiliating ulti- 
matums which Berlin for some years has delivered 
to Petrograd. The Italians, specially fascinated 
by Trent and Trieste, have long thought that they 
could limit their war to a conflict with the house of 
Hapsburg, when in reality the only and true enemy 
of the Italian people — as now the latter is more and 

66 



SPECIAL FEATURES 67 

more dearly aware — is Prussian Pangermanism. 
As for the English, they entered the lists for two 
fundamental reasons: the violation of Belgium's 
neutrality aroused their indignation, and a just 
sense of their own interests has convinced them 
that they could not allow France to be crushed 
without at the same time acquiescing in the ultimate 
disappearance of Great Britain. Completely un- 
prepared for Continental war, England has very 
well understood from the beginning of hostilities 
that these might be very much prolonged, but she 
had not the slightest notion that British interests 
would be as completely threatened as they have 
been in Central Europe, in Turkey, in Egypt, and in 
India. As to the French, the German aggression 
immediately raised in their minds and in their 
hearts the question of Alsace-Lorraine. This has 
hypnotized them to such a degree, to their own 
loss, that they have too long considered the fight 
merely a Franco- German war, whereas they ought 
to have viewed the European conflagration in its 
full dimensions. 

This piece-meal way of looking at the facts has 
been of the greatest disservice to all the Allies. 
Indeed it has had the effect of preventing them from 
discerning at the right time the special character 
which the extraordinary extent of the Pangerman 
plan must necessarily give to the war. 



The very vastness of the Pangerman plan of 191 1, 
demonstrated beyond dispute by the facts that have 
come to light, suffices to prove that Berlin meant to 
solve for her own profit, at one single blow, all the 
great political questions latent in the old world. 

The claims of Germany on the East, shown on 
the accompanying map by the thinner black line, 
raised the question of Poland in its immense extent 



68 



PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 



and in all its complexity. The claims of Germany 
towards the West, also shown on the map by 
the thinner black line, involved the indepen- 
dence of Holland, of Belgium, of Luxemburg, of 
France, threatened with the loss of vital territories. 
Further, towards the West the German aggression 
has brought forward the question of Alsace- 
Lorraine from the French point of view. Moreover, 
since Germany aims at establishing her absolute 




THE GREAT POLITICAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE WAR. 



supremacy from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, in 
order to stretch her political tentacles to the Far 
East and to the whole world by means which will be 
shown in Chapter V. the present war compels the 
powers to face the whole Eastern question (Bg-lkans 
and Turkey, shown on the map by similar black 
lines), and also the whole question of Austria. 
(Used in this sense the expression Austria indicates 
the whole of the Hapsburg Dominion, that is, 



SPECIAL FEATURES 69 

the territory enclosed by a thick black line.) In 
short, the whole of the great foreign questions are 
raised at one blow before the world by the aggres- 
sion of the Berlin Government. 

The Germans, having studied thoroughly for a 
very long time all these problems, have also provided 
for each of them a solution in accordance with their 
most cynical interests. The result is that all these 
political problems, raised simultaneously, form a 
tangled skein, and that the Allies will never be 
really victorious till they can compel the Germans 
to accept those solutions of the great problems which 
by the nature of things must be the direct contrary 
of those foreshadowed by Berlin. The Eastern 
question which is now raised in Europe is no 
longer the old orthodox question but a Prussianized 
Eastern question coloured in all its aspects by the 
present and future ambitions of the Hohenzollerns. 
In the same way the question of modern Austria 
is no longer the old Austrian question which 
consisted in the traditional struggle of the Haps- 
burgs with their various nationalities. What 
the Allies have now to consider in Central Europe 
is the question of Austria Prussianized by means of 
two essential facts: the covert but exclusive in- 
fluence which Berlin has increasingly exercised over 
Vienna, especially for the last fifteen years, and 
the hold which the Hohenzollerns have got by 
means of the war over the whole of the Hapsburg 
Monarchy, which includes 28 millions of Slav and 
Latin populations bowed under the yoke, with no 
hope of deliverance except through the crushing of 
Prussian militarism. 

II. 

The Pangerman plan finally gives to the struggle 
which it has initiated a character of sanguinary 
horror without parallel in history. 



70 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

In short, William II., after having roused by 
means of Pangerman propaganda amongst his 
people violent desires of conquest and plunder, has 
declared war with the fixed idea that it will lead in 
Europe and in Turkey to the supremacy of 77 
millions of Germans, over 127 millions of non- 
Germans. The small but violent Prussophile 
Camarilla of Vienna, a group of Magyar aristocrats 
in league with Count Tisza, a handful of pseudo 
young Turks bought by Berlin, have been 
the Kaiser's accomplices. Finally, it is these few 
men alone who have drawn into war 50 million 
Austro-Hungarians and 20 million Ottomans, that 
is, 70 million belligerents, the vast majority of 
whom certainly did not wish for a sanguinary con- 
flict. From all this it is clear that these peoples 
were betrayed into the war by their Kings or 
their Turco- Magyar governments. 

The origin as well as the object of the war make 
it therefore the most cruelly reactionary enterprise 
conceivable. It is so to such a degree that those 
who in France are called reactionaries and who 
compared to the Prussian Junkers are great 
Liberals, find themselves in close agreement with 
the most ardent Socialists in desiring the total ruin 
of an enterprise which, if successful, would put the 
modern world back into the Middle Ages in the 
most odious fashion. But this time it would be a 
mediaeval state of things made immutable through 
the force of the most modern science, which would 
stop the clock of progress. The death-dealing 
electric current which runs in the metallic wires 
actually forming an impassable barrier between 
Belgium and Holland forms a perfect symhol of 
what the Pangerman prison would be for those who 
do not belong to the German nationality. 

On the other hand, the very fact that they 
pursue a plan of gigantic and unheard of slavery has 



SPECIAL FEATURES 71 

logically led the Germans, first cynically to violate 
all the laws of war between belligerents, and then 
systematically to commit abominable crimes against 
common law, whether at the expense of neutrals 
whom they would terrorize, such as the factory 
hands of the United States, or at the expense of the 
unhappy civil populations of the "burglared" 
regions, populations whose sufferings are indescrib- 
able. The events resulting from Pangerman 
terrorism are so numerous and so unutterably 
atrocious that historians will find the greatest diffi- 
culty in painting the Dantesque picture of all these 
crimes in their colossal horror. Undoubtedly the 
Germans wage war in a manner which assimilates 
them to vulgar burglars and assassins, and therefore 
to common criminals. They have thus placed 
themselves beyond the pale of humanity, and those 
who outside of Germany knowingly help them in 
their task of enslaving Europe are nothing more or 
less than accomplices and should.be dealt with as 
such. 

III. 

On January 19th, 1916, in the Reichstag, Deputy 
Martin stated that "The German nation would be 
very ill-pleased if Germany were to restore the terri- 
tories she now occupies" {Le Temps, 21st January, 
191 6). This sentence summarizes the opinion 
prevalent beyond the Rhine. 

In their endeavours to retain the greater part of 
the territories occupied by them at the beginning of 
1916 the Germans have combined military measures 
with political manoeuvres. 

They have entrenched themselves tremendously 
on all fronts which the Allies could possibly attack. 
By the accumulation everywhere of defensive 
works, machine-guns and heavy artillery, the 
Germans hope to counter-balance the losses 



72 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

of their troops and thus to persevere in their 
resistance to the allied attacks, till the enemy grow 
weary of the dreadful struggle. The experience 
of the war having proved how extremely difficult it 
is to pierce strongly fortified lines, the German 
Headquarters Staff appears to have taken this 
knowledge as the base of the following calculation: 
"We have achieved nine-tenths of the annexa- 
tions on which we counted; only Calais, Verdun, 




THE GERMAN FORTRESS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916. 

Belfort, Riga and Salonika are wanting. We will try 
to obtain possession of these places if opportunity 
offers; if not, in order to avoid excessive risks, we 
shall remain everywhere in Europe on a keen 
defensive, but we will pretend, all the time, to 
wish to take the offensive, so as to mislead our 
adversaries. If the Franco-English insist on con- 
centrating their efforts, above all against our lines 
of the Western front, as these lines are manifold and 
very strong, the enemy losses will be such, that even 



SPECIAL FEATURES 73 

if they succeed in throwing us back, they will 
finally be so utterly exhausted as to be unable to 
cross the Rhine. Therefore, they will be powerless 
to dictate peace to Germany." 

Surely the Allies, taught by experience, can foil 
this probable calculation of their antagonists by 
well managed, simultaneous attacks on the whole 
accessible circuit of the German fortress. In 
fact this is what the Allies seem more and more 
inclined to do. 

The indented line on the map (p. 72) shows what 
a strange shape is assumed by the enormous terri- 
tories which build up that fortress. For alimentary 
purposes it is victualled, firstly, by the resources of 
non- German countries which are occupied and most 
thoroughly drained, and secondly by importations; 
which come through the channel of neutral countries 
— Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Roumania, and Swit- 
zerland—which have responded,more or less liberally, 
whether voluntarily or not, to the pressing appli- 
cations of Germany. 

On the other hand, thanks to the passage through 
the Balkans, the German fortress, early in 1916, had 
a wide open door on Persia, the Caucasus, Central- 
Russian Asia, Afghanistan, India and Egypt. After 
having armed all the Moslems on whom they could 
lay hands, and who were able to shoulder a gun, the 
German Staff reckoned on striking at Great Britain 
and Russia in all these directions. The successes 
obtained by the Tsar's troops in Eastern Turkey 
have, since then, bafiied these projects. 

On the other hand, as Germany has nothing 
whatever to gain by a prolongation of the war, she 
will continue to aim at a rupture of the Coalition by 
means of every possible political manoeuvre. It is 
clear that the defection of one of the principal Al- 
lies would necessarily place all the others in vastly 
more difficult positions for continuing the struggle. 



74 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Assuming that such a thing were to happen, the 
Germans could, indeed, hope to discuss peace on the 
base of the territories which they actually occupy. 
They will therefore repeat and increase their bids 
for a separate peace with one or other of their 
adversaries. When once their position becomes very 
difficult the Germans, so as to shatter at all cost the 
Coalition, will make propositions of separate peace 
to one of the Allies, offering that one country almost 
complete satisfaction in the hope that, swayed 
perhaps by a section of their people who have grown 
weary of war, that Allied country will lay down 
her arms. 

The Allied State which, contrary to its plighted 
faith, should separately treat with Berlin, would 
soon be punished for its infamy. By allowing 
Germany to conclude peace more or less on the 
basis of the territories she at present holds, the 
traitor State would find itself afterwards confronted 
by a formidable German Empire, and would 
inevitably become one of its first victims. 

The Germans will perhaps try to play on the 
Allies the ''armistice trick." Here, again, we 
should have a cunning calculation founded once 
more on the weariness of the combatants. It is, 
indeed, conceivable that a simple armistice might 
end in allowing Germany to hold finally most of her 
actual territorial acquisitions; but it could so end 
only by means of a manoeuvre which we must now 
expose. 

No doubt they must make at Berlin the following 
calculation, which theoretically has something to 
be said for it: "If an armistice were signed, the 
Allied soldiers would think: 'They are talking, 
therefore it means peace, and demobilization will 
soon follow.' Under these conditions the effect will 
be the moral slackening of our adversaries." The 
Germans could not ask for anything better. They 



SPECIAL FEATURES 75 

would open peace negotiations with the following 
astute idea. To understand the manoeuvre we 
must remember the proposals of peace which that 
active agent, Dr. Alfred Hermann Fried, of Vienna, 
was charged to throw out as a sounding-lead on the 
27th December, 191 5, in an article of the Nouvelle 
Gazette de Zurich, which made a great stir. These 
proposals were mixed up with provisoes, which 
would allow the discussion to be opened or broken 
off at any moment desired. For example, Belgium 
would preserve her independence, but "on condi- 
tion of treaties, perhaps also of guarantees, which 
would render impossible a repetition of the events 
of 1914." The occupied departments of France 
would be restored unconditionally to France, but 
''some small rectifications of frontiers might 
perhaps be desired in the interests of both parties" 
(Journal de Geneve, 29th December, 191 5). 
Assuming that the Allies committed the enormous 
mistake of discussing peace on such treacherous 
terms, Germany still entrenched behind her fronts, 
which would have been rendered almost impregnable, 
would say to the Allies, "I don't agree with you. 
After all you cannot require of me that I should 
evacuate territories from which you are powerless 
to drive me. If you are not satisfied, continue the 
war." As, while the negotiations were pending, all 
needful steps would have been taken by the German 
agents to aggravate the moral slackening of the 
soldiers of such Allied countries as might be most 
weary of the struggle, the huge military machine of 
the Entente could not again be put in motion as 
a whole. The real result would be, in fact, the 
rupture of the Anti- Germanic Coalition,, and finally 
the conclusion of a peace more or less based on 
actual occupation. Berlin's goal would thus have 
been reached. 

Finally, when the ''armistice trick" shall have 



76 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

also failed, and the situation of Germany shall have 
grown still worse, we shall see Berlin play her last 
trump. Petitions against territorial annexations 
will be multiplied on the other side of the Rhine. 
In an underhand way they will be favoured by the 
Government of Berlin, which will end by saying to 
the Allies: "Let us stop killing each other. I am 
perfectly reasonable. I give up my claims on such 
of your territories as are occupied by my armies. 
Let us negotiate peace on the basis of the 'drawn 
game.' " 

The day when this proposal will be made, the 
Allies will have to face the most astute of the 
Berlin tricks, the most alarming German trap. 
At that moment the tenacity, the clearsightedness, 
and the solidarity of the Allies must be put forth to 
the utmost. To show the extreme necessity of 
this, in the case supposed, I must baffle the German 
manoeuvre in advance by proving clearly in the fol- 
lowing chapter that the dodge of the drawn game, 
if it succeeded, would mask in reality a formidable 
success for Germany and an irreparable catastrophe 
for the Allies and for the freedom of the world. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE DODGE OF THE " DRAWN GAME " 

AND THE SCHEME " PROM HAMBURG TO THE 

PERSIAN GULF." 

I. What would really be the outcome of the dodge called 

the "Drawn Game." 
II. The financial consequences for the Allies of this so-called 

"Drawn Game." 
III. The Allies and the scheme "From Hamburg to the Persian 
Gulf." ... 

IV. Panislamic and Asiatic consequences of the achievement 

of the scheme "From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." 

V. Consequences for the world of the achievement of the 

scheme "From Hambvurg to the Persian Gulf." 

If the Allies really wish, as their Governments 
have often proclaimed, to put an end to the peril 
of Prussian militarism, they must resolutely face 
the facts as they are, even when these are 
unpalatable to their self-esteem. They must 
understand fully that the chance of carrying out 
the Pangerman plan rests in a large measure on 
the ignorance of the Allies. Berlin knew that 
before the war the countries now allied were 
unaware of the totally new face which within 
recent years has been put on all the political 
problems of the Balkans and Austria-Hungary by 
the labours of Pangermanism and the movement 
of nationalities. Undoubtedly that ignorance of 
the Allies has been as minutely studied and 
appraised as were their military deficiencies; the 
conviction that the Allies did not understand 
how to grapple with the situation has certainly 
contributed to Berlin's decision to unloose the dogs 

77 



78 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

of war. Now, the dodge of the ''Drawn Game," 
the last trump of the Berlin Government, is a fresh 
gamble based on the ignorance of the Allies about 
foreign affairs. 



The dodge of the "Drawn Game" will be based 
on the following train of reasoning, which un- 
questionably prevails in Berlin: 

"The Allied diplomats have grasped neither our 
plan, nor our Pangerman organization, although 
that has required a preparation lasting twenty 
years. The Allied diplomats have understood 
neither the true position of the Balkans after the 
treaty of Bukarest (though that position was so 
favourable to themselves), nor the importance of 
the Balkan forces for the issue of the war. Still 
less do the Allied diplomats and the public of their 
respective countries know about the real state of 
affairs in Austria-Hungary. In France, and above 
all in England, a considerable proportion of the 
public continue to believe that Austria-Hungary is 
chiefly a German country, and that its more or less 
formal union with the Empire is a natural and 
almost inevitable event. Therefore, if we are com- 
pelled to give way in the East and in the West we 
may still, if we are clever, have a chance of achiev- 
ing the third part of our Pangerman plan. The 
Allies will not understand the future danger in 
store for them if we carry out that part which is, 
indeed, the principal part of our scheme, namely, 
our designs on the South and South-East, symbolized 
by the formula: From Hamburg to the Persian 
Gulf." 

Indeed, the dodge of the "Drawn Game" aims 
at nothing less than at that result. We must own 
that the German argument which has just been 
summarized is not devoid of foundation; for up to 



THE ''DRAWN GAME" 



79 



now the Press of the Allies has published articles 
on Austria-Hungary revealing a total misconception 
of the facts, and they have thus unconsciously 
encouraged the Pangerman project as regards the 
Hapsburg Monarchy. 

In the Allied Press, also, the expression: 
''Drawn Game" is currently employed to mean 
that Germany might be considered as vanquished 
if she evacuates the now occupied territories in the 
East and in the West; but nobody has yet pointed 




THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DODGE CALLED 
THE "DRAWN GAME." 



out with the necessary precision that the so-called 
"Drawn Game" would not be a draw at all, since 
it would allow Germany to effect enormous acquisi- 
tions, which would make her much more powerful 
than before the war. 

And yet the Allies ought not to be again the 
dupes of a German stratagem; which, if it succeeded, 



8o PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

would involve consequences infinitely more serious 
than all the former errors of the Allies. To ward off 
that danger it suffices to look it full in the face and 
thoroughly to fathom what would be the outcome of 
a peace negotiated on the so-called principle of a 
"Drawn Game." 

The term ''Drawn Game" evidently denotes that 
each country would keep the frontiers which existed 
before the war; also that each country would 
bear the burden of the outlays it has made during 
the struggle. But we will argue on a hypothesis 
infinitely more favourable for the Western Allies 
than that of the so-called ''Drawn Game" in order 
to demonstrate super-abundantly and as decisively 
as possible what would be concealed behind 
this apparent and partial German capitulation. 

Let us suppose (see map, p. 79) that, in conse- 
quence of victorious offensives of the Allies, Ger- 
many should declare herself disposed, not only to 
evacuate totally Poland, the French Departments, 
Belgium, and Luxemburg, but also to restore 
Alsace-Lorraine to France, and even to give, as an 
indemnity all the rest of the left bank of the Rhine, 
under the sole and tacit condition that Germany 
should keep her preponderant influence, direct or 
indirect, over Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and 
Turkey. 

There are surely in the Allied Western countries 
many worthy people who, at present, no more 
see the result of such a peace, than a year ago they 
understood the enormous influences which the 
Balkans would exert on the course of the war. 
These good creatures, weary of the prolonged strife, 
would at once say: "After all, these are most 
acceptable terms: Alsace-Lorraine, the left bank 
of the Rhine! ... let us make peace." 

If matters are probed to the bottom it will be 
easily seen that, should the Allies negotiate peace 



THE ''DRAWN GAME" 81 

with Germany on such a basis, the restitution of 
Alsace-Lorraine could only be temporary; for 
with such a peace as that, Germany would secure 
all the elements of power which might enable her, 
after a very short respite, to retake Alsace-Lorraine, 
and in the end to overcome all the Allies and to 
achieve in its entirety the Pangerman plan, not only 
in Europe, but in Asia, nay in the whole world. 



To relinquish the left bank of the Rhine, accord- 
ing to our hypothesis, would mean for Germany 
that she would lose: 

Provinces. 
Rhenish-Prussia 
Rhenish-Bavaria 
Alsace-Lorraine 

Total 

The present German Empire would therefore be 
reduced to 493,408 square kilometres and 58 
million inhabitants. But this loss in the West 
would be far more than counterbalanced by that 
close union of Austria-Hungary to the German 
Empire, which would be none the less real because 
it would be disguised. On this reckoning Berlin's 
influence would be exercised directly and absolutely 
over: 

Square 
Kilometres. Population. 

German Empire curtailed in the 

West . . . . . . . . 493,408 58,000,000 

Austria-Hungary . . . . 676,616 50,000,000 

Total .. .. .. 1,170,024 108,000,000 

It is evident that a solid block of States, estab- 
lished in Central Europe under the direction of 



Square 




kilometres. 


Population 


27,000 


7,000,000 


5,928 


1,000,000 


14,522 


2,000,000 


47,450 


10,000,000 



82 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Berlin, would exercise, simply by contiguity an 
absolutely preponderant pressure on: 

Square 

Kilometres. Population. 

The Balkans . . . . . . 499,275 22,000,000 

Turkey . . . . . . . . 1,792,900 20,000,000 



Total .. .. .. 2,292,175 42,000,000 

Therefore Berlin's preponderant influence would 
be wielded, directly or indirectly, over 3,462,199 
square kilometres and over 150 million inhabitants. 

We now see clearly that in the end the dodge of 
the "Drawn Game" would lead in reality to an 
enormous increase of the German Empire, and to 
the achievement of the principal part of the 
Pangerman plan summarized in the formula "from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" (p. 109 of original). 
What then would be the general position of Great 
Germany thus constituted? 

"Having cut Europe in two, mistress of the 
Adriatic as well as of the North Sea, secure in her 
fleets and in her armies, Great Germany would 
be an incubus on the world. Trieste, the Hamburg 
of the South, would feed her in peace and revictual 
her in war. Her industry, equipped with plant of 
incomparable power, would flood with her wares 
those very countries which she now schemes so art- 
fully to monopolize: — Holland and Belgium, which 
are already penetrated; Hungary, her client; 
Roumania, her satellite; Bulgaria, a broken 
barrier; Bosnia and Herzegovina, the portals of 
the East. And, beyond the Bosphorus, Germany 
would reach Asia- Minor, that immense quarry of 
wealth. The huge German railroad projected to 
run from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf without a 
break, would link Berlin to the Far East. Then 
would the Emperor William's Brobdingnagian 
dream be fulfilled. Germany would rule the world 



THE ''DRAWN GAME." 83 

by her might and by her commerical wealth. 
The state of things which then would exist 
might be described by slightly modifying what 
Metternich wrote of Napoleonic France: 'The 
German system which to-day is triumphant is 
directed against all the great states in their entirety, 
against every power able to maintain its own 
independence.'" 

Such are the words which I published fifteen years 
ago in my book, V Europe et la Question d'Autriche 
au seuil du XX^ siecle, p. 353 {Plan, Nourrit, 
editeurs, Paris). A careful study of the Pan- 
german plan of 1895 had then convinced me that 
the whole future policy of Berlin would tend to 
carry out the plan laid down in the formula 
"from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." In what 
I then wrote a few minute discrepancies may now 
be detected, but, unfortunately, the facts of to-day 
show that still on the v/hole my words correspond 
exactly with events. The dodge of the "Drawn 
Game," which the Germans keep up their sleeve, 
hoping still to profit by the ignorance or the 
weariness of some of the Allies, would indeed 
have for its indisputable object the achievement of 
that huge plan. 

The terrible danger which this would bring 
upon the Allies will be better perceived (sup- 
posing they fall into the trap laid for them) 
when we shall have demonstrated with precision, 
what would be the consequences for them if the 
scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" 
were to succeed. 

II. 

If we suppose for the sake of argument that 
the dodge of the "Drawn Game" were to succeed 
so far as to allow the Germans, by binding Austria- 
Hungary to the German Empire, to carry through 



84 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

their plan "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," 
their success would involve certain general 
j&nancial consequences. These we must unfold, if 
we would clearly understand the full extent of the 
craft hidden under the cloak of that manoeuvre 
called the ''Drawn Game," which is still to be 
played. 

The Germans having failed to crush the Allies, 
begin to think that the expenses of war may possibly 
fall on themselves. The Berlin Post has already 
calculated: "If we do not receive a war indemnity 
we must reckon on a yearly increase of taxes of at 
least four milliard marks," being five milliard 
francs for 68 million inhabitants {Le Temps, ist 
February, 1916). 

The disappointment is certainly keen for the 
Germans who counted on exacting from France alone 
an indemnity of 35 milliard francs; but we must 
nevertheless fully understand that the dodge of the 
"Drawn Game" (which, for the sake of argument, 
we suppose to have succeeded) would place Ger- 
many in a financial position vastly more advantage- 
ous than that of the Allies. 

As a matter of fact, the cost of war has been much 
less for Germany than for her adversaries. This is 
a point which must be fully considered, all the more 
because it helps to explain why the economic 
resistance of Germany is more prolonged than was 
generally expected. 

From the beginning of hostilities, Austro- German 
troops have lived at the vast expense of enemy or 
Allied territories, such as Turkey and Bulgaria, 
whose accumulated resources they slowly, drain. 
Besides, in enemy countries, particularly in Bel- 
gium and in France, which are the richest regions on 
earth, the Germans have collected a large amount 
of plunder. On Belgium alone they have levied a 
war contribution in specie of 480 million francs a 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 85 

year. Out of Belgium and France the Germans 
draw large quantities of coal and iron scot free. 
In both these countries they have purloined raw 
goods, machines, furniture, valuables, representing 
the value certainly of several milliard francs. 
In the French towns of the Nord alone the 
Germans have stolen about 550 million francs worth 
of wool. Everywhere they have seized innumerable 
securities which they have already tried to convert 
into money, though with small success, in the 
United States. But if a complete victory did 
not compel the Germans to restore those bonds 
to the Allies who own them, some at least 
of them would suffer a heavy loss of capital, by 
the mere fact of their warrants being detained; 
the effect of this would unavoidably react on 
the general wealth of the Allied countries. To 
these losses would probably be added those of 
the numerous milliards of francs, lent by the French 
or English to Austria, to the Balkan States, and 
to Turkey, and represented by bonds which at 
present are, it is true, in Allied lands, but whose 
value would become exceedingly uncertain and 
hazardous the day that Germany ruled from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Teutonic good 
faith would then serve as the only guarantee that 
dividends would be paid. The war, therefore, has 
put within Germany's power not only vast terri- 
tories which have enabled her to carry on the struggle 
with far less expense than the Allies, but also the 
Germans have been able to lay their hands on 
enormous wealth, representing tens of milliards of 
francs, which, being partly convertible into specie, 
have reduced by that amount the direct financial 
war outlay of Germany. 

Clearly, the Allies are not in an equal position. 

Always supposing, for the sake of argument, that 
peace were concluded with Berlin on the basis of the 



86 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

"Drawn Game," each one of the Allies would have 
to bear, without any reduction, the immense 
expenses incurred to maintain a war made by- 
Germany. It is easy to perceive that these war 
costs have been and are considerably higher for 
each of the Allies and more miscellaneous than has 
been the case for Germany. The Allies found it 
necessary to improvise an enormous war plant 
under most costly conditions, while Germany had 
been able during peace, that is, under relatively 
economical conditions, to produce all the material 
of her fighting equipment. 

The Allies are bound to take care of and to main- 
tain millions of refugees from invaded regions, 
whereas the Germans have only temporarily borne 
such a burden and merely for a small part of 
Eastern Prussia. After the war, Belgium, Russia 
and especially France will have to provide for some 
tens of milliards of francs worth of extra charges for 
repairs of the colossal damages done by the Germans 
in invaded territories, to private persons, State 
properties, railways, roads, etc. The Germans 
would not have a similar outlay, at least not any- 
thing like in the same proportion. In their con- 
ception of the "Drawn Game" the Germans 
certainly reckon that these financial differences 
would almost ensure, after peace, the ulterior 
impotence of the Allied countries as against Great 
Germany. 

What, for instance, would be the position of 
France if a war indemnity were not paid to her? 
A few familiar figures, which everyone can check, 
will enable us to form an opinion on that score. If 
the struggle lasts, let us say, for two years, we can 
estimate at 50 milliards of francs the direct outlay 
for France, and about 20 milliards would be re- 
quired for her indirect expenditure, that is, v/hat must 
be paid after peace for repairing the prodigious 



THE ''DRAWN GAME^' 87 

damage caused to individuals and to the State — 
remaking of roads, rebuilding of railways, etc., the 
total of the expenses mounting up to some 70 
milliards of francs. As the national debt of France, 
before the war, was 30 milliards of francs, it would 
therefore have increased after peace to about 100 
milliard francs. 

On the other hand the budget of France in 1914 
was in round figures five milliard francs. The single 
item of the rise in price of daily commodities 
will in itself inevitably be increased after war at 
least by 10%, therefore the budget after peace will 
require, let us say, an initial increase of 500 million 
francs. On the other hand, this same budget would 
have to bear interest at 5% on the 70 milliard 
francs of newly incurred war debts; this would 
make a yearly outlay of 3,500 million francs. 
Finally, it is clear that pensions to be given to the 
wounded, to widows of combatants, will burden 
the budget by a yearly outlay of at least a milliard 
francs. Probably even that figure will be insufficient. 
Altogether the French budget of five milliard 
francs, as it was in 1914, would have to be increased 
by about five milliard francs; in other words, it 
will have to be doubled. Already we well know that 
this figure is much below what would be needed. 
And yet that enormous increase makes no allowance 
for sums required to effect important social reforms, 
nor for the great improvements necessary to bring 
up the economic national plant of France to a proper 
standard for resuming business actively. 

We remember how hard it was in France before 
the war to find, by means of taxes, even the 500 
million of francs needed for new expenditures. How 
could we find annually an additional sum of five 
milliard francs of taxes in a country cruelly devas- 
tated by the struggle and where the re-organization 
of economic life would have to be complete? It 



88 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

is obvious that the most crushing taxes levied on 
every person would not suffice for such a sum 
to be regularly raised. 

Such a situation must inevitably tend to 
raise for the State and for every Frenchman 
individually considerable financial difficulties. 
The same would apply to economic undertakings. 
Thousands of these, at present in the hands 
of shareholders or bond-holders, would be in 
a most precarious condition, or the securities would 
be immensely depreciated. Landed property, over- 
burdened by taxes and specially affected by the 
shortage of labour, would lose a great part of its 
value. This situation would lead to a general rise 
in prices for the commodities of daily life, and that 
again would lay a fresh burden on the back of every 
Frenchman. The financial position would be analo- 
gous for the Russians and for the English,^ who of 
all the belligerents have spent most on the war. 

The Germans, in trying their "Drawn Game" 
trick, reckon on these financial consequences to 
reduce the Allies to ultimate impotence. The only 
way to avoid this danger is to win that complete 
victory which all the Allies desire, since it would 
enable them to impose on Germany the payment of 
the war indemnity which she unquestionably owes, 
as she is responsible for the hostilities. Annuities 
paid to each of the Allies will be used as the basis of 
loans, which will help to tide over the serious 
financial difficulties that infallibly await all the 
belligerents after the war. 

in. 

The menace involved in the scheme "from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" creates between 
the Allies in Europe, a common bond of interest, 
which is far superior to their own individual 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 89 

interests, and which ought to keep them firmly 
united to the end. 

France, England, Russia and Italy have an 
identical and an absolutely vital interest in defeat- 
ing for ever the scheme of an empire that should 
reach from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. This is 
quite apart from the purely humanitarian con- 
sideration that the numerous non-German peoples 
who live between Bohemia and the Persian Gulf 
should not be finally subservient to Germany. 
The achievement of the '^ Hamburg to the Persian 
Gulf" scheme threatens all neutral states, for it 
would guarantee to Germany, as we shall see 
presently, her domination over the world. 

Always on the supposition that this scheme 
succeeded, it would, regarded from the general 
economic point of view, place Germany in every 
respect in an infinitely superior position to that of 
the Allies. Her direct or indirect seizure of Austria- 
Hungary, of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire 
would secure for Germany an extraordinary 
economic power, against which all eventual 
combinations of the Allies would be impotent. 
The German dogged power of work, spirit of 
enterprise and organizing skill need no further 
demonstration. We must therefore not doubt for 
a moment that they would draw, to their enormous 
advantage, all possible profits from Austria-Hungary, 
vast regions of which can still be turned to account. 
The same would apply to the Balkan countries, 
many of which are still quite virgin, and contain, to 
a considerable extent, unexplored sources of wealth, 
both agricultural and mineral. This would also be 
true of Asiatic Turkey. As early as 1886 the 
German Orientalist, Dr. Spenger, stated: ''Asia 
Minor is the only territory of the world which has 
not yet been monopolized by a Great Power. And 
yet it is the finest field for colonization. If Germany 



go PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

does not miss the opportunity and seizes it before 
the Cossacks grab it, she will have secured the best 
part in the division of the world." 

It is an illusion to imagine that the Turks would 
seriously raise obstacles to the economic exploita- 
tion of their country by Germany. If the Germans 
were masters of Central Europe and the Balkans, 
they would be in a position to sweep away all 
obstacles. The Prussian Pangermans are quite sure 
of it, thanks to their liege-men of Constantinople. 
This is proved sufficiently by the way in which the 
hereditary prince of Turkey, Yussuf-Izzedin, 
was "suicided" at the end of January, 1916, 
because he was an ti- German. The Germans would 
perfectly understand the art of showering, as 
hitherto, the amplest personal advantages on the 
handful of Young Turks of Enver Pasha's clique, 
while at the same time they would grant such 
nominal concessions as would enable Berlin under 
the same to exploit thoroughly the Ottoman Empire. 

Do not let us be deceived, if the scheme "from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" succeeded, it would 
place in Berlin's hands every element of a formid- 
able economic power unprecedented in history. It 
would secure, in fact, to Germany the exclusive 
monopoly of economic influence on about three 
million square kilometres of European and Asiatic 
lands (Austria-Hungary, Balkans, Turkey), and it 
would include, beside, the seizure of numerous 
strategical places of the highest importance (the 
coasts of the Adriatic and the ^gean Sea, the 
Dardanelles, etc.). 

Now the permanence of these enormous advan- 
tages would be assured to Great Germany through 
the expansion of Prussian militarism. For it must 
be clearly understood — the point is essential — 
that Prussian militarism would become consider- 
ably more powerful than it was in 19 14, if the 



THE ''DRAWN GAME" 91 

scheme ''from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" 
were achieved. Yet it is the destruction of 
Prussian militarism which is the true, legitimate, 
and necessary object of the war, an object infinitely 
above any mere territorial annexation whatsoever. 

The increase of power which would accrue to 
Prussian militarism through the accomplishment 
of the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian 
Gulf" is readily intelligible. The close attach- 
ment of Austria-Hungary to Germany, by placing 
under the immediate authority of the Headquarters 
Staff of Berlin a population of 108 millions, would 
enable it to mobilize at least 10 millions of soldiers. 
Now, in virtue of the central geographical position 
of the two empires, and of the network of Austro- 
German railways, which would be brought to 
the highest degree of technical perfection, this 
immense army might, even more easily than to-day, 
be very rapidly concentrated on any point of the 
periphery of the Germanic confederation. But 
that is not all. The predominance of Berlin over 
the Balkans and Turkey, by means of political 
alliances forced on the satellite states of the South- 
East, would give in addition to the Berlin Staff 
control of 42 million inhabitants, that is to say, of 
about four millions of soldiers. 

Supposing then that the mobilization applied to 
only ten per cent, of the population, the accomplish- 
ment of the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian 
Gulf" would place under the influence, direct or 
indirect, of the HohenzoUerns, a total of about 
fifteen millions of soldiers. If the mobilization 
applied to fourteen per cent, of the population, 
which is the proportion attained by Serbia and 
apparently by Austria-Hungary, the figure would be 
21 millions of soldiers. 

Now the course of the present war proves in- 
contestably that the control of great military 



92 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

masses, placed in a single hand and elaborated as 
minutely as the Berlin Staff, forms a power infinitely- 
greater than that of far more numerous masses 
under a control which is not sufficiently co-ordinated. 

Hence the accomplishment of the scheme "from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" would place 
Germany in a military position considerably superior 
to that of all the Allied countries together. 

In any case, those who are fighting for the 
purpose of putting an end to great armaments 
would find themselves once more plunged into the 
vortex of the most rigorous militarism, for they 
could not contend with Great Germany except at 
the cost of formidable armaments, which would 
absorb all their resources and all their attention. 
Now, would they be in a position to undertake such 
armaments in the infinitely difficult financial 
situation in which, according to hypothesis, 
they would stand? (see p. 86). Would they even 
have the resolution to undertake them, after the 
frightful moral disappointment of their peoples, 
who would learn too late the enormous mistake 
committed by their governments in negotiating 
peace on the basis of the so-called ''Drawn Game," 
which would have enabled Berlin to carry out its 
scheme of domination ''from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf"? 

Besides, even if the Allies were willing to attempt 
once more the overthrow of the atrocious Prussian 
militarism, now much more oppressive than before 
the war, Great Germany would certainly not give 
them time to prepare for it. 

We may be quite sure that the day peace was 
concluded on the basis supposed, Berlin would set 
about organizing economically and militarily, with 
the utmost speed, the immense territory over which 
its supremacy would be extended. Supposing that 
Russia, France, England and Italy were disposed 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 93 

to renew the conflict, they would, in the assumed 
financial and moral situation, be certainly reduced 
to impotence before they could make head against 
the new German colossus. 

Finally, it would be ignoring completely the 
tenacity and ambition of the Hohenzollerns to 
imagine that Great Germany, once mistress of an 
empire from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, would 
sincerely renounce the ambition of dominating the 
North Sea and the English Channel. Hence the 
evacuation of Belgium and the retrocession of 
Alsace-Lorraine, which on our hypothesis Germany 
would have yielded to France, would only have been 
temporary. The apparent capitulation of Berlin 
would have been, therefore, nothing but a cunning 
device to allow Germany, driven almost to bay, to 
recover herself for a renewal of the struggle. Indeed, 
she is already preparing for it in union with her 
actual allies. La Nation Tcheque, of 15th March, 
1916, an excellent review edited by M. Ernest 
Denis, professor at the Sorbonne, brought to light 
the following fact. On the 29th February, 1916, 
the Chamber of Commerce of Budapest met, all 
members being present, in order to study what 
measures to take for a future war intended to 
complete the insufficient results of a peace, looked 
upon as "imperfect." In this discussion it was 
stated that with the prospect of a fresh conflagra- 
tion the States allied to Germany in the present 
war must form an Economic Union. 

Thus, already, the Hohenzollern are stirring up 
even their allies to organize the future conflagration 
which they will set ablaze if the Allies do not crush 
Prussian militarism. William II. and his Panger- 
mans want, at all costs, to carry out the scheme 
known as "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" 
because they know very well that the completion of 
that scheme, as we shall see presently, would 



94 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

suffice to provide them with all the means of after- 
wards accomplishing in its entirety their programme 
of universal domination. 



IV. 

The Pangerman plan of 191 1 provides that the re- 
sults of the "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" scheme 
should be made the most of even in the furthest 
points of the Far East. Facts to hand and well- 
known Pangerman programmes enable us to form 
an idea of what help Germany meant to find in 
Asia during the war, and what profit would have 
accrued to her afterwards from the said scheme, if 
she had succeeded in finally carrying it out. 

William II. tried to play the Panislamic card, 
which is one of the leading trumps of the Pangerman 
game. In a word, the object was to stir up a 
Panislamic movement, both political and military, 
which would help Germany to vanquish the Entente 
powers, since these hold among their possessions 
numerous Moslem subjects: France, particularly 
in Tunis, Algiers and Morocco; Italy in Libya; 
Russia in the Crimea and in the Caucasus, in the 
region of Kazan, in Central Aisa and in Siberia; 
England in Egypt, in India, in Burma, in the 
Straits Settlements and in the greater part of her 
African Colonies. 

As Panislamism is ostensibly founded on the 
restoration and considerable extension of the 
influence and powers of the Sultan of Constanti- 
nople, Commander of the Faithful, it could not fail 
to flatter deeply the neo-nationalism of the Turks, 
which has manifested itself particularly since the 
failure of the Allies at the Dardanelles. The result 
is that, thanks to Panislamism, the Kaiser's inter- 
ests have been well served by the Sultan's Moslem 
subjects; a clever propaganda has dazzled their 



THE ''DRAWN GAME" 



95 



eyes with a prospect of the restoration of a great 
empire, even greater than in days of old. 

The Panislamic movement, minutely and long 
prepared during peace by Germany, was started by 
her as soon as hostilities began. On the advice of 
Berlin, the Sultan proclaimed, as early as the end 
of 1 9 14, the Jehad or Holy War. No doubt the 
Moslem insurrection has not become general, but 
the Islamic agitation has nevertheless yielded 
local results, which will be better understood after 
the war, and which have hampered the Allies in 




ASIATIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE 
SCHEME "FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF." 

India, in Egypt, in Libya and in the French posses- 
sions of North Africa. Particularly in April, 191 5, 
an insurrection of British Indian troops at Singa- 
pore very nearly succeeded. About the same time 
in Siam, numerous German officers, with the assis- 
tance of Indian and Burmese revolutionaries, had 
begun to muster a small army of 16,000 men, 
who, after being armed, were to attack British 
Burma. This Islamic agitation was threatening 
to assume serious proportions, when the success of 
the Russians in Armenia and in Persia fortun- 
ately checked it by striking a heavy blow at the 
prestige of the Sultan, the Commander of the 
Faithful. 



96 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Nevertheless, what Berlin has already attempted 
to achieve with the help of Islam, should serve the 
Allies as a strong warning of what Germany would 
certainly do in time to come, if the future peace left 
her the necessary means. As soon as the Turco- 
German junction had been effected across Serbia in 
October, 1915, the Panislamic policy of the Kaiser 
assumed a more decided form. At the behest of 
the Kaiser, his familiar spirit at Constantinople, 
Enver Pacha, who then was all-powerful, mobi- 
lized the whole of such of his Ottoman subjects as 
were able to carry the arms provided for them, 
which only at the beginning of 191 6 began to pour in 
from the Central Empires, after communications had 
been established across invaded Serbia. At the 
same time, hundreds of thousands of Armenians 
were systematically massacred, in order to eliminate 
a non-Moslem population, which thwarted the 
Turco- German plans for the future. As to the 
military and Panislamic activity of the Turks, 
directed by the Germans, it has endeavoured to 
radiate from Constantinople in many directions 
towards Egypt, the Caucasus, Persia, Central- 
Russian Asia, Afghanistan and India. 

After the war, if by our hypothesis, peace were 
made on the basis of a "Drawn Game," that is to say, 
if the scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" 
were carried out, all these other plans v/ould be 
taken up again. How would the Turks free them- 
selves from the German clutches? Their financial 
position binds them entirely to Germany. Such 
large personal advantages as the Kaiser's agents 
would inevitably offer to all Turks whose help 
would be considered useful, would suffice to ensure 
Berlin's predominance in the Sultan's Empire, that 
classical land of backsheesh (see map, p. 95). 

Now, there are in Persia, in the Azerbijan, about 
400,000 men who would make quite useful soldiers. 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 97 

ana who would provide what is necessary for an 
ofifensive against Russia; in Afghanistan 500,000 
first class combatants would be found. Once 
armed they could be let loose in Northern India, 
which contains about 50 million Moslems. These, 
so far, have collectively remained loyal to Great 
Britain, but their feelings might be subject to a 
change if, as a fact, Germany appeared to ,be 
victorious by remaining mistress of the route from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Hence we conclude 
that very soon after a peace negotiated on such a 
basis, the English and the Russians might have to 
face very grave difi&culties. 

That is not all; German propaganda has ex- 
tended to the whole of China by various means. 
First of all the 20 to 30 milHon Moslems who dwell 
in the Celestial Empire, have been worked up by 
Turco- German agents in the same way as the 
Moslem population in other Islamic regions. But 
as the Chinese Moslems are geographically not well 
grouped to form a sufficiently powerful basis for the 
German agitation, the latter has fastened on the 
vital and motor organs of China. The German 
agents have bought in China, as elsewhere, all the 
newspapers which could be utilized for their object, 
particularly the Peking Post, written in English, 
and the Chinese review, Hsie-Ho-Pao. They have 
also made use of the Ostasiatische Lloyd, which 
was published at Tien-Tsin before the war. Since 
its outbreak they have founded the German China 
Gazette. All these organs have propagated every- 
where in the Celestial Empire the doctrine of 
German invincibility. Thanks to this, says the 
Frankfurter Zeitung, "every coolie knows by now 
that Germany is victorious." 

For the moment the policy which Germany 
pursues in China consists in stirring up everywhere 
trouble and unrest. In Northern China it upholds 



98 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

the President Yuan-Shi-Kai.* In his set the Ger- 
mans have gained numerous followers. Thanks to 
their influence, German officers already occupy 
very important posts in the Chinese army. But in 
Southern China, Germany is rousing the popula- 
tions against the authority of Yuan-Shi-Kai. The 
aim of Berlin in this apparent contradictory policy, 
is to create such a position in China that it will 
engross the attention of Japan, and prevent her 
from intervening with her troops in Europe; such 
an intervention has been already contemplated 
and would be still possible. 

The present Berlin policy in the Celestial Empire 
has also for its object to prepare the German policy of 
the future in the Far East. When once peace is 
concluded, on the basis on which she counts, 
Germany would pursue in China exactly the same 
policy which she intends to pursue in Turkey. 
Then Berlin will say to the Chinese, as she now says 
to the Turks, "See, we are bold financiers, enter- 
prising manufacturers, energetic business men. We 
will help you to turn your country to account. 
We shall procure for you the experts whom you 
need. We will give you the means of defending 
yourselves against your neighbours. We, who are 
the finest soldiers in the world, will bring up to a 
proper standard your endless and magnificent 
military forces, now in embryo. With your 300 
millions of inhabitants you can be the absolute 
rulers of all Asia. We will, therefore, build up for 
you a formidable army and a very powerful navy." 

It is easy to perceive what is hidden behind this 
programme, with its obvious attraction for the 
Chinese. In reality, it is a preparation for the 
seizure by Germany of part of China, and her 



*This passage was written before Yuan-Shi7Kai's death. Trans- 
lator's Note. 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 99 

economic exploitation under exactly the same con- 
ditions and by the same measures as those already 
employed in Turkey. Moreover, this policy is a 
signal vengeance which Germany means to wreak in 
the future on Japan after the victory of which she 
thinks herself assured. No doubt, in order to break 
the union of her adversaries, Berlin has already 
hinted to Tokio the idea of a separate peace, but 
that is merely a piece of tactics exacted by the need 
of the moment. 

Never would a Great Germany, mistress of the 
route from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, and 
exercising a predominant influence in China, forgive 
Japan for having driven her out of Kiao-Chau. 
Now, if and when an immense Chinese army 
shall have been created, under the direction of 
German officers, Japan, in spite of the bravery of 
her soldiers, would at once be unable to avoid the 
consequences of the intolerable situation in which 
she would be placed through the relative smallness 
of her population (70 millions, with her colonies, 
against 300 millions of Chinese). Japan is, there- 
fore, directly aimed at by the scheme of domination 
from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, which really 
endangers her future. 

Finally, we can see that thanks to a combination 
of Panislamism and a Chinophile policy, at least 
one that is outwardly so, the achievement of the 
scheme of domination from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf, would assure to Germany the means 
not only of dominating Europe, but also of exercis- 
ing a preponderant influence over the whole of Asia. 
After having obtained for herself in Europe the 
possibility of drawing exclusive profit from strategic 
positions of inestimable value, such as the shores of 
the Adriatic, the ^gean, and the Dardanelles, 
Germany would be mistress, by mere force of 
circumstances, of the Suez Canal and would com- 



loo PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

mand besides numerous vantage points on the 
Chinese coasts. Thus the defeat of the "Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf" project is a vital question not 
only for France, England, Russia, and Italy, but 
also for Japan. 

V. 

In order to demonstrate the really extraordinary 
importance of the scheme "from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf," we have still to show how its achieve- 
ment would not only make Germany mistress in 
Europe and preponderant in Asia, but would carry 
with it the accomplishment of the Pangerman 
plan in its world-wide form. The world-wide 
elements of this plan, graphically shown on the map 
herewith, have been set forth in the book of Otto 
Richard Tannenberg, The Greater Germany, the 
Work of the 20th Century* which appeared at 
Leipsic in 191 1. As this book, which hearing date 
jQii, contains the exact programme of the seizures 
to be effected in Europe and Turkey, nine-tenths 
of which the German General Staff has already 
carried out to the letter, the exceptional importance 
of Tannenberg's book is indisputable. It is demon- 
strated, in fact, that the annexations and seizures 
which he advocated in 191 1 correspond as com- 
pletely as possible with the execrable ambitions of 
the government of Berlin. 

As for the territorial acquisitions which Tannen- 
berg advocates in Asia, in Africa, in Oceania, and 
in America, they would be the perfectly logical 
consequences of the accomplishment of the "Ham- 
burg to the Persian Gulf" project. If that project 
became a reality, it would be because the European 
Allies, through their blunders in the management of 
the war, would have had to forego the notion of 

* A French translation of this work, by M. Maurice Millioud, of 
Lausanne, has been published by the firm of Payot. 



I02 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

beating Germany and to leave the German General 
Staff to command an army of from 15 to 21 
millions of men (see p. 91). Therefore, it is 
obvious that on this hypothesis the Allied peoples, 
after a treacherous peace, morally and financially 
exhausted, having to face the formidable armies of 
Pangermany, would be unable to oppose the 
accomplishment of those colonial schemes, which 
the success of the ''Hamburg to the Persian 
Gulf" plan would afford to Great Germany the 
means of carrying out, since, always on the 
assumption in question, they would have given 
way on an issue much more vital for them — that of 
the independence of Europe. 

Once grant this supposition, and we shall be con- 
vinced that Tannenberg's world-wide plan of Pan- 
german annexations is quite stripped of that 
chimerical character which at first sight we might 
be disposed to ascribe to it. 

Besides, we must add that the programme, which 
is fully described below, was drawn up by Tannen- 
berg on the supposition, on which the Berlin 
Government also reckoned, that England would 
not take part in the war. In order to purchase her 
neutrality, Tannenberg advocated dividing the 
colonies of the other European powers between 
London and Berlin. But now that England has 
thrown herself into the struggle, it is clear that, 
assuming Germany to be victorious, she would 
take possession also of those colonies which 
Tannenberg proposed to assign to Great Britain, 
since Britain would be incapable of resisting. It 
follows that the world-wide acquisitions of -Pan- 
germany, sketched in the plan of 191 1 and summar- 
ized below, are in fact less than Germany would be 
able to effect, since having presumably accom- 
plished the scheme of domination "from Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf," no organized force on earth 



THE ''DRAWN GAME" 103 

would be powerful enough to curb the boundless 
ambition of Berlin. 

We have proved above that if the Allies allowed 
Germany to secure her hold on Austria-Hungary, 
the predominant and exclusive influence of Berlin 
over all the Balkans and Turkey would be inevitable. 
Tannenberg {op. ciL, p. 323) explains that finally 
Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia, Palestine, 
Western Persia, and the larger part of Arabia 
would pass under the absolute protectorate of the 
German Empire, making a total of, say, 3,200,000 
square kilometres and 16,500,000 inhabitants. 

Once masters of the coasts of the Adriatic, the 
iEgean, the Dardanelles, and Aden, helped by the 
Panislamic propaganda, the Turco- German seizure 
of Egypt, and therefore of the Suez Canal, would 
necessarily follow. Germany, if she commanded 
these essential strategical points, would then 
obviously be able to retake her colonies in Africa 



and Oceania. 




Square 


Native 






Kilometres. 


Population. 


Togo 


. . 


87,000 


1,003,000 


Kameroon 


. . 


790,000 


2,540,000 


South- West Africa 


. . 


835,000 


87,000 


Eastern Africa 




995,000 


7,510,000 


Kaiser Wilhelm Land, 


Bismarck 






Archipelago, CaroUne 


Islands, 






Marshall Islands, the 


Marianes, 






Samoa _. . 


.. 


245,000 
2,952,000 


647,000 


Making a total of 


11,787,000 



Always on the assumption which we have made, 
the Allies, having given way in Europe, could not 
prevent Great- Germany from snatching, according 
to Tannenberg's programme, the Belgian, Portu- 
guese, and Dutch Colonies, namely: 

Square Native 

Kilometres. Population. 

Belgian Congo . . , . . . 2,365,000 15,000,000 

Portuguese Angola . . , . 1,270,000 4,200,000 

Dutch East Indies . . . . 2,045,000 38,106,000 

Total . . . . 5,680,000 57,306,000 



I04 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Next would come the turn of those French 
colonies, the cession of which to Great Germany- 
was foreshadowed by Tannenberg, op. cit., p. 313. 







Square 


Native 






Kilometres. 


Population. 


Morocco . . 


, , 


416,000 


3,000,000 


French Congo 




1,439,000 


9,800,000 


Madagascar 




585,000 


3,232,000 


Mayotta and the Comoros 


Islands 


2,000 


97,000 


Reunion . . 




2,000 


173,000 


Obok and dependencies 


(East 






Africa) . . 




120,000 


208,000 


Indo-China 




803,000 


16,990,000 


French Islands of Oceania . . 




24,000 


88,000 


Making a total of 


3,391,000 


33,588,000 



The combination of Panislamism and the so-called 
Chinophile movement would prepare for the Ger- 
man seizures in Asia. As we have seen (p. 99), the 
Berlin plan consists first in arming China powerfully 
enough under the orders of German officers, to expel 
the Japanese from Kiao-Chau and from the province 
of Shantung, Germany would thus inflict a first 
and striking vengeance on the Empire of the Rising 
Sun. But that would not be all. The policy 
which Berlin foreshadows with regard to China is 
identical with the one which it is now pursuing in 
Turkey. If Germany armed China, it would be 
under conditions such that the Celestial Empire 
would have to submit to the strict influence of 
Pangermany. Tannenberg (op. cit., p. 321) tells 
us that the outcome of these tactics would be the 
establishment of a vast zone of special German 
influence on the whole lower course of the Yang- 
tse-Kiang and the Hoangho, that is to say-, over 
that vast portion of China which forms the hinter- 
land of Kiao-Chau, making a total of about 750,000 
square kilometres and 50 millions of inhabitants. 

Tannenberg finally gives an exact enumeration 
of the various German protectorates which would 



THE ''DRAWN GAME" 



105 



be established in the southern part of South 
America, where dwell many German colonists, 
whose aggressive tendencies are already plain 
enough. "Germany," says Tannenberg literally, 
"takes under her protection the republics of 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, the southern 
third of Bolivia, so far as it belongs to the basin of 
the Rio de la Plata, together with that part of 
southern Brazil, in which German culture is 
dominant" {op. cit., p. 321). 





Square 






Kilometres. 


Population. 


Argentina 


2,950,000 


7,091,000 


ChiH 


757,000 


3,4i5,ooG 


Uruguay . . 


187,000 


1,225,000 


Paraguay . . 


253,000 


800,000 


J^Bolivia . . 


500,000 


666,oop 


>S Brazil . . 


1,700,000 


5,000,00© 


Making a total of 


6,347,000 


18,197,090 



"German South America," concludes Tannen- 
berg, "will provide for us in the temperate zone a 
colonial region where our emigrants will be able to 
settle as farmers. Chili and Argentina will pre- 
serve their language and their autonomy. But we 
shall require that in the schools German shall be 
taught as a second language. Southern Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay are countries of German 
culture. German will there be the national tongue" 
{op. cit., p. 337). 

Even during the war, Germany has laid the train 
for some of these explosions. The Chicago Tribune 
has learned that the Committee of Foreign Affairs 
for the Senate of the United States possesses the 
proofs of German intrigues carried on in the 
American hemisphere in defiance of the Monroe 
doctrine {Le Temps, i6th February, 1916). These 
official Pangerman machinations, proved up to the 
hilt and entirely in harmony with Tannenberg's 
American plan of campaign, demonstrate the 



io6 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

identity of his colonial views with those of the 
government of Berlin. 

To sum up, the result of the Pangerman pro- 
gramme for countries outside of Europe would be 
to assure to Germany, under the form of colonies, 
protectorates, or zones of special influence: 







Square 








Kilometres. 


Population. 


In Asia 


. . 


. . 4,753,000 


83,490,000 


In Africa . 


. 


8,906,000 


46,850,000 


In Oceania . 


• . • > • 


2,314,000 


38,841,000 


In America 


a total of 


6,347,000 


18,197,000 


Making 


. . 22,320,000 


187,378,000 



Germany, which occupied or controlled, at the 
beginning of 1916, in Europe, 3,576,237 square 
kilometres, including the Empire, and more than 
160. millions of inhabitants, would then have a 
universal domain of influence reaching over 
25,896,237 square kilometres and 347 millions of 
inhabitants. This figure includes at the utmost 90 
millions of Germans; therefore, these will exercise 
their supremacy over 257 millions of non- Germans. 

It must be clearly understood also that the 
enormous possessions of Pangermany in both 
hemispheres would be thoroughly under the domina- 
tion of Berlin; indeed, a glance at the map (p. loi) 
will show that the universal Pangerman plan aims 
at seizing all the essential strategic points which 
command the seas of the world, especially, in 
addition to those already mentioned, the Straits of 
Gibraltar from the side of Morocco, Cape Horn, 
Madagascar, and all the naval bases of Oceania. 

To sum up, the complete Pangerman plan aims 
at procuring for Germany all the means of domina- 
tion by land and sea, which would enable Pan- 
germany to hold the entire world in the dreadful 
hug of Prussian militarism screwed up to its highest 
degree of power. 



THE ''DRAWN GAME" 107 

Not for a moment do the Pangermans pause 
to reflect how criminal is this programme of universal 
slavery. "War," says Tannenberg, with his mon- 
strous cynicism, "must leave nothing to the 
vanquished but their eyes to weep with. Modesty 
on our part would be purely madness" {op. ciL, p. 
304). Now, it is a fundamental truth, of which I 
should like to convince my readers, that the 
universal Pangerman plan is solely and wholly 
based on the achievement of the scheme "from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," which forms its 
backbone. If this is broken, the whole of the 
Pangerman plan falls to the ground, and the 
projects of Prussian domination are destroyed for 
ever. The principal problem which the Allies have 
to solve, if they wish to ensure their liberty and that 
of the whole world, is to make impossible the 
achievement of the plan "from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf." 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM. 

I. The obligation which the threat of the scheme "from 

Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" imposes on the Allies. 
II. The capital importance of the question of Austria-Hungary. 
III. All the racial elements necessary for the destruction of the 
Pangerman plan exist in Central Europe. 

I. 

Now that they have laid their hands on nine- 
tenths of the territories which they coveted (see 
p. 63), the Germans will only give in at the last 
extremity. Maximilian Harden has peremptorily 
declared: "Every means will be enthusiastically 
employed against her enemies by the German 
people. We will go back to the times of savagery 
when man was a wolf for his fellow man" (quoted 
by Le Temps, 9th February, 19 16). In face of this 
firm resolution of the Germans to achieve at all 
costs the plan of universal domination, a plan of 
which the "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" project 
is the necessary and sufficient backbone, the real 
destruction of Prussian militarism becomes more 
than ever a duty. Only this result can repay the 
sacrifices of the admirable "Tommies" of the 
Allied armies. If they are determined to hold on 
as long as necessary, it is not to cover themselves 
with military glory; it is to acquire the certainty 
"that it shall not begin again, that their children 
shall not know horrors like those of the hellish 
struggle initiated by Prussianized Germany." 

The Allies will certainly issue as conquerors from 
this dreadful war, but on condition that in future 

108 



THE CRUCIAL POINT 109 

the struggle should be directed by the lessons of 
experience. These essential lessons are the out- 
come of the geographical, ethnographical, economic, 
and strategical elements which constitute the 
Pangerman plan of 191 1, temporarily accomplished. 
Now, these lessons of experience show that the 
Allies could not possibly be content with a half- 
and-half victory; a complete victory alone can 
guarantee them against any aggressive revival, after 
peace, of Prussian militarism. 

The following considerations appear strongly to 
justify this opinion: 

''If in France," declares Harden, ''they think 
that the re-establishment of peace can only be made 
possible by the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, and 
if necessity should oblige us to sign such a peace, 
the 70 millions of Germans would very soon tear 
that peace to tatters" (quoted by Le Temps, 9th 
February, 191 6). Is there a single living French- 
man of sense who would be willing to recover 
Alsace-Lorraine under such conditions that it 
would be necessary afterwards to make incessant 
and exhausting military efforts in order to keep the 
restored provinces? Certainly not. The restora- 
tion of Alsace-Lorraine will only become of value 
for France when the annihilation of Prussian 
militarism shall guarantee her a legitimate and 
peaceful possession of the territories in question. 
Now, as I think I have proved, it would be im- 
possible to reckon on this security if France allowed 
Berlin to carry out the scheme "from Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf," which would furnish Germany 
with superabundant means to retake Alsace- 
Lorraine after a short respite. 

The imperious necessity of avoiding financial 
ruin further forces the Allies to seek a complete 
victory. Indeed, such a victory alone will enable 
them to escape the most frightful impoverishment, 



no PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

which otherwise threatens the Allied States and 
their citizens. The fabulous expenses which the 
present war necessitates distinguish it, financially 
speaking, by a vast gulf from all the wars that have 
gone before. 

After 1870, France was able very quickly to 
recover her position, and in spite of the misfortunes 
of the country, individuals were able, on the 
morrow of the peace, to promote the prosperity 
of their business. But after the present war, if the 
Allies did not win a complete victory, our States, 
like our individuals (see p. 88), would be faced by 
almost inextricable pecuniary difficulties. The 
endless economic consequences resulting from crush- 
ing taxes, which could not be regularly and perma- 
nently collected, would be such that the States and 
most individuals in the Allied countries would see 
themselves reduced to impotence and therefore to 
poverty. This, however, is truly the situation with 
which the Allies would be confronted if Germany 
were to achieve her plan of domination ''from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," since that solution 
would enable her to retain her enormous spoils of 
war and to lay hands on considerable sources of 
wealth (see p. 85). 

Now, would it not be a monstrous iniquity that 
the people of France, England, Russia, and Italy 
should be reduced for tens of years to terrible 
poverty because it suited the execrable ambition of 
the Hohenzollerns to reduce Europe to slavery? 

Only a complete victory can save the Allied 
countries from financial ruin, because, no matter 
what some people say, Germany will be able to pay 
the cost of the struggle she has initiated. As she is 
responsible for the war, Germany already owes to the 
united Allies a colossal sum which can be estimated 
roundly at between 250 and 300 milliards of francs. 
But if the credit of the German Empire is doomed to 



THE CRUCIAL POINT iii 

disappear on the day of her defeat, the material 
riches of Germany, which are very considerable, will 
continue. They represent much more than 300 
milliards of francs. Of course Germany will only 
be able to pay her fabulous debt very gradually. 
But when means for collecting the German revenues 
shall have been systematically and leisurely studied 
by the conquering Allies, when these collections of 
revenue shall have become assured, of course not 
by written German promises, worthless scraps of 
paper, but by real guarantees in harmony with 
those precedents of history, which the government 
of Berlin strongly contributed to establish in 1870, 
Germany will be perfectly able to hand to each of 
the great conquering Allies about two milliards of 
francs a year. This annuity, thanks to modern 
financial combinations, will be sufficient to allow 
each Allied state to raise annual loans at relatively 
low rates and therefore easily procurable; and 
these will permit each State to spare its citizens the 
burden of taxes which would be not only crushing 
but fatal, and which would be inevitable if the 
countr}'^ had to relinquish the hope of being re- 
couped for its war expenses by Germany. 

Now, a truly complete victory like this, which is 
indispensable from so many points of view to the 
Allies, is perfectly possible in spite of the faults 
committed by the Allies, which alone have delayed 
it. 

A line of argument will set this possibility in a 
proper light. Harden himself has been constrained, 
as we have already seen, to face the hypothesis of a 
cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France. It is obvious 
that when they have come to that pitch at Berlin, 
it will mean that Germany at bay, on the brink of 
absolute disaster, will try to negotiate with the 
Allies in order to save her plan of domination 
''from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." This 



112 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

would enable her, after a short respite, to recover 
Alsace-Lorraine from France, as Harden also 
indicates. Therefore, the effort needed at the 
present moment, if the Allies wish to secure a 
complete instead of a doubtful victory, which in 
reality would mean for them a catastrophe, would 
be comparatively slight. That effort would prob- 
ably only represent the hundredth part of all 
those already made by the Allies. We should be 
mad or criminal not to make it, because it is that 
last effort which will put an end to the horrible 
nightmare conjured up all over the world by 

Prussian militarism. 

* 

* * 

In order to make sure of this complete victory, 
we need only draw the appropriate lesson from the 
mistakes that have been made. As M. Briand said 
in Rome, the solidarity of the Allies should be 
closer than ever. "They ought to pool all their 
resources, all their energies, all their vital forces." 
But that co-ordination of the efforts of the Allies, 
which is called for on every side, would be greatly 
facilitated, if the common objective of the common 
action of all the Allies were thenceforth clearly 
defined in its geographical, military, and political 
aspects. 

The German aggression took the Allies by sur- 
prise, and their first duty was to resist it. After- 
wards, through the mere force of circumstances, the 
operations of each of them were directed mainly to 
the particular objects which each had in view. 
England and France have reasons of honour ^nd of 
interest for defending the absolute independence of 
Belgium. France must recover its invaded depart- 
ments and liberate Alsace-Lorraine. Russia must 
not only reconquer its frontiers on the West, but 
free the whole of Poland, to which she has promised 



THE CRUCIAL POINT 113 

autonomy. The empire of the Tsars must also put 
an end, once for all, to the Turco- German menace 
on the south of the Caucasus. Italy must recover 
her lost lands — Italia irredenta — from the clutch of 
the Hapsburgs. But all these particular objects, 
however legitimate and necessary, have long pre- 
vented the AlHes from seeing the war in its European 
dimensions, and have therefore diverted their 
attention from what, alike from the geographical, 




THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM. 

the military, and the political point of view, should 
be the common objective of all their efforts, an 
objective- of supreme importance, since its attain- 
ment would deliver them at once from the menace 
of the "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" project, 
which threatens all the Allies alike; and by striking 
a decisive blow at Prussian mihtarism it would 
assure the accomplishment and the permanence of 
the practical results aimed at by each of the Allies 
individually. 



114 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Now this common objective, this geographical, 
military and political crux of all the problems 
which the Allies have to solve, is represented by 
Austria-Hungary. On that subject the diplo- 
macy of the Allies, thanks again to M, Briand and 
his colleagues, appears to have entered on the 
right path. The Matin of 4th February, 1916, 
reported the reception by M. Briand of Professor 
Masaryk, one of the most highly esteemed leaders 
of Bohemia. In reference to this meeting the 
Matin added the following significant words, which 
deserve to be borne in mind: ''M. Briand en- 
couraged M. Masaryk to persevere in his propa- 
ganda, and expressed to him his good wishes and 
his sympathy with the legitimate claims of the 
Czech-Slovak people." But Bohemia is the corner- 
stone of that group of non- German peoples included 
in Austria-Hungary, whose independence is one of 
the conditions indispensable to the destruction of 
Prussian militarism. Therefore public opinion in 
the Allied countries should henceforth clearly 
understand the close relation which, as I have 
shown above, exists between the little understood 
question of Austria-Hungary and the end of the 
Pangerman nightmare. It will then have a fresh 
and extremely powerful reason for the conviction, 
that the complete victory, which the Pangerman 
plan renders indispensable for the Allies, cannot fail 
to be theirs, provided they set their heart on it 
and avoid further mistakes. 

II. 

In Austria-Hungary lies the crucial point of the 
European and even of the world-wide problem 
raised by the German aggression, because: 

I. Austria-Hungary has entered into the struggle 
in very peculiar circumstances. This State is not 
an enemy of the Allies, except at the bidding of the 



THE CRUCIAL POINT 115 

Hapsburg dynasty, which, by yielding to the in- 
junctions of Berlin, has betrayed its own peoples. 
In fact, Francis Joseph declared war without even 
daring to consult his parliament, for he knew very 
well that nearly three-fourths of his subjects, 
sympathizing with Russia, France, and England, 
and being definitely hostile to Germany, would have 
opposed, by the voice of their representatives, any 
sanguinary conflict destined to turn to the advant- 
age of Germanism. 

2. It is manifest that Germany cannot maintain 
a war against Europe except with the help of 
the Austro-Hungarian soldiers, whom she has 
dexterously contrived to enlist in her cause, and of 
whom the vast majority only fight because they are 
forced to do so by the brutal German Staff Officers 
who command them. 

3. It is clear that after the peace, if Germany 
were to evacuate all the territories she now occu- 
pies in the East and the West, to restore Alsace- 
Lorraine to France, and yet to keep her hold, more 
or less disguised, on Austria-Hungary, Berlin 
would possess all the means for retaking, after a 
short delay, Alsace-Lorraine from France, since, 
as we saw in the foregoing chapter, the German 
hold on Austria-Hungary inevitably implies the 
accomplishment of the scheme "from Hamburg to 
the Persian Gulf." 

4. From this last consideration it follows that 
if after the peace Germany were to retain her dis- 
guised hold on Austria-Hungary, the solemn promise 
given by France, England, and Russia, to re- 
establish Serbia in its independence and its in- 
tegrity, would be practically incapable of fulfilment. 

5. On the contrary, if the freedom from German 
control of at least the majority of the Austro- 
Hungarian territories were assured after the peace, 
this would absolutely prevent for the future any 



ii6 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

aggressive revival of Prussian militarism. For by 
the very fact of that independence the General 
Staff of Berlin would be deprived of troops which 
are indispensable to the forcible execution of the 
Pangerman projects. 

6. A glance at the map (p. 113) will show that 
in virtue of their geographical situation nothing but 
the freedom of the majority of the Austro-Hungarian 
territories from German control could enable the 
Allies to keep their promises to Serbia, and, by 
definitely breaking the backbone of the Pangerman 
plan, to prevent the immense danger of the "Ham- 
burg to the Persian Gulf" plan, the accomplish- 
ment of which all the Allies, without any exception 
(France, England, Russia, Italy, Japan, Belgium, 
Serbia, Montenegro) have a really vital interest to 
prevent. But, as we shall see at the end of the 
volume, their interest in this matter is also the 
interest of the whole civilized world. 

The fact that public opinion in the Allied coun- 
tries is not yet fully alive to the capital, the essential 
importance of the Austro-Hungarian question for 
the issue of the war and the future of Europe, is due 
to a variety of causes which must be enumerated. 

In the first place, the question of Austria-Hungary, 
an empire composed of very complex racial and 
social elements, is undoubtedly very difficult to 
grasp. 

In the next place, the lamentable want of interest 
in foreign affairs, which before the war prevailed 
in the Allied countries, is responsible for the 
extreme inaccuracy of those current beliefs on the 
subject, which the German press agents have 
successfully palmed off on the newspapers of the 
present Allies. 

As a result, many people in these countries, 
especially in England, still imagine that Austria- 
Hungary, with a population of fifty millions, is a 



THE CRUCIAL POINT 117 

country mainly German, which is a radically false 
idea. This serious mistake is sometimes made, to 
my knowledge, even by men occupying very 
important posts. 

Evidently a large part of the public is no longer 
quite so ignorant as that. Nevertheless, even for 
them the Austro-Hungarian question is still full of 
obscurities. Need we wonder at it? The official 
diplomatists themselves in general, whatever their 
personal intelligence, have been able to acquire but 
a very superficial insight into the internal affairs of 
the Hapsburg empire. The reasons for the 
deficiency have been already set forth (Chapter I., 
§ 3); they include the old-fashioned means of 
observation and information which the diplomatists 
have been constrained to employ. 

Finally, the learned men who have studied 
Austria-Hungary only as historians, that is to say, 
as foreigners and in books, whatever their qualifica- 
tions, have not been able to acquaint themselves 
with the exact internal condition of the country, 
which has been completely transformed, especially 
within the last ten years. But it is just this present 
condition which it is important, and alone important, 
to comprehend. 

This want of clear notions on the Hapsburg 
empire involves a very great danger for the Allies. 
It has contributed largely to the very grave mis- 
takes which they have made in the general conduct 
of the war. An end must be put to this ignorance. 
In regard to Austria-Hungary the Allies must on no 
account continue to commit such a series of blunders 
as those which made up their policy towards the 
Balkans. Their punishment for such repeated mis- 
takes would be even more severe than it has been. 

The only way of avoiding these mistakes is to 
listen to the opinions of the few men, citizens of the 
Allied states, who in recent years^ in virtue of their 



ii8 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

thorough-going studies and of their extensive travels 
in the whole of Austria-Hungary, have been able 
to acquire a really exact and general knowledge of 
the facts as they are at present. 

Those who possess these qualifications are far 
from numerous. I will mention first two Russians: 
M. de Wesselitsky, correspondent of the Novoe 
Vremya in London, who knows not only Austria- 
Hungary, but all Europe, and has very profound 
views; and M. Briantchaninoff, of Petrograd. I 
know that in o£&cial circles the ideas of the latter 
gentleman are deemed too violent or extreme, but 
he is one of the few Russians who have travelled 
much for the purpose of acquainting themselves 
with foreign affairs. A very intelligent Liberal and 
a clearsighted man, he has for a very long time 
advocated the concession by Russia of the largest 
and the most genuine autonomy to Poland. . His 
opinion with regard to Austria-Hungary, which he 
has often visited, deserves to be listened to. 

Two Englishmen in particular possess an excellent 
knowledge of the Hapsburg empire: Mr. Wickham 
Steed, foreign editor of The Times, who was for ten 
years the remarkable correspondent of that power- 
ful organ at Vienna; Mr. Seton- Watson, who, under 
the name of Scotus Viator, has published, within the 
last ten years, the results of his manifold inquiries 
in works of the highest value dealing with the 
nationalities subject to the German-Magyar yoke. 

In France we find M. Louis Leger, Member of the 
Institute,* who for fifty-one years past, has devoted 
special study to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary 
and knows them thoroughly. Further, M. JErnest 
Denis, professor at the Sorbonne, has written a 
remarkable history of Bohemia. In studying on 
the spot for the purpose of writing this book, he has 

* He has published an excellent pamphlet with the significant 
title. The Liquidation of Austria-Hungary.. Felix Alcan, Paris. 



THE CRUCIAL POINT 119 

acquired a very full knowledge of the Czech nation, 
which by its geographical position in Bohemia and 
Moravia, forms the indispensable basis of every 
reconstitution of Austria-Hungary in a modern 
form. Finally, may I be allowed to cite myself, since 
for twenty-two years, by a series of manifold 
inquiries on the spot, I have endeavoured to under- 
stand in their detail the very complex problems 
which form the Austro-Hungarian question ? 

Now, I have reason to believe that these men, who 
have thoroughly studied Austria-Hungary, and 
whom therefore we ought to trust, are agreed on the 
general lines of the policy which the Allies should 
pursue in regard to the Hapsburg monarchy, I 
think that I am not mistaken when I say that the 
opinions which I am about to express are on the 
whole in harmony with the views of these gentlemen. 

Let us first understand that those who still up- 
hold the doctrine of the maintenance of Austria- 
Hungary as she is, that is, in subjection to the 
Hapsburg dynasty, are at least twenty years behind 
their time. To adopt this solution would be to 
play the German game; for it is practically im- 
possible to separate the Hapsburgs from the 
HohenzoUerns. It would establish the Germanic 
yoke on the Slav and Latin subjects of the Hapsburgs, 
thus facilitating the accomplishment of the scheme 
''from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." 

Finally, the Hapsburg dynasty has given too 
many proofs of its incapacity, its duplicity, and its 
submissiveness to the suggestions of Berlin, to allow 
us to consider seriously its maintenance at the head 
of the Austro-Hungarian peoples. 

In no way must the Allies be dupes of the comedy 
which the Pangermans of Berlin, Vienna, and 
Budapest are getting up now in order to profit by the 
ignorance of the Allies as to Austro-Hungarian facts. 

All the measures tending to force Austria- 



I20 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Hungary into the German Zollverein, which would 
make its political absorption inevitable, must be 
looked upon as a farce, a simple act of criminal 
violence done to the wishes of the immense majority 
of the populations in the Hapsburg monarchy. So 
true is this, that certain Magyar noblemen, who up 
to the present have been decided allies of Berlin, are 
already uttering protests against the Prussian yoke, 
understanding at last that it is to be imposed upon 
them. Count Theodore Batthyany, vice-president 
of the Independent Left of the Hungarian Chamber, 
declared at the end of March, 1916: "It is often 
said among us that the future Customs-Union 
would create in our country better economical 
conditions. This is much more true for Germany, 
who will hold both the reins and the whip in the 
combination. . . . Besides the Germans make no 
secret of it that in the proposed compact there will 
be other agricultural states which will be our future 
competitors (in allusion to Turkey and the Balkan 
States). Certainly, from the time that the union 
is concluded, all capital will come to us from Ger- 
many and never from elsewhere. The Germans 
will have the monopoly of capital among us, and 
you know what a monopoly is and what it costs. 
The money will cost us dear" {Le Temps, ist 
February, 1916). 

In Austria, M. Nemetz, President of the Chamber 
of Commerce at Prague, declared: "None of the 
arguments adduced in favour of a Customs-Union 
with Germany will for a moment bear the light of 
criticism. An insuperable obstacle is opposed to 
an intimate Customs-Union between the two 
empires: their interests are not identical but on 
the contrary competitive" (quoted by Le Temps, 
9th February, 1916). 

These categorical declarations prove what resis- 
tance the Pangerman manoeuvre has already to 



THE CRUCIAL POINT 121 

encounter. The Allies have much to gain from 
these statements, for they prove the reality of the 
deep opposition existing between the interests of 
Pangerman Germany and those of the majority of 
the Austro-Hungarian peoples. 

But there remains an essential point to prove, for 
it gives rise to special anxiety in the minds of that 
part of the public in the Allied countries which 
still harps on the false idea that Austro-Hungary 
is a specially German country. This section of the 
public doubts whether the application of the 
principle of nationalities, which the Allies demand, 
would not have the effect of necessarily and con- 
siderably increasing Germany by incorporating in 
it the Germans of the Hapsburg empire. 

It is, therefore, necessary to demonstrate by 
means of figures and accurate geographical and 
ethnographical arguments that this fear is quite 
chimerical. Austria-Hungary contains all the ele- 
ments of a new State which can be constituted on 
just and lasting foundations, and under such condi- 
tions that it would form for the future an insur- 
mountable barrier to Pangermanism. It is there, 
as we shall see, on the road from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf, in Central Europe, and nowhere else 
that we shall find the solution of the problem set to 
the world by the hateful ambition of the Hohen- 
zollerns. 

III. 

Let us examine in figures what would be the 
result in Central Europe of the application of the 
principle of nationalities, which ought to form the 
moral base of the Allies for the reconstitution of 
future Europe. The French Socialist Congress at 
the end of 19 15, in my opinion, gave an excellent 
definition of the principle of nationalities as we see 
it at work in the present war. The manifesto of 



122 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

the Congress declared: ''No durable peace unless 
the small martyrized nations are restored to their 
political and economic independence. . . . No dur- 
able peace unless the oppressed populations of 
Europe have restored to them the liberty of shaping 
their own destinies" {VHumanite, 30th December, 

1915)- 

As nothing in this world is absolute, it is clear that 
the principle of nationalities cannot always receive 
in practice a complete application. In order to 
constitute States with a potentiality of life, we must 
take into account not only the nationalities but also 
the strategical, defensive, historical, and economical 
needs of the majority. There are besides countries 
like Macedonia and like certain regions of Austria- 
Hungary, where the nationalities are so inter- 
mingled that the application of the principle of 
nationality can only be relative. 

On the other hand, sacrifices must sometimes be 
made at the cost of the principle of nationalities 
for the sake of the general European interest. 
Thus, for example, France cannot think of incorpor- 
ating those who speak French in Belgium and 
Switzerland. The first of those people wish to 
remain Belgians and the second wish to remain 
Swiss. Their wish must be all the more respected 
since the maintenance of the Belgian state and of 
the Swiss state is necessary to the balance and the 
peace of Europe. There are, moreover, other parts 
of the continent where this consideration outweighs 
the principle of nationalities. 

Having given these explanations, and made these 
reservations, let us see what would be obtaiiied in 
the main by the application of the principle of 
nationalities to the German empire. In virtue of 
this principle the Germans ought to restore liberty 
to those peoples who are included by force within 
their boundaries, that is to say about 



THE CRUCIAL POINT 123 

Inhabitants. 
Poles . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000,000 

Inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine .. .. 1,500,000 

Danes . . . . . . . . . . . . 200,000 



Total .. .. .. .. .. 6,700,000 

The Germany of to-day, which numbered 68 
millions of inhabitants in 19 14, including the non- 
Germans, would be brought down to about 
61,300,000, in round figures, 61,000,000 of genuine 
Germans. 

But the logical application of the principle of 
nationalities would give to that Germany the 
liberty of absorbing those Germans of the Hapsburg 
monarchy who on historical, strategical, and 
geographical grounds can be legitimately added to 
Germany after its reduction from 68 to 61 millions 
of inhabitants. What would be the result? 

Let us look back to p. 32 and examine the map 
which sums up the ethnographical situation of 
Austria-Hungary. On this map the Slav and Latin 
nationalities subject to the Hapsburgs, named in 
the margin, are indicated by different shadings. 
The region inhabited by Germans and that in- 
habited by the Magyars have been left blank. The 
two last ethnographic groups are separated by a 
dotted line. This map only gives a very imperfect 
idea of the ethnographic facts, because it is drawn 
from ethnographic documents which are German 
and Magyar, and which are purposely falsified. In 
reality the Slav regions are a good deal more exten- 
sive than is indicated by the blank zones (Germans 
and Magyars). This is particularly true in the 
blank zone to the north and north-west of the 
purely Czech region. 

Vienna, which, however, is in the centre of a 
perfectly blank zone, is by no means, as is generally 
believed, a purely German city. Her population 
is Slav to the amount of about one-third (Poles and 



124 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

especially Czechs). This fact, which is certain, is 
yet not recognized by any official Austrian statistics, 
because these are drawn up by German function- 
aries who have orders to falsify them. Their 
principal mode of garbling the figures is as follows: 

In the whole of Austria every Slav or Latin, who 
merely knows a few words of German, is styled, 
much against his own will, a German. Now, all 
the Slavs who live in Vienna know a few words of 
German. This allows the German statisticians of 
the Austrian Government to conclude that there 
are no Slavs in Vienna, and to set down the number 
of the Slavs in all the rest of Austria at a figure con- 
siderably below the truth. 

In Hungary the statistics are garbled with the 
same effrontery by the functionaries of the Buda- 
pest government in favour of the Magyar element. 

The following, however, are the results given for 
the whole of the Hapsburg monarchy by the official 
Germano- Magyar statistics in the census of 1910: 

Round figures in tens 

Austria. of thousands. 

Germans . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,950,000 

Czechs . . . . . . . . r . . . 6,440,000 

Poles . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,970,000 

Ruthenians . . . . . . . . . . 3,520,000 

Slovenes . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,260,000 

Serbo-Croatians . . . . . . . . . . 790,000 

ItaUans . . . . . . . . . . . . 770,000 

Roumanians . . . . . . . . . . 280,000 



Hungary. 



Total . . 

Magyars . . 

Roumanians 

Serbo-Croatians 

Germans . . 

Slovaks 

Ruthenians 



Total 

Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Serbo-Croatians (orthodox, or Moslems 
bian origin) 



27,980,000 

10,050,000 
2,950,000 
2,940,000 
2,040,000 
1,970,000 
480,000 

20,430,000 



of Ser- 



2,000,000 



THE CRUCIAL POINT 125 

According to these figures there are 12 millions of 
Germans in the Hapsburg empire, but we shall see 
that not nearly all these 12 millions of Germans 
could be united to Germany. In fact: 

1. As the table shows, rather more than two 
millions of Germans are in Hungary, where they are 
scattered in small groups among the other nationali- 
ties. They could not therefore be united to 
Germany. 

2. Out of the 10 millions, roughly speaking, of 
Germans in Austria, those of Bohemia, to the north 
and north-west of the purely Czech zone, could not 
be united to Germany, because in that zone they 
are mixed up with numerous Czechs, and because 
the dotted line, which on the map (p. 68) separates 
Bohemia from the German empire of to-day, repre- 
sents the historical and strategical boundaries of the 
kingdom of Bohemia. Now it would be impossible 
without these boundaries to assure the indepen- 
dence of the Czecho-Slovaks. Clearly we could 
not think of sacrificing nearly 9 millions of Czecho- 
slovaks to I million of Germans in Bohemia, 
especially as these same Germans simply squatted in 
the country long ago by sheer violence and fraud. 

3. By this fact the 10 millions of Germans, who 
might seem to be eligible for incorporation in 
Germany, are reduced to about 9 millions. These 
form on the map the blank group which stretches 
from Switzerland to the dotted line which marks 
the Magyar ethnographical boundary. But there 
are serious reasons for thinking that were a thorough 
investigation made of the ethnographical facts, that 
is to say, of the mixture of Slavs and Germans to the 
east of this group, and consequently between the 
purely Czech group to the north of Vienna and the 
purely Slovene group to the south of Vienna, the 
result of such an investigation would be to show 
that this German group could not in its entirety 



126 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

be united to Germany. As it would be out of the 
question here to enter into these very difEcult 
ethnographical details, we shall, under all possible 
reserve, and purely for the convenience of demon- 
stration, make the supposition that the whole of 
this German group should be united to Germany. 
But from these 9 millions of Germans we should 
certainly still have to subtract the Slavs who are 
included in this figure through the systematic 
garbling of the Austrian statistics. The typical 
example of the city of Vienna, cited above, proves 
this necessity. As this deception is practised on an 
enormous scale at the expense of the Slavs, we may 
allow that the true number of Germans in this part 
of Austria who could be geographically incorporated 
in Germany, amounts to not more than 7 or 8 
millions. Let us take this last figure. If these 8 
millions of Germans were incorporated in Germany, 
then Germany of to-day, reduced for the reasons 
indicated on p. 123 to 61 millions, would be en- 
larged, at the expense of Austria, by 8 millions of 
inhabitants. She would then have a total of 69 
millions of inhabitants. 

Therefore, as the present German empire had in 
1 9 14 a population of 68 millions of inhabitants, we 
see that the application of the principle of nationali- 
ties would allow Germany to gain on the south- 
west just about the equivalent of what the same 
principle would take from her on the circumference 
of the existing empire. 

Would a Germany of 69 or 70 milhons of genuine 
Germans be really dangerous for Europe? I do 
not think so, for, as we shall see, the application 
of the principle of nationalities would have the 
effect of withdrawing totally from the influence of 
Berlin's Pangermanism all the rest of the inhabi- 
tants of Austria-Hungary. 

Tn fact, if out of the 50 millions of inhabitants in 



THE CRUCIAL POINT 127 

Austria-Hungary of to-day about 8 millions joined 
Germany, 42 millions of Austro-Hungarian subjects 
would remain. Of this number: 

Five millions of Poles would join Poland; 

Four millions of Ruthenians would join Russia; 

Three millions of Roumanians would join 
Roumania; 

One million of Italians would join Italy; 

Making a total of 13 millions of inhabitants. 

There would therefore remain a compact group 
composed of 29 millions of inhabitants, made up of 
Czech-Slovaks, Magyars, and Germans, these last 
diluted in the solid mass of Magyars and Serbo- 
Croatians. As the Magyars and Serbo-Croatian'^l 
wish to unite with the 5 million Serbians of 
Serbia, we thus deduce the presence in Central 
Europe of a mass of 34 million inhabitants, con- 
taining an infinitesimal proportion of Germans ; 
and so situated geographically that they could ' 
perfectly form United States, in which the rights 
/of each nationality and the form of government of 
f each State would be respected, and which, neverthe- 1 
, less, would constitute an economic territory exten- \ 
^ sive enough to correspond to modern needs. 

The obstacle to the creation of such United ' 
States might seem to be the reluctance of the 
Magyars, who at present play the German game, to 
come to an understanding with the neighbouring 
nationalities. This objection disappears when we 
know what is unfortunately known to none but a 
small number of experts. Out of the 10 millions of 
Magyars, there are about 9 millions of poor labourers, 
almost all agricultural, cynically exploited by the 
Magyar nobility, who possess nearly all the land. 
Now it is these nobles, owners of enormous landed 
estates, who, with the Magyar functionaries whom 
they nominate, are Prussophile, and not even all of 
them are that. It must also be known that the 



128 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

9 millions of Magyar proletariat are not so much as 
represented in the parliament at Budapest, for 
elections in Hungary are neither more nor less than 
barefaced swindles practised for the benefit of the 
million Magyars who sweat their poor compatriots. 
Now these 9 millions of unhappy peasants by no 
means love the Prussians. More than that, they 
are quite ready to fraternize with the other dem- 
ocratic masses represented by the nationalities 
which surround them. Therefore, on the day when 
the true Magyar people shall be delivered from the 
feudal nobility who oppress them, and shall become 
in their turn masters of their own destinies, they will 
certainly not stand out against the creation of the 
United States here adumbrated. I am quite sure 
of the popular feeling on this subject, for on my last 
visits to Budapest I was able to put myself in 
communication with the leaders of the Magyar 
democratic organizations. It was thus that I 
learned that even before the war they had been 
trying to find a basis for a mutual understanding 
with the other Slav nationalities of Hungary. So 
strong indeed was this tendency that it furnished 
the nefarious Count Tisza with a motive for declar- 
ing war in order to elude the democratic movement, 
which threatened the privileges of the Magyar 
nobility, of which he is one of the leaders. 

In short, we may conclude that there is in 
Austria-Hungary and in Serbia a mass of 34 
millions of inhabitants, who are practically free 
from Germanic elements and could form in Central 
Europe a confederacy of United States that might 
in time develop into the United States of Europe. 

Thus there undoubtedly exist all the ethno- 
graphical elements which could render possible the 
erection in Central Europe of a very powerful 
triple barrier against every aggressive revival of 
Pangermanism (see p. 43). The erection of this 



THE CRUCIAL POINT 129 

barrier would form the solution of the great problem 
set us by the Pangerman peril. It would free for 
ever numerous nationalities from the Prussian 
yoke. It would coincide not only with the interests 
of all the Allies, but also with those of the whole 
world. For as I hope to prove in Chapter IX, the 
inhabitants of both South and North America 
would be not less vitally affected than the European 
Allies and Japan by the achievement of the scheme 
"from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." 

Therefore, the necessary but suf&cient backbone 
of the Pangerman plan, as represented by the 
formula ''Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," can be 
certainly destroyed in Central Europe and there 
only. The net result is that the question of Austria- 
Hungary constitutes the crucial point of a problem 
which is not only European but universal, set to all 
the civilized States by the war which Prussianized 
Germany has initiated and by the execrable 
ambition of the Hohenzollerns. 

The question of Austria-Hungary has besides an 
aspect of social and universal interest, which the 
Liberals and Socialists of Allied or neutral countries 
have not yet perhaps sufficiently contemplated. 
The supremacy of Germany over Austria-Hungary 
would have, in fact, a social consequence of infinite 
importance: a new lease of crushing and strength- 
ened power would be ensured to the German- 
Austrian aristocracy, to the Magyar aristocracy of 
Hungary, to the German aristocracy of the German 
empire, and above all to the execrable Prussian 
Junkers, who are principally responsible for the 
war. This great and insolent triumph of the 
Junker spirit, supported by the means of universal 
domination which would be put at the disposal of 
the Berlin government as a consequence of the 
accomplishment of the scheme "from Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf," would have a disastrous after- 



I30 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

effect by repressing those democratic and liberal 
movements, which are at present developing 
legitimately and necessarily, not only in the Allied 
countries but in the whole world. Finally, it would 
entail fresh revolutionary crises, causing disturb- 
ances which it is of serious interest to avoid, lest 
ideas of social justice should lose the vantage ground 
of liberty which they have so painfully conquered. 
These considerations, therefore, lead us to the 
conclusion that the final liberation of all the Latin 
and Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary from the 
German yoke is a matter of universal social interest. 
In fact, it constitutes an essential condition of the 
progress of liberal ideas, of the pacific development 
and organization of democracy in the whole world. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE BALKANS AND THE PANGERMAN PLAN. 

I. The connexion between the Pangerman plan and the plan 

of Bulgarian supremacy. 
II. Greece and the Pangerman ambitions. 
III. Roimiania and the Pangerman plan. 

In virtue of the geographical position which they 
occupy in the zone "from Hamburg to the Persian 
Gulf," the Balkan States are of extreme importance 
for the making or the marring of the whole Pan- 
german plan. Moreover, events have proved to the 
satisfaction of the most sceptical the influence 
which these States exert on the issue of the struggle. 
Public opinion, therefore, both in Allied and neutral 
countries, should note very clearly the intimate 
relation which exists between the Balkan factors 
and the universal Pangerman plan. 

I can here touch only on the fundamental Balkan 
factors, those that have a durable and permanent 
character, not on the attitude of certain governments 
in the Eastern peninsula. That attitude for the last 
year has been singularly vacillating. It shifts, in 
fact, under the action of those parasitic German 
influences which, through the dynastic ties of the 
reigning families, backed by the threats of Berlin, 
sway these governments in opposition to the 
national interests which it is their bounden duty to 
defend. Moreover, simple justice compels us to 
acknowledge, that the diplomatic mistakes made 
by the Allies, especially in 1915, in consequence of 
their imperfect acquaintance with Balkan facts, 
has been singularly favourable to the success of the 
German influences. 

I3t 



132 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Thus, for example, at Athens, the present 
Cabinet, formed after the arbitrary dissolution of 
the Greek parliament, and therefore destitute of all 
constitutional authority, has been instigated by 
King Constantine, brother-in-law of the Emperor 
William II., to persevere in a policy which all 
influential Greeks who are free to speak their minds 
regard as disastrous to the true interests of Hellen- 
ism. Similarly at Bukarest the attitude of the 
Bratiano cabinet is subjected by eminent Rou- 
manians to searching criticism. Thus La 
Roumanie, the organ of M. Take Jonescu, speaking 
of the commercial agreement between Germany and 
Roumania, has recently said: "This agreement 
makes Roumania the dupe of Germany" * (see Le 
Journal, 20th April, 1916). The final decision of 
certain Balkan governments is, therefore, for the 
moment still in suspense, but whatever it may be, 
each of the Balkan peoples would infallibly see its 
future interests thwarted or menaced by the triumph 
of the Pangerman plan. It is important to clear 
up these prospects. So far as Montenegro and 
Serbia are concerned, any discussion would be 
superfluous, so evident is it that a German victory 
would mean for these two States their definite and 
final disappearance. 

I. 

It is otherwise with Bulgaria. Indeed, the key 
of the whole Balkan situation lies in the plan of a 
Bulgarian supremacy, which, as we shall see, is 
closely bound up, at least in principle, with the 
Pangerman plan. 

It was said long ago that the Bulgarians are the 
Prussians of the East. Now it is just their fixed 

* Since this was said, Roumania has joined the Entente Powers 
in the war. Translator's Note. 



THE BALKANS 133 

idea of achieving at any cost their dream of dominat- 
ing the Balkans which has led the Bulgarians to 
throw in their lot with Berlin, without perceiving 
that though they might benefit by the first phase 
of this combination, they would finally fall victims 
to Pangermanism. 

The pretensions of Bulgaria to supremacy, 
though even less has been known about them 







LA GRANDE BULGARIE 



Parties deja deki/rees car 
/es Bulgares 
j Parties non det/vreespsr 
les Bulgares 



GREAT BULGARIA. 

than about the Pangerman plan, are nevertheless 
relatively old, as is conclusively proved by the 
I olio wing facts: 

The map printed above is a document of the 
highest importance, for it enables us to detect the 
real pohcy, first of Bulgaria, and next of the other 
Balkan States. This map is an exact translation 
and reproduction of the map which is to be found 



134 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

on p. 56 of the historical part of a book published in 
Bulgarian at Sofia and called: The Soldier's Com- 
panion, Manual for the Soldiers of all arms. This is 
an official work of propaganda in the army, and 
therefore in the whole Bulgarian people, since 
all Bulgarians go through the ranks; and it 
was published in obedience to order No. 76 of 
March 14th, 1907, issued by the Bulgarian Ministry 
of War, approved and authorized by the Chief of 
the Headquarters Staff of the Bulgarian army. 
This manual has been recommended by the Bul- 
garian Ministry of War, in circular No. 28 of March 
2ist, 1907. Hence we are confronted with an offi- 
cial Bulgarian book dating from 1907, which proves 
very clearly beyond the possibility of dispute the 
ideas which have been systematically instilled into 
the whole Bulgarian people for at least nine years. 

In this map, entitled Great Bulgaria, which is 
coloured in the eighth edition of the Bulgarian 
original, the part said to be ''already set free by 
the Bulgarians" is coloured pink (represented by 
large hatchings on our map), and the parts said to 
be "not set free by the Bulgarians" are coloured 
red (represented by closer hatchings on our map). 
This official Bulgarian document helps us to under- 
stand, both what happened in the Balkan wars, 
and the conduct of the government of Sofia during 
the European war. 

In fact, when in 191 2 the Bulgarians entered into 
an alliance with the Greeks and Serbians against 
Turkey, they were not even then true to their 
Allies. At that time they had a very low opinion 
of the Greeks and Serbians as soldiers. But they 
thought it very expedient to employ the forces of 
these nations against the principal enemy, Turkey, 
intending afterwards to settle accounts with their 
temporary allies by means of the increase of power 
which they expected to gain at the expense of 



THE BALKANS 135 

Turkey. As these intentions were suspected at 
Belgrade and Athens, it may easily be conceived 
that from the very beginning of their joint action 
the Greek and Serbian governments did not repose 
full confidence in that of Sofia. The distrust of the 
Greeks and Serbians was, moreover, thoroughly 
aroused when King Ferdinand, before he allowed 
his troops to hurl themselves against the lines 
of Chataldja, disclosed his claim to enter Con- 
stantinople, with the evident intention of staying 
there if he could. 

Given the Bulgarian claims in the west, which are 
set forth in our map, we can further explain why 
in 1913 the Bulgarians, whose character is hard 
and unyielding, refused all compromise when 
the Serbians, excluded by Europe from the Adriatic, 
demanded from the Bulgarians an equitable com- 
pensation to the south of Uskub. 

Moreover, always instigated by their desire of 
supremacy, and stirred up by Vienna and Berlin, 
the Bulgarians thought that the moment had come 
to annihilate the Serbians and Greeks. So they made 
the sudden attack of June 17-30, 1913, on their 
former alHes. But the wary Serbians and Greeks 
were ready for the encounter. Roumania, as little 
inclined to tolerate Bulgarian supremacy as Greece 
or Serbia, marched her troops to within ten kilo- 
metres of Sofia. The Bulgarians were crushed by 
the Serbians at Bregalnitza, and were compelled to 
sign, on August loth, 19 13, the treaty of Bukarest. 
But from that moment, animated by a boundless 
hatred of their conquerors, they had but one desire, 
and that was to take vengeance on the victors, one 
after the other, and above all to destroy the treaty 
of Bukarest at the first favourable opportunity. 

Hence 

1°. The treaties made by Sofia with Berlin 
and Constantinople, before April, 1914, as M. 



136 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Radoslavojff has disclosed (see Havas, quoted by 
Le Petit Parisien, 26th March, 1916, and Le Temps, 
loth April, 1916). 

2°. Bulgaria's participation in the European 
war on the side of Germany, whose plans for the 
future, like the Bulgarian ambitions, were threatened 
by the consequence of the treaty of Bukarest {see 
Chapter II, § i). 

* 
* * 

An examination of the Bulgarian map, which 
serves us as a document, proves that the Bulgarian 
pretentions to supremacy, like those of Panger- 
manism, aim at absorbing, regardless of language 
or race, the regions whose possession is deemed 
useful to Bulgaria. Thus the rapacious doctrine 
of the Bulgarians is absolutely identical with 
that of the Prussians. This identity has 
facilitated the understanding between the two 
peoples. In fact, the Great Bulgaria of our official 
document of 1907 (see the map on p. 133) includes 
the following: the Roumanian Dobrudja as far as 
Galatz and Sulina, on which clearly the Bulgarians 
can lay no justifiable claim; the shores of the 
^gean Sea; the territory from Serres to Gumuld- 
jina, where the Greek element is dominant; the 
region of Nisch, which is Serbian; the region of 
Prizrend, which had been recognized as Serbian by 
the Bulgarians themselves in their treaty of 
alliance with the Serbians in 191 2. As to the region 
of Uskub as far as Lake Ochrida, near Albania, the 
Bulgarians in their treaty with the Serbians 
admitted it to be disputable. Its allotment was to 
be referred to the arbitration of the Emperor of 
Russia, which the Bulgarians never seriously 
desired, and to which they opposed a solid 
obstacle by their attack on the Serbians in June, 



THE BALKANS 



137 



19 13. Lastly, the region south of Uskub, that is, 
the portion of Macedonia which forms the south 
of the present Serbia, requires a detailed exposi- 
tion by itself. This is essential, for concerning 
Serbian Macedonia many misconceptions have 
been propagated by the Allied Press and have 
been the source of the mistakes committed by 
the Allies in the Balkans in 191 5. It is therefore 
absolutely necessary to correct these misconcep- 
tions, if the AUies would avoid falling into fresh 
mistakes in the Balkans, for which they would 
again have to pay a heavy price. 




\ ^ oKustendil 
■a \0 

Blip f VS 



LASERBIE MACEDONSIEMNE 



SERBIAN MACEDONIA. 

In short, to look the difficulties clearly in the face, 
we must answer the question, Is the south of Serbia 
Bulgarian? (see the map, above). 

The territory in the south of Serbia on which 
divergent opinions have been expressed is repre- 
sented with tolerable exactness: 

1°. By a triangle of which the apex lies a little 
to the north of Veles, and of which the other angles 



138 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

are formed by Guevgheli on the east and Lake 
Ochrida on the west. 

2°. By a strip of territory which lies to the east 
of this triangle, and which, between the left bank 
of the Vardar and Bulgaria, contains the regions of 
Kotchana, Stip, and Stroutmitza-gare. The Bul- 
garians contend that all the territory formed by 
this triangle and this lateral strip is incontestably 
Bulgarian; last year some Allied writers supported 
this contention. In the first place, it was said, the 
treaty of San Stefano (1878) assigned to Bulgaria 
what is now the south of Serbia. They forgot that 
in 1878 the ethnographic study of the Ottoman 
empire had not yet begun, and that at that time the 
Russians and the English were both inclined, for 
different reasons, to consider almost all the inhabi- 
tants of European Turkey as Bulgarians, without 
inquiry or distinction. The Russians, who then 
aimed at establishing themselves ultimately in the 
Balkans, were impelled by this aim to regard the 
Bulgarians as extremely numerous. As for the 
English, burning with indignation at the "Bul- 
garian atrocities" of Gladstone, they very gener- 
ously thought of nothing but liberating from the 
Turkish yoke as many Christians as possible, and 
these in Macedonia were labelled indiscriminately 
Bulgarians. 

Be that as it may, it was only after the treaty of 
San Stefano that the ethnographical study of 
Macedonia was taken up in earnest. Moreover, it is 
proper to add that most of the writers who have 
discussed the subject have drawn their information, 
not from inquiries on the spot, but from Belgrade, 
Athens and Sofia. In these three centres they 
were supplied with minute statistics, very well 
printed, and to all appearance perfectly convinc- 
ing, but which laboured under the serious dis- 
advantage that they flatly contradicted each other. 



THE BALKANS 139 

For my own part, I acknowledged that I was not 
able to arrive at a comparatively clear idea of the 
complicated ethnography of this part of Macedonia 
till I had carried out my inquiries of 19 14, not as 
before in the Balkan capitals, but on the spot, at 
Uskub, at Prizrend, at Prichtina, at Monastir, at 
Ochrida, and at Strouga. 

This inquiry, conducted six months before the 
war, led me to the following conclusions. Serbian 
Macedonia contains two quite distinct groups of 
population. 

1°. The one is formed of Turks, Albanians, 
Kutzo-Wallachians or Roumanians, Greeks, Jews, 
and Gipsies, who are scattered all over the country. 

2°. The second group is composed of the Mace- 
donian Slavs. 

In the absence of trustworthy statistics it is 
impossible to say which of these two groups is 
numerically the stronger. Thus, at Uskub, the 
Turks and the Jews alone were reckoned as numer- 
ous as the exarchists, that is to say, as those who, 
attending the churches and schools of the Bul- 
garian exarchate, were considered to be Bulgarians. 

But what is quite certain is that the Serbs and 
the Bulgarians are found in the second group of the 
population, that of the Macedonian Slavs. Now 
this group itself comprises four sections, namely, 
native Serbs, native Bulgarians, "floating" Serbs, 
and ''floating" Bulgarians. The two "floating" 
sections seem to be more numerous than the two 
native sections. This singular expression, "float- 
ing," is justified by the following explanation. In 
1870 the Bulgarians of Macedonia, then Ottoman 
subjects, obtained from the Sultan leave to be 
considered, from the religious point of view, not as 
before members of the Greek Orthodox Church, 
but as members of a separate and autonomous 
church, the Bulgarian Exarchate, of which the seat 



I40 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

was fixed at Constantinople. The Bulgarians of 
Bulgaria, who also joined the new church, took 
advantage of the condition of things which resulted 
from this creation to organize in Macedonia a propa- 
ganda nominally religious but really political, being 
designed to gain over to the Bulgarian nation 
as many Macedonian Slavs as possible; and this 
propaganda was directed and actively assisted by 
the Bulgarian Exarch, Mgr. Joseph, who resided in 
Constantinople and was an Ottoman subject. In 
those days the Macedonian Slavs were very poor 
peasants, who had been oppressed by the Turks for 
centuries, and the greater number of them did not 
care a straw whether they belonged to one nationality 
or to another. The propaganda of the Bulgarian 
Exarchate in Macedonia came into conflict 
with the Greek propaganda, and a little later 
with the Serbian propaganda, which two pro- 
pagandas, the one directed from Athens and 
the other from Belgrade, had one and the same 
object. All three propagandas together employed 
in Macedonia the most diverse means — money, 
schools, and terrorism — to win over the Mace- 
donian Slavs, who were still hesitating, to the 
national Bulgarian cause, to the national Greek 
cause, and to the national Serbian cause. 

These various propagandas very often led to 
extraordinary results, which proved the artificial 
character of the movements. For example, before 
the European war you might find in many Mace- 
donian villages families of three blood brothers, of 
whom one would say he was a Greek, the second 
would solemnly affirm that he was a Serb, and the 
third would swear he was a Bulgarian. Frequently, 
under the influence of the forcible arguments applied 
to them, their national convictions would undergo 
a sudden and radical change, so that the man who 
yesterday was a Serb, to-day would give himself out 



THE BALKANS 141 

as a Bulgarian, or contrariwise. It is to persons 
whose nationality is of this unstable and erratic 
character that the adjective ''floating" is appro- 
priately applied. At the same time there is no 
question that the Serbian propaganda, having 
started business in Macedonia about fifteen years 
later than its Bulgarian rival, had gathered into the 
fold fewer of those ''floating" sheep, who were still 
sitting on the nationalist fence, not yet having made 
up their minds whether to come down on the Serbian 
or the Macedonian side. The two elements which 
compose the Bulgarian group in Macedonia, namely, 
the genuine Bulgarians and the "floating" Bul- 
garians, have, besides, a geographical distribution 
which is comparatively definite. Though mixed up 
with Turkish elements, the inhabitants of the region 
of Kotchana and Istip (Stip in Serbian), on the 
right bank of the Vardar and on the Bulgarian 
boundary (see the map on p. 137) are for the most 
part indisputably genuine Bulgarians. If at the 
time of the treaty of Bukarest the Serbians claimed 
these mountainous regions, they did so for strategi- 
cal reasons, in order to ensure the defence of the 
railway, which, passing through the valley of the 
Vardar, connects Belgrade, Nisch, and Uskub with 
Salonika, and is therefore of vital importance for 
Serbia. The present war has proved that this 
point of view was not without justification. 

On the other hand, on the right bank of the 
Vardar, and therefore in the greater part of Serbian 
Macedonia, the Bulgarian elements, whether genuine 
or "floating," are more or less scattered among all 
the other racial elements. Undoubtedly there are 
to the west of the Vardar some Bulgarians whose 
descent is very ancient and beyond dispute. A 
certain number, who have emigrated from these 
regions, exercise a predominant political influence 
even in Bulgaria. Thus General Boyadjeff was 



142 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

born at Ochrida, and M. Genadieff was born at 
Monastir. But these Bulgarians by descent are 
certainly a minority in the whole population of 
Macedonia. For example, at Monastir, in 1914, out 
of 60,000 inhabitants about a third were Bul- 
garians. It is true that round about Monastir and 
Uskub you might find villages inhabited almost 
entirely by Bulgarians, but beside these villages 
were others formed of different Macedonian nation- 
alities (Serbs, Roumanians, etc.). 

As for the ''floating" Bulgarians, after a Serbian 
occupation which had lasted only five months since 
the treaty of Bukarest, many of them already pro- 
claimed themselves Serbs. For example, the 
Serbian mayor of the little town of Strouga had 
been in Turkish times the pillar of the Bulgarian 
propaganda in the district of Strouga. Similar 
cases were very numerous. The Bulgarians of 
Sofia, unable to deny this wholesale transformation 
into Serbians of quondam Bulgarians who had been 
raked into the fold by the propaganda of the 
Exarchate, gave out that this sudden conversion 
was the effect of that reign of terror which, accord- 
ing to them, the Serbians resorted to for the purpose 
of establishing their dominion in Macedonia. The 
allegation seems to me untenable. I traversed 
most of the roads of Serbian Macedonia in the 
winter (January, 1914), accompanied only by one 
or two persons. I very often met Serbian soldiers, 
who came from the garrisons on the Albanian 
frontier and were going on furlough to Northern 
Serbia. Now these soldiers were travelling singly 
or in groups of two or three. With nothing but a 
walking-stick in their hand they were making their 
way over the 60 or 70 kilometres which separated 
them from the nearest railway. If the country had 
really been inhabited by convinced Bulgarians who 
detested the Serbians^ is it not evident that there 



THE BALKANS 143 

would have been attacks on these isolated and 
defenceless Serbian soldiers? But there were no 
such attacks, and from personal observation I can 
affirm that the most complete tranquillity prevailed 
in Serbian Macedonia, which in the days of the 
Tu'rks had been the scene of incessant murders; 
and these murders were generally brought about 
by the terrorist means employed by the Bulgarian 
propaganda. 

What is certain is, that at the beginning of 19 14 
the ''floating" Bulgarians, who were in fact the 
more numerous, acquiesced without resistance in 
the Serbian rule and called themselves Serbians. 
The Bulgarian Exarch, Mgr. Joseph, who had 
organized and directed the Bulgarian propaganda 
since 1870, was not at all surprised at this result. 
He acknowledged to me at Sofia, in February, 1914, 
that the Bulgarian game was up in the south of 
Macedonia, and that in a short time most of the 
adherents whom he had enlisted in former days 
would prove themselves very good Serbians. In- 
deed, he had made up his mind to it, for he had 
been opposed to the attack of June, 19 13, on the 
Serbians and the Greeks, and he thought that 
Bulgaria should accept a situation for which she 
herself was responsible, and of which she must 
bear the consequences. 

For these manifold reasons it is impossible to say 
that the south of Macedonia is Bulgarian. But the 
Bulgarian people of Bulgaria has been completely 
intoxicated by the intense propaganda which has 
been organized, especially during the last thirty 
years, in Bulgaria itself by Bulgarians who are 
natives of Ottoman Macedonia. These men, most 
of them very energetic, have in reality engrossed all 
the important posts, military, political, and adminis- 
trative, in Bulgaria. So well have they done the 
business of propaganda that the lowest Bulgarian 



144 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

peasant of Bulgaria believes in his heart and soul 
that all Serbian Macedonia is Bulgarian. It is easy 
to understand how German policy at Sofia has been 
able to turn this state of mind to account for the 
purpose of hurrying the Bulgarian people into the 
war on the side of Pangermanism. 

To recapitulate, the south of Macedonia is really 
Macedonia, that is to say, it is a territory inhabited 
by motley peoples, who are almost everywhere 
jumbled up together. The Bulgarians who live there 
cannot therefore rightfully claim that the treaty of 
Bukarest violated the principle of nationalities to 
their detriment by assigning South- Western Mace- 
donia to Serbia. In fact, just because it is Mace- 
donia, that is, an extraordinary jumble of hetero- 
geneous peoples, the principle of nationalities 
cannot possibly be applied to Macedonia. In 
strict justice, the destiny of this peculiar country 
should be settled simply and solely with reference 
to the general strategical and economic needs of the 
surrounding States. Now if there are Bulgarians 
in Macedonia there are also Serbians, and neither 
strategically nor economically is the south of Mace- 
donia necessary to Bulgaria. On the other hand, 
Serbia has a really vital interest, both economic and 
defensive, in maintaining a direct geographical 
contact with Greece, in order to have by means of 
Salonika that access to the ^Egean Sea which is for 
her indispensable. 



What proves, moreover, in ample measure that 
the exorbitant Bulgarian pretensions ar£ not 
founded on a racial basis is that at present the 
ambitions of the government of Sofia considerably 
exceed even the extreme limits of the map which 
serves us as a document (see p. 133). Indeed, not 
only does Bulgaria desire to keep the region of 



'^ 



THE BALKANS 145 

Nisch, but she aims at expanding as far as Hungary, 
which in her turn also wishes to encroach on Serbia. 
In February, 1916, Mr. Take Jonescu declared at 
Bukarest that he had it from a sure source that 
Germany had just promised to Bulgaria the 
possession of Salonika and the Roumanian 
Dobrudja as far as Sulina (see Le Matin, 25th 
February, 1916), that is, exactly that part of the 
Roumanian Dobrudja which, according to our 
documentary map the Bulgarians have coveted ever 
since 1907 at least. As to King Ferdinand, he 
wishes to obtain for his son the whole of central 
Albania, which would allow Bulgaria under colour 
of an eventual arrangement, more or less forced on 
a few Albanian tribes, to spread from the Black 
Sea to the Adriatic — an old plan familiar to all who 
are versed in the ambitions of the Coburg prince at 
Sofia. It is, moreover, probable, so far as Albania 
and the Roumanian Dobrudja are concerned, that 
the Berlin government will curb the Bulgarian 
ambitions in order not to hurt the feelings of 
Vienna, and to prolong the neutrality of Roumania 
by nursing the illusions of the Bratiano cabinet. 
There will be plenty of time afterwards to punish 
Roumania for hesitating to submit to the German 
yoke, when the hour for freeing herself from it 
shall have passed for ever. 

The secret treaty, the negotiations for which 
between the Kaiser and the Tsar Ferdinand were 
revealed by Le Temps of 29th February, 19 16, 
would ensure to Ferdinand the means of ulti- 
mately putting the last touches to his plan of 
Bulgarian supremacy. But this treaty, linking the 
fate of Bulgaria to that of Germany in a military, 
economic, and political aspect, would involve the 
inclusion of Bulgaria in the Germanic Confederation. 
Therefore, finally, always in pursuance of the plan of 
191 1, Bulgaria would serve as a broad bridge between 



146 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

the Germanic Confederation of Central Europe and 
Prussianized Turkey. 

This recent revelation completes the demon- 
stration of the mode and form in which the plan 
of Bulgarian supremacy is closely bound up with 
the Pangerman plan^of world-wide domination. 



II. 

The evidence of the facts as they now stand 
appears to be bringing the Greeks to recognize, 
that if the Allies have committed faults in the 
Balkans — through excess of candour, miscon- 
ception of the mental factors, and with the best 
intentions in the world — the government of Athens 
has been equally deceived as to the surest means 
of safeguarding Hellenic interests. 

According to the treaty of alliance with Serbia 
of i6-29th June, 1913, Greece was bound to come to 
the help of her ally, in case the latter were Attacked 
by any third power. This article was clear. It is 
needless to harp on the point, for even without a 
treaty, it was a vital necessity for Greece not to 
let the Bulgarians upset the balance of power, to 
her detriment, in the Balkans and intrude them- 
selves between her and Serbia. That necessity 
imperiously required the government of Athens 
not to suffer Serbia to be crushed. Now, as we 
know, the allied armies under General Sarrail at 
the end of 191 5 very nearly effected a junction with 
the troops of the Voivode Putnik. It is, therefore, 
manifest that if, on the landing of the Allies at 
Salonika, Greece had joined her efforts to theirs, 
Serbia would have been savfed. That is a truth 
which M. Venizelos and a great part of Greek public 
opinion well understood, but King Constantine 
would not admit it. History will prove whether 
in this grave crisis of his country his relationship of 



THE BALKANS 147 

brother-in-law to the Kaiser did not greatly preju- 
dice the judgment of the King of Greece. What is 
certain is, that no rational explanation has yet been 
given of King Constantine's conduct, and that his 
pohcy has elicited the protests of Greek colonies in 
foreign countries, which, being free to speak, 
declared, in an appeal drawn up by their congresses 
in February, 19 16: 

"While we nurse a meaningless neutrality which 
provokes derision, we run the risk, not only of 
failing to achieve the aspirations bequeathed to 




GREECE AFTER THE TREATY OF BUKAREST. 

us by our fathers, but also of losing our independ- 
ence" (quoted by Le Temps, 26th February, 191 6). 

The vehemence of these protests is intelligible, for 
just in virtue of the policy which for some months 
the government of Athens has pursued, Greece is 
now confronted by vital problems which she must 
absolutely solve without delay, if she would ensure 
her future. 

The annexed map, which represents the state of 
Greece before and after the war, will render intelli- 



148 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

gible the essential interests which Greece has to 
defend. 

Greece has always taken deeply to heart the 
many Greeks living in the East outside her bound- 
aries. She would either incorporate them or at 
least ensure them a tolerable existence. 

These Greeks are to be found in the ethnographi- 
cal regions indicated by cross hatchings on the map, 
which I have copied exactly from the map No, 2 in 
the Pangerman Atlas of Paul Langhans, published 
at Gotha by Justus Perthes in 1900. Thus the 
Pangermans themselves recognize the presence of 
many Greeks in the south of Albania and especially 
in Bulgaria and Turkey. No doubt, since the 
Balkan wars the density of the Greeks in the 
Hellenic regions of Bulgaria and Turkey has under- 
gone serious modifications. Many of these Greeks 
have been massacred either by the Turks or by the 
Bulgarians. Under the pressure of these Turko- 
Bulgarian persecutions about 500,000 Greeks 
have been obliged, since 191 2, to take refuge in 
Greece. But the Greeks who have sources of exact 
information estimate that there still remain about 
200,000 Greeks on the ^Egean coasts of new Bul- 
garia, and 2,300,000 in the Ottoman empire. It is 
clear that if Bulgaria and Turkey, by the help of 
Germany, were finally victorious, these 2,500,000 
Greeks would be lost once and for all to Greece. 
Therefore, if the government of Athens would save 
the Greeks, it has a primary and fundamental 
reason for speedily withstanding the progress of the 
Bulgarians as well as of the Turks. In point of fact 
the Ottoman Greeks are actually harassed most 
systematically by the fanatical young Turks. On 
the other hand the Russian successes in Armenia 
make a profound impression on public opinion at 
Athens, if not on the government of King Constan- 
tine. The Greeks of Greece are too well acquainted 



THE BALKANS 149 

with the decadence of the Ottoman empire not to 
know that its days are numbered. The majority 
of Greeks understand that the moment is approach- 
ing when, by joining the Allies, the adversaries of 
Turkey, Greece should secure for herself a voice 
in their councils, in order that, when peace is con- 
cluded, she may be able to shape the destinies of the 
Greeks of Turkey in conformity with Greek interests. 
This is all the more necessary because these Greeks 
of Turkey, as the map shows, are in the peculiar 
position of being dispersed in small groups over the 
Ottoman coasts, without anywhere forming an 
aggregate large enough to confer the right of being 
treated as a definite part of the Ottoman empire. 

With regard to Bulgaria, the interest of Greece is 
twofold. It consists, in the first place, in prevent- 
ing, as speedily as possible, a continuation of those 
systematic persecutions, deportations, outrages and 
robberies of which the Greeks of Turkey and of the 
invaded regions of Serbia are at present the victims. 
But, above all, Greece has a really vital interest in 
preventing the government of Sofia from carrying 
out its plan of supremacy in the Balkans (see the map 
on p. 133). It is well known at Athens that the 
Bulgarians covet Salonika, and that if, even without 
including that city, Great Bulgaria extended to 
Albania, Greece would thereby be cut off from the 
north of Europe by a rancorous and implacable 
neighbour, and would thus find herself in an un- 
tenable position, alike from the military and the 
economic point of view. It is this serious danger 
that is emphasized by the organs of M. Venizelos, 
who since 1909 has been truly the saviour of Greece. 
As this conviction is deeply rooted in the heart of 
almost all Greeks, who view with irreconcilable 
aversion the Bulgarians as their hereditary enemies, 
it constitutes a mental factor which, more than any 
other motive, will at last, in all probability, open 



ISO PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

the eyes of Greece to the danger which she incurs 
through the alliance of the Bulgarians and the 
Germans. 

But though the Pangerman plan in itself threatens 
the interests of Greece most directly, we must 
recognize that this truth has not yet been sufficiently 
apprehended by Greek public opinion. Neverthe- 
less, it is manifest that Great Germany's ultimate 
aim is to rule at Salonika, perhaps not at first 
directly, but at all events through the agency of the 
Prussianized Bulgarians. But the great railway 
which, starting from Vienna, goes by Belgrade, 
Nisch, Uskub, and Salonika, now ends at the 
Piraeus, since, quite lately, the junction has been 
effected by the continuation of the Greek line of 
Larissa from Papapouli to Guida, a station on the 
trunk line from Salonika to Monastir. In conse- 
quence of this junction line, 96 kilometres long, a 
great Continental railway has just been completed, 
which, after peace has been concluded, will have a 
considerable economic importance for Greece and 
even for the whole of Europe. In fact, the distance 
of Marseilles from Alexandria is 1,404 sea miles, that 
of Brindisi from Alexandria is 836, and that of 
the Piraeus from Alexandria is only 514. Supposing, 
then, that the average speed of the mail steamers is 
15 miles an hour, we infer that the voyage to 
Alexandria takes about 93 hours from Marseilles, 
55 from Brindisi, and only 34 from the Piraeus. The 
new railway will therefore be greatly preferable, not 
only for travellers, but for perishable goods and for 
the post. Hence it is indisputable that, after the 
peace, part of the sea traffic of Europe will bctrans- 
ferred from Marseilles and the Italian ports to the 
Piraeus. From this transference of economic ac- 
tivity certain and important profits will accrue to 
Greece, to say nothing of the considerable portion 
of the wealthy classes of the Continent, who spend 



THE BALKANS 151 

some months of every year in Egypt, and who will 
then stop at Athens before embarking and make 
tours to the classical ruins, leaving behind them, 
as tourists do, quite appreciable sums of money, 
which will be a clear gain to the country. If Serbia 
is re-established, Greece is certain to draw all the 
profits from this new situation. On the contrary, 
were the Pangerman designs in the Balkans to 
succeed, it would be Great Germany that would 
secure for herself all the advantages to be got from 
the great new trunk railway through the Balkans, 
the control of which she covets as usual. But it is 
clear that if Germany triumphed, nothing could 
prevent her from stretching her economic tentacles 
over Salonika, the Piraeus, and the whole of Greece, 
so that in this form also the independence of 
Greece would be doomed. 

Consequently, the Pangerman plan threatens all 
the vital interests of Greece, since its success would 
necessarily entail for that country an economic 
invasion, the_ ruin of Hellenism, and Bulgarian 
supremacy in the Balkans. On the contrary, 
nothing but a victory of the Entente powers can 
save Greece from these dangers. Greek public 
opinion understands this better and better. More- 
over, in a letter published by Le Temps of 20th 
February, 1916, Prince Nicolas of Greece, the able 
diplomat of the royal family, plainly proposed to 
clear up loyally the misunderstandings that exist 
between the government of Athens and the Entente. 
In this letter the following declarations are particu- 
larly memorable, because coming from the brother 
of the King of Greece, they have a bearing which is 
sufficiently obvious. "There are only two currents 
in Greece: the one impels Greece to throw herself 
into the struggle on the side of the Entente, the 
other favours neutrality. But nobody has ever 
uttered the thought that in this war we should have 



152 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

taken part on the side of the Central Powers. 
Greece has remained neutral. She has never 
declared that nothing could induce her to abandon 
her neutrality." 

On March 9th, the Patris of Athens published an 
article of General Danglis, formerly Minister of War 
in the Venizelos Cabinet, which concluded thus: 
"Greece ought without delay to proceed to the 
revision of all the classes of her army capable of 
being called up for service; for without any doubt 
Greece will be obliged to employ her forces during 
the present war" (see Le Temps, loth March, 1916). 

III. 

The serious consequence which Germany's 
alliance with Bulgaria would entail on Roumania, 
must ultimately oblige that country, despite the 
temporizing attitude of its government, to defend 
its vital interests. These interests now stand out 
more and more clearly. In the first place it is 
certain that the plan of Bulgarian supremacy in 
the Balkans (see p. 133) is as little acceptable to 
the Roumanians as to the Greeks. The frontier 
incidents, which have multiplied lately, between 
the Bulgarians and the Roumanians are manifest 
symptoms of the mutual and irreconcilable dislike 
of the two peoples. Besides, the Roumanians have 
been specially alarmed by what has happened in the 
part of the Dobrudja which Bulgaria was compelled 
to cede to Roumania in 1913 (indicated by crossed 
hatchings on the subjoined map). The syndicates 
of Bulgarian peasants in this region have -plainly 
shown their separatist tendencies. Further, it has 
lately been discovered that in the New Dobrudja, 
the Bulgarian system of espionage has been worked, 
under colour of archaeological excursions, by 
Germans, who afterwards transmitted to the 



THE BALKANS 



IS3 



Bulgarian military authorities photographs and 
plans of great importance. Lastly, at the begin- 
ning of 1 916 Mr. Take Jonescu made known at 
Bukarest that Germany had promised to Bulgaria, 
at the expense of Roumania, not only the territory 
which Bulgaria had lost in 1913, but also the 
Roumanian Dobrudja as far as Galatz and Sulina. 
Since then Berlin has been obliged to throw a sop 




GREAT ROUMANIA. 

to Roumania by assuring Bukarest that Germany 
will put a curb on Bulgarian ambition. But this 
promise, a sort of blackmail extorted by the needs 
of the moment, forms but a very precarious guaran- 
tee for the Roumanians. They feel themselves 
threatened by Bulgarian ambitions, and there seems 
little reason to doubt that as soon as circumstances 



154 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

shall appear favourable, Roumania will make an 
end of the Bulgarian peril, as ''she ought to 
have done in 19 13," if the Roumanian Government 
does not allow itself to be "hypnotized" by that 
of Berlin, to use the language of the Universal, 
the official connection of which with the military 
authorities at Bukarest is well known (quoted by 
Le Temps, 19th March, 191 6). 

On the other hand the national policy of Rou- 
mania is influenced in the highest degree by the two 
questions of Bessarabia and Transylvania. As 
the map on the opposite page shows, Roumania 
irredenta is composed of two great racial and terri- 
torial elements: about 1,000,000 Roumanians live 
in Russian Bessarabia, but 3,700,000 Roumanians 
inhabit Transylvania and Bukovina, that is to say, 
vast regions of Hungary and Austria. The Rou- 
manian ideal, in its entirety, would evidently be to 
incorporate at the same time the Roumanian 
brothers of the East and the West, but as the ideal 
is not practicable, a choice must be made. The 
partisans of Germany at Bukarest, led by M. 
Carp and Marghiloman, maintain that Roumania 
should elect for Bessarabia and therefore march 
against Russia. To this the practical politicians 
of Bukarest reply: "We should certainly be glad 
to incorporate the Roumanians of Bessarabia also, 
but that policy would only be possible if Russia 
were completely destroyed by Germany, which 
has not been done and cannot be done, for the facts 
so far prove that Russia could not be decisively 
beaten. Therefore Roumania cannot be such a 
fool as to incur the permanent hostility of the enor- 
mous empire of the Tzar. Moreover, in order to 
incorporate the 1,000,000 Roumanians of Bess- 
arabia, we must abandon the 3,700,000 Rou- 
manians of Transylvania, besides accepting into 
the bargain the supremacy of the Bulgarians in the 



THE BALKANS 155 

Balkans, since they are the allies of the Central 
Empires." 

Such are the essential arguments which incline 
Roumanian opinion to make a decided choice for the 
acquisition of Transylvania. In order that the re- 
lations between Russia and Roumania should 
become cordial enough to permit of an alliance 
between St. Petersburg and Bukarest it remains, 
perhaps, for Russia to reassure Roumania with 
regard to the control of the Straits. It is certainly 
well understood at Bukarest that after the 
enormous sacrifices which she has made Russia 
cannot consent to remain bottled up by the Turks 
in the Black Sea, and that after the peace she must 
hold a preponderant position at Constantinople. 
On the other hand, it is the interest of all Europe 
and of Russia herself that she should ensure for the 
future a large amount of liberty in the control of the 
Straits. I cannot see, therefore, why Bukarest and 
Petrograd should not come to an understanding on 
this important subject. 

In order to prevent, or at least retard, the inter- 
vention of Roumania, of which Berlin is much 
afraid, the Kaiser's diplomacy is putting pressure 
on Vienna and on Budapest in order to obtain 
"large concessions" in favour of the Roumanians 
of Transylvania and Bukovina. But at Bukarest 
people know by experience the value to be attached 
to the promises of Vienna, and especially to those of 
the Magyar nobility. Besides, as Roumania desires 
the annexation, pure and simple, of Transylvania 
and of the Roumanian region of Bukovina, she 
could not be content with mere concessions. So 
the offers of the Central Empires at Bukarest have 
little chance of being seriously considered. 

They will have still less, if the Roumanians yield 
to the force of evidence by recognizing, that even 
if the Pangerman plan were to provide for the 



156 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

cession of Transylvania to Roumania, at the 
expense of Hungary, that plan would still threaten 
their independence in the most direct and indisput- 
able manner. In her attempt to win Roumania to 
her side, Berlin has promised to give Bessarabia, 
with Odessa, to Roumania at the expense of Russia. 
In order to appreciate the character and the sin- 
cerity of this offer, the Roumanians need only refer 
to the pamphlet long ago circulated by the All- 
deutscher Verband, which sets forth the fundamental 
plan of 1894, and which I have often quoted. It 
bears the title. Great Germany and Central Europe 
in 1950. On p. 36 that work defines as follows the 
fate which Pangermanism has in store for Roumania 
on the East. '*In the case of a victorious war 
against Russia, Roumania might get Upper Bess- 
arabia as far as the Dniester. Austria would annex 
Lower Bessarabia in the form of a Margraviate of 
Bessarabia, and by means of the German colonies, 
which already exist, she would transform it into a 
purely German region. The boundaries of this 
Austro- German Margraviate of Bessarabia would 
include the cities of Odessa, Bender, Borodino, 
Formosa, Beni, Ismail, and the mouths of the 
Danube at Sulina. A reciprocal exchange of 
populations with the neighbouring countries would 
easily ensure the exclusively German colonization 
of this Margraviate. German ships of war would 
mount guard at the mouth of the German Danube." 
This fundamental plan, which dates from twenty- 
one years ago, would now be completed, as we saw 
(P- 133) by the ultimate establishment in the Rou- 
manian Dobrudja of the Bulgarians, wha would 
thus be in direct contact with the new Margraviate 
of Prussianized Austria. 

Hence, supposing the Germans were victorious, 
the Roumanians, who have been much alarmed by 
the idea of seeing the Russians installed at Con- 



THE BALKANS 157 

stantinople, would be confronted by the danger of 
being soon entirely cut off from both the Black Sea 
and from the Mediterranean. The Bulgarians 
would take possession of the Roumanian Dobrudja, 
the Germans would remain at Constantinople and 
the Dardanelles, where they are already, and besides 
they would be dominant at Odessa and the mouths 
of the Danube, according to the plan drawn up, as 
far back as 1844, by the future Marshal Moltke 
{see p. 4). The authority of that name may 
satisfy the Roumanians that the scheme is no mere 
fantasy. 

Moreover, it is plain enough that were Roumania 
once encircled, she could no longer dream of creat- 
ing, as she so ardently desires to do, a national 
industry, since she would be no more than an 
economic territory reduced to impotence, a mere 
dumping-ground for goods made in Pangermany. 

To sum up, we see that this is really a question of 
life or death for Roumania. A Prussian victory, 
in fact, would imperil her national independence in 
the most direct and indubitable manner. It 
appears that the general opinion in Roumania is 
alive to the danger and to the necessity of Rou- 
manian intervention in the conflict. It remains 
to be seen whether German influences at Bukarest 
will be adroit enough and powerful enough to 
delude the Roumanian authorities into shilly- 
shallying till the decisive hour shall have come and 
gone. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

GERMAN MANCEUVRES TO PLAY THE ALLIES THE TRICK 
OF THE "drawn GAME," THAT IS, TO SECURE THE 
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE " HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN 
gulf" SCHEME AS THE MINIMUM RESULT OF THE WAR. 

I. The exceptional importance of the economic union of the 
Central Empires, and the danger for the Allies of establish- 
ing a connexion between that iinion and their own 
economic measiires after the war. 
II. Reasons for the Turco-German dodge of making a separate 

peace between the Ottoman empire and the Allies. 
III. Why a separate and premature peace with Bulgaria would 
play the Pangerman game. 

At the moment when this book is published, the 
Germans have certainly not renounced the hope of 
keeping and establishing a definite claim to the 
territories which they actually occupy on the West 
and on the East; but with their usual foresight they 
nevertheless contemplate the possibility of their 
having to consent to evacuate on the West, let us 
say, 90,478 square kilometres, and on the East 
260,000 square kilometres, in order to preserve 
almost entire the principal part of the Pangerman 
acquisitions, that is to say, the gains made, directly 
or indirectly, to the South and South-east, namely, 
Austria-Hungary (676,616 square kilometres), the 
Balkans (215,585 square kilometres), Turkey (about 
1,792,000 square kilometres). Total, 2^684,201 
square kilometres. 

To maintain its dominion over these territories, 
the government of Berlin is from now onward 
directing its energies to three sorts of manoeuvres, 
all very astute, and very well co-ordinated, though 

158 



GERMAN MANCEUVRES 159 

they wear different aspects, each corresponding to 
each of the three territorial stages essential to 
the achievement of the scheme ''from Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf." These three stages are 
Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, which last 
forms the bridge between the two other stages. 



As regards Austria-Hungary the Berlin pro- 
gramme may be summed up as follows: to take 
advantage of the occupation of the territories of the 
Hapsburg Monarchy by the troops of William II. in 
order to impose, by all possible means, both on Hun- 
gary and on Austria, a series of measures called an 
economic union with Germany, which would leave 
Austria-Hungary an appearance of independence 
sufficient to throw dust in the eyes of the Allies, while 
at the same time it would in fact subject that etnpire 
absolutely to the will of Berlin. 

So far, these tactics have not succeeded in put- 
ting on a semblance of legality. Since the out- 
break of war, the Pangermans of Vienna have not 
even dared to summon the Austrian parliament, 
knowing very well that the Slav and Latin deputies 
would protest most vehemently against the sub- 
jection of their respective countries to the German 
empire. At present the Germans of Vienna, while 
they terrorize the Austrian Slavs and try to per- 
suade them that the Allies have forsaken them, 
are striving to prepare a meeting of the Reichsrath 
which might seem to sanction all that has been 
done. But the reader will understand that it is 
no easy matter to get up this farce, when he learns 
that even the Magyars, who have linked themselves 
closely to Germany, are beginning to resist, now that 
Berlin is forced to disclose those measures of en- 
slavement, of which Hungary must feel the effects, 



i6o PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

like the other States destined to pass under the 
Pangerman yoke. It is said that William II.'s 
great Magyar accomplice, Count Tisza himself, is 
protesting. At all events in the Pesti Hirlap of 
Budapest, of 12th April, 191 6, we are assured that 
his friend, the Senator Eugene Rakosky, has just 
published the following lines, which are particularly 
significant: 

*'A11 this Central European ferment will have no 
other result than compelling the Hungarians to 
pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the Germans. 
They want us to make high roads for the Germans to 
the East. All these Central European alliances 
and unions mean nothing but that we are expected 
to sell our national soul and pass under the German 
yoke" (quoted by Le Temps, 19th April, 1916). 

But the Allies should have no illusion on this head. 
The most vehement protests of the Magyars will be 
of no avail. The Germans are in occupation of 
Austria-Hungary and they have the power. They 
may disguise their enslavement of this vast empire 
under various formulas, such as extension of the 
Zollverein, economic union of the Central Empires, 
unification of the commercial laws of Austria and 
Germany, etc.; or they may even, as a subterfuge, 
to lull the fears of the Allies to sleep, give up the use 
of any positive formula, the final result will always 
be the same, the political seizure by Germany of 
the Hapsburg Monarchy cloaked under the decent 
pretext of economic measures. 

To this object the Germans cling above every- 
thing else, because it has been the basis of the whole 
Pangerman plan since 1895, and the indispensable 
condition of achieving the scheme ''from Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf," as the reader will find ex- 
plained, with the reasons in full, in my book 
published fifteen years ago, VEurope el la Queslion 
d'Autriche au seuil du XX^ siecle; they cling to it, 



GERMAN MANCEUVRES i6i 

too, because Germany has made war for the 
very purpose of effecting at least this seizure of 
Austria-Hungary, which is absolutely indispensable 
to the plans of William II. 

Nothing but the complete victory of the Allies 
can compel Berlin to renounce this plan of domina- 
tion and liberate the non- German peoples of the 
Hapsburg Monarchy. Meantime the Germans are 
taking all possible precautions against such an 
event. We have seen (p. 93) how already, under 
their pressure, the Magyars are concerting with them 
the economic measures to be taken in view of that 
future war, which is to complete the results of a 
peace which Berlin already thinks bound to be 
''imperfect." Accordingly, the Allies cannot have 
the faintest doubt as to the new war which as sure 
as fate will follow, sooner or later, from the economic 
and necessarily political union of the Central 
Empires. In Chapter V we saw that the certain 
consequence of this economic union would be: 

1°. To secure to Germany the spoils of war and 
a trade monopoly over nearly 3 millions of square 
kilometres containing wealth untold. 

2°. On the contrary, to leave the Allies to pay 
all their expenses in the war, which is equivalent 
to condemning their peoples to ruin. 

3°. To make Prussian militarism more powerful 
than ever, since, radiating from the block of Central 
Europe, it could command an army of from 15 to 21 
millions of soldiers. 

4°- ^ To give Germany the supremacy over the 
majority of essential strategic points on land and 
sea, which would provide Berlin with all the means 
for executing gradually and completely its plan of 
world-wide domination. 

But it seems that these formidable consequences, 
which flow from the seizure of Austria-Hungary by 
Germany, have not yet been sufficiently understood 



i62 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

in the Allied countries. That is the conclusion 
indicated by the following opinions which have 
been published in some French and English news- 
papers: ''The declarations of Mr. Runciman, 
President of the Board of Trade in the United 
Kingdom," says Le Temps of 25th March, 1916, 
"prove that Great Britain is resolved to work 
without delay for the formation of an economic 
alliance against the powers of Central Europe." 

Mr. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, in an 
address at the Carlton Club, gave his hearers to 
understand that the German Empire must not be 
allowed to hope to reduce other countries to a state 
of commercial dependence upon it (see Le Temps, 
23rd March, 1916). In consequence of these 
declarations an idea was formed of an economic 
understanding between the AlHes in order, accord- 
ing to Le Petit Parisien, "to make an effective reply 
to the project of a Central Europe conceived by our 
enemies." 

M. Jules Siegfried, in a letter to the Temps, 3rd 
April, 1916, afl&rmed, with reference to this: 
"Germany, aware of the danger, is seeking to form 
a Customs-union with Austria, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey. It is therefore necessary for us to guard 
against this danger." Mr. Hewins, chairman of the 
Business Committee of the House of Commons, 
stated at London on April 6th: "But France and 
England, after their victory, will possess a pre- 
ponderance over the Austro- German union which 
will enable them to dictate their tariffs, etc." 
(see UEcho de Paris, 7th April, 1916). M. Edmond 
Thery, in Le Matin of 13th April, 1916, discussing 
the same problem, concluded: "If, therefore, the 
Allied nations will erect simultaneously and under 
identical conditions a powerful Customs barrier 
between their respective home markets and the 
products of Germany and her accomplices, this of 



GERMAN MANCEUVRES 163 

itself will suffice to strike a mortal blow at German 
industry, commerce, and credit." 

These declarations are amazing. How can the 
economic problem to be solved by the Allies be 
placed, even through an obvious "inadvertence," 
on a basis so manifestly inaccurate? How, in 
fact, can we voluntarily admit the least connection 
between the economic conference of the Allies and 
the economic union of the Central empires, since 
that union is clearly in flagrant contradiction with 
the general object of the war, which nevertheless, 
the Allies are perfectly at one in pursuing? In 
fact, to keep repeating that the Allies must form 
an economic alliance of the Allies to compete after 
the war against the economic union of Central 
Europe, and to prevent the German Empire from 
reducing other countries besides Austria-Hungary 
to a commercial dependence on itself, this is, in 
strict logic, to assume that the Allies agree to let 
Prussianized Germany lay hands on the 50 million 
inhabitants of Austria-Hungary, which would 
secure for Berlin the means of carrying out her 
scheme of domination ''from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf." But it is clear that this result is 
radically incompatible with the higher ideal aim of 
the war which the Allies propose as their goal, 
the aim which their governments incessantly pro- 
claim, that is, the destruction of Prussian militar- 
ism. 

There has therefore unquestionably been a mis- 
take on the part of some French and English 
authorities, who are in other respects well qualified, 
in the way they have put the question and in the 
association of their ideas. This mistake is doubt- 
less explained by the fact that in England loose 
ideas are still prevalent as to the Pangerman plan 
and Austria-Hungary. Many people on the other 
side of the Channel still imagine that the majority 



i64 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

of the population of that Empire is German, whereas 
on the principle of nationalities, Germany could at 
most incorporate 7 or 8 millions of Germans at 
present subjects of the Hapsburg {see p. 126). 
These loose ideas prevalent in England are very- 
difficult to eradicate. It is these ideas which are at 
the root of the mistakes made by our British Allies 
in regard to the Balkans and Salonika, whereas, on 
account of Egypt and India, England was more 
interested than all the other Allies in the rapid 
execution of that expedition. 

Be that as it may, as the Allies cannot indulge 
in the sanguinary luxury of fresh serious blunders, 
it is necessary to show why the project of an eco- 
nomic understanding between the Allies should be 
absolutely independent of the Berlin project of a 
Central European Union. 

In point of fact, if this separation is not clearly 
effected, it will entail the following baneful conse- 
quences, which will delay still further the victory to 
gain which the Allied peoples are making such 
gigantic sacrifices. 

1°. To allow it to be understood in the news- 
papers of the Allies, even by inadvertence, that the 
Allies could possibly admit of the economic union 
which Germany intends to force on Austria- 
Hungary, would be to furnish the German news- 
papers with a cordial for reviving the fainting 
spirits of the German nation; for in that case the 
German journalists would point out to their people 
that they can still count on carrying out the main 
part of the Pangerman plan, which they regard as 
the essential object of the war. 

2°. The German scheme of capturing Austria- 
Hungary in an economical net is radically incom- 
patible with the pledges which the Allies have given 
to Serbia. In his toast to the Prince of Serbia^ 
M. Poincare declared: ''Acting with the Serbian 



GERMAN MANCEUVRES 165 

army, the Allies will liberate the Serbian territory, 
will re-establish the independence and the 
sovereignty of your noble country on a solid founda- 
tion, and will vindicate the rights which have been 
infringed" (see Le Temps, 23rd March, 1916). 
Now a mere glance at the map (p. 79) suffices to 
show that the capture of Austria-Hungary by 
Germany would render the fulfilment of that 
solemn promise impossible. Once in contact with 
the Balkans, Germany would be the mistress of 
these countries, and for Serbia that would be a 
sentence of death. 

3°. To allow it to be supposed that the project 
of an economic union between Germany and 
Austria-Hungary could be even contemplated by 
the Allies, would be to give over to an agony of 
despair the 28 million Slav and Latin subjects of the 
Hapsburg Monarchy, who look to the Allies as their 
deliverers, and who, just because of their sympathies 
with the Allied cause, are subjected to the most 
atrocious persecution. There can be no doubt that 
the German press would catch at any ambiguous 
phrases in the utterances of the Allied press about 
the "economic union" of Central Europe in order 
to persuade these poor wretches that the Allies 
have forsaken them for good and all, and that there 
is nothing left for them, but to bow their neck to 
the German-Magyar yoke. But it is manifestly 
the political and military interest of the Allies at 
the moment to let the Slavs and Latins of Austria- 
Hungary know at once that they may rely on the 
Allies, and that the victory of the Allied cause 
would mean the end of their own serfdom. To 
attain that result of the war is unquestionably a 
moral duty for the Allies; but more than that it is 
in strict conformity with their own future interest, 
for the independence of 28 milKon Slavs and Latins 
of Austria-Hungary is absolutely indispensable to 



i66 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

the establishment of a new and lasting Europe, 
founded on the principle of nationalities, and 
capable of forming at the same time in Central 
Europe a barrier, which Pangermanism in arms will 
for the future be powerless to overleap. 

4°. Every mistake, or appearance of a mistake, 
as to the treatment which the Western Allies intend 
to mete out to Austria-Hungary would excite the 
liveliest protests among our Russian Allies. As 
M. Milioukoff well said in a speech to the Duma: 
''When we have wound up bankrupt Turkey, as 
we are now doing, it will be necessary to wind up 
another bankrupt concern, and that is Austria- 
Hungary. We are certain that the numerous 
nationalities which form part of the Dual Monarchy 
will receive their liberty at the hands of Russia" 
(quoted by Le Temps, 27th March, 1916). But the 
point of view set forth by M. Milioukoff, which is 
that of everybody who really knows Austria- 
Hungary (see p. 118), must be shared by all the 
Allies, since they intend to destroy Prussian 
militarism and clearly do not wage the most fright- 
ful of all wars for the purpose of seeing militant 
Prussia emerge from the struggle infinitely more 
powerful than she entered into it. 

These many and forcible reasons make it clear 
how necessary it is that there should be no possible 
ambiguity in the Allied press as to the economic 
conference of the Allies. It is all very well for the 
conference to look ahead to the time when peace 
shall have been concluded, to take "concerted 
measures to counteract the dirty tricks by which 
Germany has compassed the destruction "of her 
rivals," to forestall fresh German depredations, in 
time of peace, on the financial establishments of the 
Allies, to prevent the Germans from manipulating 
the Custom-house tariffs, with all their usual 
dexterity, and so forth. This is all very well; 



GERMAN MANCEUVRES 167 

nothing better; but on no account let there be, 
even in appearance, the least connexion between 
these theoretical measures of the Allies and the 
pretensions of Berlin to establish the economic 
union of Central Europe. Besides, as Mr. Lloyd 
George has said, with his robust good sense: 
"Before discussing the commercial system to be 
adopted after the war, we must first win the 
war. Everything depends on that" (quoted by 
Le Temps, 25th March). But the war will not be 
really won till every revival of aggressive Pan- 
germanism shall have been rendered impossible; 
and this implies nothing less than the most energetic 
opposition to Germany's attempt to capture the 
majority of the countries which actually compose 
the empire of the Hapsburgs. 

11. 

A cunning manceuvre for saving the future of 
Pangermanism and of Enver Pasha's gang in 
Turkey has already been broached by the Germans. 
As it will certainly be attempted again, should it 
be in the interest of Berlin to push it through (and 
everything points that way), it becomes necessary 
to unmask it completely beforehand. In February, 
1916, numerous Turkish agents, installed in Switzer- 
land and apparently working through spies in the 
Allied countries, began to set afloat a rumour that 
Turkey was ready to conclude a separate peace. 
Enver Pasha had been assassinated (which of course 
was a lie), and so forth. The aim of this manoeuvre 
was to secure in the Allied countries the assistance 
of those incorrigible fools, armed with the panoply 
of crass ignorance on the affairs of the East, who 
nevertheless are not always without influence on 
men at the head of affairs. If I am rightly in- 
formed, this clever dodge of the Turkish agents did 
really succeed for a time in enlisting some of the 



i68 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

fools I speak of. In the opinion of these gentry the 
conclusion of a separate peace with Turkey would 
have been a very good move, since it would have 
deprived Germany of the help of her Ottoman ally, 
etc. These are very dangerous illusions, and it is 
necessary to show how and why this measure would 
play the game of Berlin and gravely imperil the 
victory of the Allies. 

The Turks, greatly alarmed by the Russian 
successes in Armenia, see at the same time their 
dream of a Panislamic movement fading away. 
They are obliged to acknowledge to themselves that 
the Germans are cynically using them for their own. 
selfish ends, are driving them along the road to 
famine by making a clean sweep of all their food 
supplies, and are sending them to slaughter for the 
higher interests of Pangermany. But while the 
mass of the Turks may very well feel their anger 
beginning to rise against the Germans, they are 
completely in the hands of the Young-Turk ring- 
leaders, who in their turn are bound over, hand and 
foot, to the Germans; and more and more the 
Germans are masters of the organs of administra- 
tion and government in Turkey. Therefore there 
is no counting on an effective revolt of the Turkish 
population, who moreover are entirely destitute of 
the spirit of organization. On the other hand, the 
Germans are far-seeing people and perfectly under- 
stand that Turkey is hastening towards a catas- 
trophe. But to bring about a separate peace between 
Turkey and the Allies would be equivalent to inducing 
the Allies to recognize the permanence of the Ottoman 
empire; it would thus save that empire from 'disaster, 
and leave the door open for Berlin to re-open its old 
ifitrigues after the conclusion of a peace on the basis 
of the "drawn game" (see chap. V). 

On the contrary, if the question of the Ottoman 
East is logically settled once for all, all hope of 



GERMAN MANCEUVRES 169 

carrying out at a later time the Pangerman dream 
"from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf" is 
finally shattered. Moreover, a separate peace 
would also serve the turn of the Young-Turk ring- 
leaders, for clearly nothing else could enable them 
to keep their hold on the reins of power, or could 
save them from being massacred by their fellow 
countrymen the day that the Ottoman crash comes. 
We see therefore why the rumours of a separate 
peace between Turkey and the Allies, which have 
been circulated and afterwards denied, only to be 
started again, at some other time, are really a 
Turko- German manoeuvre. Besides, the Arabian 
journal Al-Mokattan of Cairo (22nd April, 191 6) 
has remarked that "a separate peace with Turkey 
would cause Germany no uneasiness, since the 
retirement of Turkey from the arena would relieve 
Germany from the need of helping the Turks, as she 
does at present." Finally, the Vossische Zeitung 
has confessed that " sl separate peace between 
Turkey and the enemies of Germany would in no 
way prejudice Austro-German interests" (quoted 
by Le Journal de Geneve, 25th April, 1916). 

However, it is not to be supposed that the leaders 
of the Entente will allow themselves to be caught 
in the Turko- German trap. The Eastern question 
is a regular ulcer, which has envenomed European 
policy for a hundred years; it is the nightmare of 
the chanceries. Every attempt to reform the 
Ottoman empire has always failed. The fact is 
that this dry-rotten State has only been bolstered 
up by the mutual rivalries of the great powers. 
Since the victory of the Allies is bound to secure for 
the Old World a very long period of peace, that 
perennial source of troubles and wars, the Turkish 
empire, must be stopped for good. Moreover, 
justice in its broader aspect demands the same 
solution of the problem. 



I70 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

In Turkey, as elsewhere, if the new settlement is 
to be endowed with a potentiality of life, the 
principle of nationalities must be followed as far as 
is practicable. Now, out of the 20 million inhabi- 
tants of the Ottoman empire, four great nationali- 
ties (see the accompanying map) account for 
about 18 millions. In the absence of statistics on 
which any reliance can be placed, it is estimated that 
there are in Turkey about: — 




THE NATIONALITIES IN TURKEY. 



Two millions of Levantines, of Europeans, of 
Jews, and of miscellaneous races. 

Two millions of Greeks. 

Two millions of Armenians. 

Eight millions of Arabs. 

Six millions only of Turks. 

As for the Greeks, who unfortunately do not form 
a coherent body (see p. 147), there are several 
solutions to be considered, with a view to giving 
them a fraction of the Ottoman empire, if they 
throw themselves into the struggle in the Balkans 



GERMAN MANCEUVRES 171 

on the side of the Allies. With regard to the Arabs, 
they detest the Turks, who have oppressed them 
for centuries. The liberation of the Arabs from the 
Turkish yoke should therefore be carried out so far 
as it is at all possible. As for the Armenians, of 
whom several hundreds of thousands have just been 
massacred by the Turks, it is clearly impossible to 
contemplate the continuance of the remnant of this 
unhappy people under the iron heel of Enver 
Pasha, Talaat, and the rest of that gang. With 
regard to the six millions, or thereabouts, of Turks, 
who represent less than the third of the population 
of the Ottoman empire, they, really inhabit only 
Anatolia, that is to say, the portion of the Ottoman 
empire included between the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean. Everywhere else the Turks are 
merely hated officials, who, ever since the conquest 
by the Osmanli Sultans, have cynically sucked dry 
the other populations of the Ottoman empire. No 
doubt the Turkish peasant of Anatolia, when he is 
not a prey to one of those paroxysms of religious 
fanaticism which seize him periodically, is generally 
a good fellow. Very sober and long-suffering he 
makes an excellent soldier, but the mental appara- 
tus of your Anatolian Turk is several centuries 
behind the time. He is incapable of self-govern- 
ment in our modern age. It is true that there are 
some thousands of Turks who make excellent 
employees in the service of the Ottoman Debt, but 
only on condition of their being constantly super- 
vised and directed by European heads of depart- 
ments. Among the Turks of Constantinople there 
is not a single group offering any serious guarantee 
for the guidance of the Turkish masses. If the 
Turkish peasant of Anatolia is undoubtedly endowed 
by nature with some sterling qualities, it is equally 
certain that the Turks of Constantinople, with few 
exceptions, are corrupt to the marrow of their 



172 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

bones. In these circumstances to imagine that a 
really independent Turkish empire could be set up 
is to nurse an absurd chimera. As for Constanti- 
nople, it is not even a Turkish city; it is essentially 
cosmopolitan. Its 1,200,000 inhabitants consist 
of Turks (43 per cent.), Armenians (18 per cent.), 
Greeks (17 per cent.), Jews (16 per cent.), Euro- 
peans, Levantines, and miscellaneous peoples (6 
per cent.). 

On the other hand, it is plain enough that this 
amazing war cannot close without allowing Russia 
to acquire a predominant position at Constanti- 
nople. Russia certainly did not want the war, but 
she has been compelled to wage it and to send 
millions of men to their death, while she has had to 
support a formidable financial burden. For these 
gigantic sacrifices Russia must receive compensa- 
tion. The toll which Russia will take of Poland in 
return for the autonomy granted to her — a toll 
which is both just and conformable to the common 
interest of the Poles as well as of the Russians — ■ 
evidently cannot repay Russia for her enormous/ 
sacrifices. That necessary compensation, there- 
fore, Russia must look for elsewhere. Now a glance 
at the map, combined with a knowledge of the 
cosmopolitan character of Constantinople, will 
convince anybody that Russia cannot continue to be 
bottled up in the Black Sea. While it is necessary 
to the peace of the new Europe that the control of the 
Straits should be exercised under the direction of 
Russia on as liberal principles as possible, it is no 
less necessary for the West to understand that 
justice demands for Russia a preponderant p'osition 
at Constantinople, even though the Western powers 
must make some undoubted sacrifices to secure 
that object. If the soldiers of the Tsar have given 
proof of unparalleled self-sacrifice, if, despite some 
cruel reverses, they display an inflexible tenacity, 



GERMAN MANCEUVRES 173 

it is because they are stirred by two motives — a 
hatred of the Germans who have poisoned the 
Russian bureaucracy, and the ardent wish for the 
fulfilment of that hope which animates the poorest 
peasant in Russia, the hope of securing for Russia 
a free outlet on the Mediterranean. These are the 
feelings, the depth and power of which M. Milioukoff 
put into words when he said to the Duma: "We 
shall not end the war without securing an outlet to 
the open sea. The annexation of the Straits will 
not be a territorial annexation, for vast Russia has 
no need of new territories, but she cannot prosper 
without access to the open sea" (see Le Journal de 
Geneve, 28th March, 1916). But in spreading the 
rumour of a separate peace with Turkey the 
Germans expect to derive the following advantage 
from the manoeuvre. They reckon that some 
Allied newspapers in the West will receive the idea 
favourably. The Germans would immediately take 
advantage of that to stir up in Russia a violent storm 
of indignation and doubt against the Western 
Allies. The example of 191 5 ought to serve the 
Allies as a warning against any imprudence in the 
press. It is not sufi&ciently known in France that 
last year the Germans traded largely on the 
apparent inactivity of the French troops, at the 
time when the Russians were obliged to endure their 
long retreat of five months. That inactivity was 
certainly not the effect of any ill will of the French 
towards their Russian allies; it was the consequence 
of that baneful theory of the Western front con- 
sidered as the principal and exclusive theatre of 
war, a theory which prevented the intervention by 
way of Salonika, at a time when it might still have 
been easily effected, between May and July, 1915. 
Nevertheless, that apparent inactivity has been 
used by the Germans to excite discontent in Russia 
against the French, and their efforts have not been 



174 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

unsuccessful, for during a long time many Russians 
were much annoyed with th( French for an in- 
activity which seemed to them inexplicable. This in- 
stance may help us to understand what a disastrous 
effect would be produced in Russia by the news that 
in the West the newspapers or influential circles 
contemplate as possible a separate peace with 
Turkey at the very moment when the Russian 
arms are more and more successful in Armenia, and 
when these successes not only console the soldiers 
of the Tsar for their former reverses, but also 
render the Allies a substantial service by draining 
the Balkan peninsula of Turkish troops, and thus 
facilitating the Allied offensive from Salonika 
Northward. 

Such are the various results aimed at by the 
astute new dodge of a separate peace with the 
Ottoman empire. Surely it is only necessary to 
recognize them to prevent the Allies from being 
caught in the new Turko- German trap. 

III. 

Contemporaneously with the rumour of a separate 
peace with Turkey, in February, 191 6, a suggestion 
was mysteriously made to the Western Allies that 
the Bulgarians also wished to treat with them. The 
two manoeuvres, as we shall see, are in fact closely 
connected. If the Bulgarians were to come and 
say to the Allies: "We have been deceived, 
deluded by Berlin, we have pursued an odious 
policy. As a proof of our good faith we will evacuate 
immediately the Serbian territories which we have 
invaded, and we will do all in our power to undo 
the mischief we have done. Grant us peace on 
these terms"; in that case, clearly enough, there 
would be some reason for listening to Sofia. But 
it would be entirely to mistake the character of the 
Bulgarians and of their government to imagine that 



GERMAN MANOEUVRES 175 

they could even dream of such a proposal. What 
the Bulgarians would like well enough would be a 
peace with the Allies, which should allow them to 
retain their territorial acquisitions, the permanent 
character of which was proclaimed by M. Radoslavoff 
on March ist, 1916. Such a settlement, moreover, 
as we shall see, would square exactly with the 
interests of Sofia and Berlin. 

j At heart, the Bulgarians would be very glad of 
peace, since a continuation of the war can hardly 
procure for them any accession to what they already 
hold. On the other hand, the offensive of the 
Allies from Salonika, if it is well organized, ought 
to mete out to the Bulgarians the chastisement 
which they dread, especially since the check to the 
Germans before Verdun and the Russian successes 
in Armenia. The Bulgarian people is moreover 
deeply discontented at the heavy losses which it has 
already sustained by the sword and by disease 
in the campaign against Serbia. They see the whole 
of Bulgaria in the hands of German officers. As for 
the Bulgarian army, it is in a very unsatisfactory 
state, which has already led to local mutinies and 
many desertions. In these circumstances Bulgaria 
would evidently on all accounts do a good piece of 
business if she were to make a separate peace with 
the Allies. It must be clearly understood that this 
Bulgarian manoeuvre is not openly avowed at 
Sofia; it is only carried on underhand, and prob- 
ably, for the reasons we shall see, with the con- 
nivance of Berlin. Nevertheless, it is very danger- 
ous, for, it must be said in the interest of the common 
Allied cause and of the truth, it has found supporters 
in the Allied countries among those who combine 
an invincible fatuity with ideas on the Balkans 
which are forty years behind the time. 

There are also some Russians who still imagine 
that in 1915 the Allied diplomacy made a mistake 
in not undoing the consequences of the treaty of 



176 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Bukarest; whereas in point of fact that is just what 
has been done, and what, as we saw in Chapter II., 
§ I., constituted the fundamental error of the Allied 
policy in the Balkans. According to these Russians 
the treaty of Bukarest should have been set aside in 
order to restore Bulgaria to the limits assigned to 
it by the treaty of San Stefano. This is the point 
of view maintained as late as March, 191 6, by M. 
Milioukoff from the tribune of the Duma. I have 
explained (p. 138), why on the west the Bulgaria of 
the San Stefano treaty by no means corresponded 
to the racial facts, and for what reasons Macedonia, 
forming the south of Serbia, is very far from being 
Bulgarian. A striking proof of it is that the 
Bulgarians have just massacred there a quantity 
of Serbians. With regard to the ethnography of the 
region we may introduce into the discussion a new 
argument, as original perhaps as it is convincing. 
To tell the truth the most accurate account of the 
ethnographic position of Macedonia is that which 
has been handed down to us for generations by the 
Cooks — it is a Macedoine. In the great dictionary 
of Larousse, vol. x, p. 855, edition of 1873, and 
therefore anterior by five years to the treaty of San 
Stefano (1878), we read: "Macedoine (Macedonia), 
a dish composed of a great number of different 
vegetables or fruits. 'This word,' says Ch. Nodier, 
'was probably first applied to a very miscellaneous 
dish in allusion to the incredible medley of peoples 
on whom Philip and Alexander imposed the laws of 
Macedonia.' " 

Now these various peoples are the Turks, the 
Albanians, the Bulgarians, the Jews, the Rou- 
manians, and the Serbians, who inhabit the south 
of Serbia. Thus the ancient tradition handed down 
by the cooks, whose impartiality in matters of 
ethnography will not be disputed, undoubtedly 
contradicts the theory of the ethnographical unity 



GERMAN MANOEUVRES 177 

of Bulgaria mapped out by the treaty of San 
Stefano; and it must be remembered that in 1878 
Russian diplomacy had special reasons, which no 
longer exist, for treating the whole of that Bulgaria 
as exclusively Bulgarian. The words of M. 
Milioukoff prove that the erroneous ideas of 1878 
still linger in the minds of some Russians. Happily 
among the vast majority of our Eastern Allies the 
logic of facts has dissipated those sentimental 
leanings to Bulgaria which were once so strong. 
Indeed, the Bulgarians themselves have powerfully 
assisted the Russians to arrive at a juster apprecia- 
tion of the true situation. At the end of 191 5, in 
the first effervescence of their affection for Germany, 
the newspapers of Sofia announced that the 
Bulgarians are not Slavs but Tartar-Mongols, and 
that this racial consideration, added to all the rest, 
goes to show that along with the Turks and the 
Magyars they should form the "Turanian block," 
which, in association with Germany, will master and 
hold down the Slavs and Latins in Europe. Hence 
the Bulgarian dodge of a separate peace with the 
Allies has very little chance of being seriously 
considered in Russia. But unfortunately some of 
those same Englishmen, whose erroneous informa- 
tion greatly contributed to the Balkan mistakes of 
1915, are actually supporting it. I shall only refer 
here to Englishmen who have no official position. 
Among them must particularly be named the 
brothers Charles and Noel Buxton, who have long 
been at the head of a committee which is called the 
Balkan Committee, but which in fact has always 
been systematically Bulgarophile. Now by an 
odd coincidence the brothers Buxton have into 
the bargain Germanophile leanings. Le Temps 
of January loth, 1916, noticed a curious book of 
theirs which had lately appeared, and which the 
journal described as ''pacificist dreams." These 



178 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

gentlemen appear to advocate a premature peace 
with Berlin as well as with Sofia, a policy which 
is characteristic of them. Still more dangerous 
is the activity of some underground workers 
who masquerade as correspondents of English 
newspapers in the Balkans. Amongst them are 
some who, holding views that were true enough in 
the time of Gladstone but are wrong to-day, 
systematically favour the Bulgarians. Such is 
their prejudice that they have failed to see the 
bearing of the treaty of Bukarest, and did not 
so much as suspect the existence of the treaties 
which Bulgaria concluded with Germany and 
Turkey in the spring of 19 14, and which have 
just been disclosed by M. Radoslavoff (see p. 154). 
These correspondents, in virtue of the undeserved 
credit given them in London, contributed in large 
measure to delude the British authorities in 191 5 as 
to the true intentions of Bulgaria down to the mo- 
ment when it stepped into the arena at the side of 
Germany. From this grievous error has resulted 
the crushing of Serbia, with its manifold conse- 
quences. In spite of these plain facts staring them 
in the face, some incorrigible Englishmen are still 
unconvinced. While they acknowledge the very 
great difficulties of the actual situation of the 
Bulgarians, they nevertheless arrive at this para- 
doxical conclusion that the Allies should make 
peace with the Bulgarians and suffer them to 
retain their present conquests. 

Be that as it may, this underhand agitation 
lately carried on in London by a few but very 
active agents, has naturally been reprobated by 
well-informed British opinion. The English who 
in April, 1916, gave so warm a reception to the 
Prince of Serbia, are apprehensive lest a new 
blunder should be perpetrated in the Balkans. To 
prevent that contingency a question was put in the 



GERMAN MANOEUVRES 179 

House of Commons on March 28th: ''A member 
asked for an assurance that Bulgaria would not be 
admitted to a separate peace, and especially that 
she should not be permitted to acquire territories 
at the expense of the peoples who have fought on 
the side of the Allies during the war" (see UCEuvre, 
29th March, 1916). This British resolution is in 
harmony with the interests, moral and material, 
recent and future, of the Allies. 

In the first place, it is useless to reckon, as some 
misguided people have done, on a really effective 
popular Bulgarian rising against the government. 
Tsar Ferdinand has always done just what he 
pleased in Bulgaria, and now that he is hand in 
glove with Berlin, the Germans will furnish him 
with the force needed to keep him on the throne. 
As for the Bulgarian people, they are no doubt the 
victims of the present situation, but so they will 
remain. Unquestionably they possess some sterl- 
ing qualities. They are industrious, energetic, 
and sober. But they resemble the Prussians in 
many points, as the new German minister to Sofia 
announced recently (see Le Temps, i8th March, 
1916). In fact the Bulgarian people has the keen 
eye to the main chance, the duplicity, and the 
domineering spirit of the Brandenburgs. More- 
over, the Bulgarian people is the prey of the 
Bulgarian politicians, who, with the stubborn- 
ness of mules and a doggedness of which it is im- 
possible to convey an idea, are perfectly irre- 
concilable on the question of Macedonia. No 
doubt the most astute among them might very 
well, as in 191 5, pretend to negotiate with the 
Allies for the purpose of delaying the attack from 
the side of Salonika, of which Berlin is extremely 
afraid; but to believe it possible to come to a 
sincere and durable understanding with Bulgaria 
is merely to nurse the most pernicious of chimeras. 



i8o PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

To conclude a premature peace with Bulgaria 
would also entail on the Allies other fatal conse- 
quences, which it is easy to demonstrate. A 
treaty with the Bulgarians, who in complicity with 
the Germans have just massacred systematically 
an enormous number of Serbians, would be a 
manifest act of treason to Serbia; it would be to 
treat the crimes of the Bulgarians as if they actually 
conferred rights on the criminals. Clearly the 
public opinion of the Allied nations would never 
tolerate such an infamy. Besides, from a military 
point of view the calculation would be wrong. In 
order to avoid giving battle to 350,000 Bulgarians, 
whose forces must be divided between the Rou- 
manian front and the Salonika front, the Allies 
would be obliged, in the first place, to dispense with 
the assistance of 150,000 Serbian soldiers, who 
obviously would refuse to march the day that the 
Allies entered into negotiations with the Bulgarians. 
Moreover, an understanding with Bulgaria would 
have the effect, at once political and military, of 
undermining the favourable disposition of the 
Greeks and Roumanians towards the Entente. 
As I have shown in Chapter VII, the hatred of the 
Roumanians and the Greeks for the Bulgarians is 
the great psychological factor in the Balkans. 

The official plan of Bulgarian supremacy, set 
forth on the accompanying map, may serve to 
explain that hatred, for it shows that Bulgarian 
ambition '*'encroaches considerably on the terri- 
tories of all her neighbours. It now even extends 
by way of Albania to the Adriatic. We can there- 
fore readily understand that this plan of Bulgarian 
supremacy is the nightmare of the Greeks and the 
Roumanians. But these Bulgarians, like the 
Prussians, because of the similarity of their charac- 
ters, will never renounce their programme of 
dominion until they shall have received at the 



GERMAN MANCEUVRES i8i 

hands of^ the Allies, with the help of the Greeks and 
Roumanians, the sound thrashing which they have 
earned a hundred times over, and which is essential 
to the establishment of lasting peace in the Balkans. 
But it is clear that if negotiations were opened for a 
separate peace with the Bulgarians, the Greeks 
(250,000 men) and the Roumanians (600,000 men), 




Li mite du Plan - 
d'heqemonie bulgare 



ENCROACHMENTS PLANNED BY BULGARIA ON 
NEIGHBOURING STATES. 

seeing their interests once more misunderstood by 
the Allies, would refuse once and for all to fight on 
their side. 

Finally, a separate peace which left Bulgaria in 
possession of her conquests, would enable her to 
build and buttress the bridge which is to join the 
Central Empires to Turkey. That is just what 



i82 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Berlin wants in order to execute its scheme of 
domination ''from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.'* 
In the light of that aim, the secret attempts of 
Bulgaria to conclude a separate peace are seen to 
be the Bulgaro- German counterpart of the Turko- 
German manoeuvre which I have exposed above (see 
p. 167). 

Evidently the Allies will not allow themselves to 
be taken in by these clumsy tricks. The lesson 
taught by the faults committed in the Balkans in 
1 91 5 is so plain that it will prevent the Allied leaders 
from perpetrating any fresh blunder on a large 
scale. Moreover, the victory of the Allies cannot 
be won, and a lasting peace cannot be established 
in Europe, unless the German dodge of the "drawn 
game" is frustrated. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE STILL NEUTRAL STATES WHOSE INDEPENDENCE 
WOULD BE DIRECTLY THREATENED BY THE ACHIEVE- 
MENT OF THE "HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF" 
SCHEME, AND THEREFORE BY GERMANY'S CAPTURE 
OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

I. The example of Portugal. 

II. Holland. 

III. Switzerland. 

IV. The States of South America. 
V. The United States. 

Almost all the neutral States, though as yet they 
are hardly aware of it, have a vital interest, not only 
in compelling Germany to abandon her conquests 
in the East and in the West, but also in preventing 
her from establishing her supremacy over Austria- 
Hungary by means of the war. This latter aim is 
perfectly logical, since the German supremacy over 
Central Europe would secure for the government of 
Berlin formidable means of domination both by 
land and sea (see p. io6). One of the effects of the 
colossal upheaval in the mutual relation of the 
forces of the States involved, in view of the abnor- 
mal concentration of the sources of power in Ger- 
man hands, would be that the independence of the 
neutral States would inevitably be gravely im- 
perilled. In this chapter we shall consider the 
situation of countries still neutral, which would 
be particularly affected by the achievement of the 
scheme "from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." 



The case of Portugal is typical, because here we 
have a small State which, in the opinion of many, 
seemed for a long time as if it could keep out of the 

183 



i84 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

conflict; whereas on the contrary the necessity of 
defending itself against the German schemes for 
swallowing it up, compelled it at last to plunge into 
the war. 

Ever since the opening of hostilities in Europe, 
Portugal has been the scene of German intrigues 
carried on with the greatest activity; indeed, even 
before the outbreak of the European conflagration 
the train had been laid as carefully in Portugal as 
elsewhere. Working through reactionary centres, 
these intrigues ostensibly aimed at the restoration 
to the throne of Emmanuel of Saxe-Coburg and 
Gotha-Braganga, who had been dethroned, on 
October 5th, 1910, by the revolution which gave 
birth to the Portuguese Republic. Atterwards, on 
the 4th of September, 1913, he married the German 
princess Augustine- Victoria, of HohenzoUern Sig- 
maringen. The German agents also brought 
influence to bear on certain Portuguese anarchists 
in order, by every possible means, to stir up trouble 
in the country which had been marked out for ruin 
by the Pangerman plot of 191 1. We have seen 
(p. 103) what Portuguese colonies that plot had 
specially in view. Now in 191 2 the government of 
Berlin, eagerly and astutely plotting its European 
war on the assumption that England would stand 
out of it, and that she might be lulled into acquie- 
scence by the bait of temporary colonial gains, 
availed itself of the ofiicial negotiations with Lord 
Haldane to propose to the English Cabinet that 
England and Germany should divide the Portuguese 
colonies in Africa between them. 

These colonies (the Azores, Madeira, Cape Verd, 
Princes Island, St. Thomas, Guinea, Angola, 
Mozambique) shown on the accompanying map, 
are of great importance to Portugal. With their 
two milHons of square kilometres, and their 
8,300,000 inhabitants, they are the still important 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 



185 



relics of the once magnificent colonial empire of 
Portugal; they are accordingly an essential base 
for Portuguese commerce, and especially for a 
future commercial revival of Portugal, which the 
government of Lisbon is naturally anxious to 
promote. 




Louran^ Marquez * 

c 
o 



PORTUGAL AND COLONIAL PANGERMANISM. 



in 



At the very commencement of hostilities 
Europe, the Germans, discounting their victory in 
Europe, invaded Angola, and it is only lately that 
the Portuguese soldiers succeeded in driving them 



i86 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

out. Thus in point of fact a state of war has long 
existed between Portugal and Germany, and it is 
Germany that took the offensive. Hence from the 
outset the Portuguese government has had many 
excellent reasons for wishing well to the cause of 
the Allies; and Portugal has effectively proved her 
good will by all the means in her power. 

By way of reprisals for the incessant German 
intrigues in Portugal itself, and for the acts of war 
committed on her colonial territory by the soldiers 
of William II., Portugal at last seized the numerous 
German vessels which had been interned in her ports 
since the outbreak of the European conflagration. 

Germany replied in March, 191 5, by an official 
declaration of war, which in fact did nothing but 
legalize a state of things that had long existed in 
consequence of the German aggression on Angola. 

After this official rupture Portugal perfectly 
understood that, if she wished to save her very 
existence, she must range herself completely on the 
side of the Allies. On March 25th, 1916, the 
Portuguese Minister of War issued an order to the 
army, in which he said: 

"No one who has followed with patriotic anxiety 
the acts of Germany ever since the conference of 
Berlin in 1885, can doubt that her victory would 
involve the loss of our colonies, perhaps even of our 
nationality. Therefore we must all impress it 
clearly on our minds, that the battles now being 
fought in so many parts of the world touch us very 
closely; that this war is our war, a war for our 
liberty, for our independence, for the integrity of the 
territory of our native land, and that we should 
wage it wherever our forces can strike the heaviest 
blow at the power of Germany. The hatred of 
our barbarous foes, the Germans, should pervade 
every heart, and that it may strike root and pene- 
trate into the army, it is necessary to explain to 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 187 

the soldiers the reasons of the war, to enumerate 
the injuries that have been done us by the Germans, 
and to set forth clearly the intentions and schemes 
which Germany cherishes in regard to small nations, 
like Belgium, Serbia, and Portugal." 

This proclamation of the Portuguese Minister of 
War deserves to be remembered, for it accurately 
expresses the general sentiments which will be 
shared more and more by States still neutral, in 
proportion as they understand more and more 
clearly that their future independence really hangs 
on the total defeat of Germany. 

IL 

The following words give a summary of the views 
and the tactics adopted by the Germans with 
regard to the Dutch in the Pangerman plan of 1895. 

"When our brothers of the Low German race 
shall have got over their almost childish fright at 
'annexation by the Prussians,' they will acknow- 
ledge that the admission of Holland into Great 
Germany is advantageous to both parties. More- 
over, in the bosom of Great Germany, the Dutch 
would be able to preserve, to a reasonable extent, 
their own particular characteristics. 

"The Kingdom of the Low Countries, on entering 
into not only the German Customs Union but also 
the Pangerman Confederation, with the retention 
of all its rights, will cease to maintain an independ- 
ent fleet, but will organize an independent Army 
Corps, with privileges like those of Bavaria, and 
also a colonial army. It will remain in possession 
of its colonies, and might even undertake the 
administration of New Guinea and of all the German 
colonies in the Pacific. 

"The official language will remain Low German 
(Dutch) for the legislation and the administration in 
State, School, and Church. High German will not 



i88 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

be employed except in matters that concern the 
Confederation. Besides it is obvious that its use 
will spread rapidly, but voluntarily, in commerce 
and the sciences. 




THE NEUTRAL STATES OF EUROPE AND PANGERMANISM. 

"If the Rhine from its source to its mouth 
becomes a truly German river, it will then be the 
Low German (or Dutch) commercial towns and 
seaports near its mouth, which will chiefly benefit 
thereby. 

"It will thus be seen that a singularly attractive 
prospect for the economic and poHtical future of the 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 189 

Low Countries, is being opened up, if they will only 
consent to become members of the Pangerman 
Confederation. God grant that our Low German 
cousins may at last abandon that jealous regard for 
their independence as a separate State, which we, 
the Germans of the Empire, also felt down to the 
years 1866 and 1870" (see Grossdeutschland und 
Mitteleuropa urn das Jahr 1950, p. 13, Thormann 
und Goetsch, S.W. Bessel-Strasse 17, Berlin, 1895). 

So it seems that twenty years ago the Germans 
trusted to moral suasion to open the eyes of the 
Dutch to the intrinsic beauties of Pangermany. 
The hope was built on the familiar fact that many 
Dutchmen, addicted, like their ancestors for ages 
before them, to the profitable occupation of foreign 
trade, devote their energies to the pursuit of gain, 
and have very little time, and even less taste, for 
situations that call for bellicose resolutions. The 
same turn of mind explains why ever since the 
outbreak of war the Germans have easily found 
in Holland plenty of enterprising firms, which have 
smuggled ample supplies of all sorts into Germany 
and snapped their fingers at the blockade. 

However, 1895 is a long time ago, and since then 
Pangerman ideas have marched with the time. As 
we have seen (p. 103), the plan of 191 1 provides for 
the "conveyance" of the Dutch colonies to Pan- 
germany under conditions which would not allow 
the Low Countries to cherish the least illusion as to 
the ultimate preservation of their independence. 

But the revelation of the German plans for the 
perpetration of burglary and the appropriation of 
other people's goods, has had its effect, and even the 
Dutch, in spite of their intense desire not to be 
drawn into the great war, are now forced to look 
hard facts in the face. 

In truth, the moral situation of the Dutch is 
hard, for they are pulled in opposite directions by 



I90 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

sentiments which logically lead to contradictory 
decisions. On the one side, historical memories 
and ancient rivalries in the commerce of the sea 
still inspire them with a lively dread of England; 
on the other side, they are constrained to admit 
that the Pangerman peril has grown imminent for 
their country. It is plain, in fact (see the map on 
p. 1 88) that if Germany were to tighten her grip on 
Belgium, or if she emerged from the war much 
strengthened by the establishment of her supremacy 
over Austria-Hungary, Holland would soon in- 
evitably be forced, even in time of peace, to 
acquiesce in vassalage to her formidable neighbour, 
Pangermany. 

The Dutch are all the more perplexed and irreso- 
lute, before they can screw their courage up to the 
sticking point, because they are sometimes dis- 
concerted by the action of their government, which, 
as everybody knows, is open to both direct and 
powerful German influences. The situation is 
described as follows in a few paragraphs of the 
Telegraaf, which earned for their author a series of 
prosecutions on the pretext that they endangered 
the neutrality of the country: — 

"For our part," said the Telegraaf, "we shall 
not cease to oppose a Government and its accom- 
plice Press, who under the cloak of a ' dignified 
neutrality' are pursuing a rash policy of exporta- 
tion and provisioning Germany with articles of 
prime necessity, thereby enabling that country to 
continue the war, and betraying not only the 
interests of their own country but also the cause of 
humanity" (quoted by Le Temps, 30th March, 1916). 

As for the general and dominant tone of Dutch 
public opinion, Mr. Holdert, the editor of the 
Telegraaf, who is particularly well qualified to form 
an opinion on the subject, sums up as follows: 

"Every time an incident occurs that might lead 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 191 

Holland to take a grave decision, before you 
venture to predict, remember that the people over 
there do not want war. With us, business, money, 
gain, and all that sort of thing, is considered ex- 
tremely, supremely, infinitely important. 

"To-day the majority of my fellow countrymen 
are rolling in money. Why trouble about any- 
thing else? 

*'Yes, eighty per cent, of the population are in 
favour of the Allies. France especially is loved, 
and she could ask but little of us which we would 
not give. But that affection, though real, is so to 
speak, remote. We quickly turn over the page 
which contains the news of the war" (see Le Journal, 
5th April, 1 9 16). 

Thus Dutch opinion seems stagnant, yet it 
moves, though very, very slowly; for people are 
beginning to ask themselves whether, despite all 
their efforts, all their intense desire for peace, this 
dreadful war can end with the Dutch sword still in 
the scabbard. 

No doubt the military measures taken by the 
Hague government have been dictated purely with 
the intention of defending Dutch neutrality. But 
facts such as the torpedoeing of the Tuhantia go 
far to add to the number of those clearsighted and 
energetic patriots, who, like the admirable and 
vigorous artist Raemaekers, acknowledge and pro- 
claim that for the sake of her honour as well as of 
her interest Holland is bound to do all in her power 
to favour and hasten the victory of the Allies. 

III. 

The Pangerman aims with regard to Switzerland, 
as set forth in the plan of 1895, are summed up as 
follows : — 

•'We may then leave Switzerland to choose, 
whether she shall enter the German Customs Union 



192 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

and the Pangerman Confederation bringing all her 
cantons or only the German ones with her, or 
whether she shall form part of the German Empire 
on equal terms as a Federal State" (see Gross- 
deutschland um das Jahr 1950, p. 17). 

The Pangerman programme is, therefore, defi- 
nitely directed against Switzerland (see the map on 
p. 188), but Berlin has always flattered itself with 
the hope of absorbing this little State, like Holland, 
without resort to force, simply in the course of 
nature and as a consequence of the defeat of the 
great European powers. 

What is certain is that before the war the prestige 
of Germany in German Switzerland was so great, 
and the organization of the German propaganda in 
this part of Helvetia was so perfect, that all the 
excuses published by the Berlin government to 
explain and justify the violation of Belgium were 
swallowed without winking by the German Swiss. 

But since then a slow change of sentiment has 
taken place. The enormous annexations contem- 
plated by Germany, the atrocious manner in which 
she is waging the war, and, above all, the terrible 
horrors perpetrated in Serbia, have at last con- 
vinced an increasing number of Swiss that a victory 
for Germany would create a formidable danger for 
the whole civilized world in general, and for the 
independence of Switzerland in particular. 

A gentleman at Zurich, whose position affords 
him ample opportunity for forming a just apprecia- 
tion of the state of affairs, gave me recently the 
following concise statement of the real feeling in 
German Switzerland: ''The majority of the in- 
tellectuals, almost all of whom have studied in 
Germany, and a part of the business men, are the 
only resolute champions of Prussia. They would 
be quite willing to see Switzerland absorbed in 
Pangermany. But the Swiss who hold that view 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 193 

are only a small minority. In German Switzerland 
most of the manufacturers, almost all of whom have 
suffered very heavily in recent years through the 
keenness of German competition, desire a German 
defeat, which would be in harmony both with their 
opinions as liberals and with their interests as 
manufacturers, by relieving the strain of the present 
fierce competition in business. As for the mass of 
the German Swiss — and that is the important point 
— they are by no means in love with the Prussians, 
as people in France wrongly imagine. They are 
before all things Swiss." 

The Swiss have resolved to defend their neu- 
trahty against the first of their neighbours that 
shall violate their frontier. The Allies wish for 
nothing more than that. They only desire that 
the Swiss should impress this truth more and more 
clearly on their minds, that in presence of the for- 
midable Pangerman ambition the victory of the 
Allies is a condition essential to the maintenance of 
the Helvetic Confederation. 

IV. 

The accompanying map summarizes and recalls 
the Pangerman claims to such direct German pro- 
tectorates in South America as were provided for 
by the plan of 191 1 (see p. 105). 

It is important to observe that the German 
designs on South America began just at the time 
when the European nations, acquiescing in the 
Monroe doctrine, renounced all intentions of ap- 
propriating any part of the New World. This 
renunciation took place about 1898, the date of the 
war between Spain and America. That was the 
very moment when the Pangermanists of Berlin 
conceived and prepared to execute the plan of ex- 
tending in the future the power of the Hohen- 
zollerns to Cape Horn. This fact, taken in con- 



194 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

junction with many others, serves to demonstrate 
the spirit of conquest and aggression, the boundless 
ambition which animates the Germany of William II. 
The preparations for carrying out the Pangerman 
plans in South America were, as everywhere else, 
conducted by the organizers of the movement most 
methodically. 



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COLONIAL PANGERMANISM AND SOUTH AMERICA. 

Having thus settled on their plan of 1895, they 
proceeded to draw up an actual register of all the 
Germans existing on the face of the terrestrial 
globe, in order to pick out from them such as were 
likely to prove the most serviceable tools in execut- 
ing the Pangerman scheme. The general results 
of this register of Germans all over the world are to 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 



195 



be found, in a concentrated form, in the Pangerman 
Atlas of Paul Langhans, published by Justus 
Perthes at Gotha in 1900. 

So far as relates to South America, this document 
proves that there were 



2,000 Germans 

3,000 

3,000 

5,000 

5,000 

15,000 

60,000 

400,000 



In Peru in 1890 

In Paraguay in 1890 

In Colombia in 1890 

In Uruguay in 1897 

In Venezuela in 1894 

In Chili in 1895 

In Argentina in 1895 

In Brazil in 1890 

These Germans have been strongly inoculated, es- 
pecially since 1900, by the Pangerman Societies. 
They have been organized with particular care in 
the countries which, like Argentina, and, above all, 
Brazil, were intended to be the principal German 
protectorates in South America. 

The German law, called Delhriick's law, of 
July 22nd, 1 913, dealing with the nationality of 
the Empire and the nationality of the State, has 
greatly favoured the Pangerman organization in 
America. Hence it is needful to be acquainted 
with at least the substance of the Delbriick law, 
since it formed the last stage, and a very significant 
one, in the Pangerman organization all over the 
world before the outbreak of war. 

The second part of article 25 of that law runs as 
follows: — "If any person before acquiring nation- 
ality in a foreign State, shall have received the 
written permission of a competent authority of his 
native State to retain his nationality of that State, 
he shall not lose his nationality of the said native 
State. The German consul shall be consulted 
before granting the said permission." 

These words afford us a measure of the depth of 
German astuteness. According to this provision, 



196 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

a German may become a naturalized subject of a 
foreign State, but if he obtains a written permission 
from the competent authorities of his native Ger- 
man State, he continues, in spite of this naturaliza- 
tion, to enjoy, for himself and his descendants, all the 
rights of a German citizen and all the protection of the 
German Empire. 

These provisions being contrary to all the general 
principles of international law on the subject of 
nationality, a German citizen who benefits by them 
will take very good care not to acquaint the foreign 
State whose nationality he has acquired, with the 
highly peculiar situation in which he stands. By 
this process Germany has been able to have in 
every State agents devoted to her aggressive 
policy, without these States being aware of the 
danger they run through this secret service. In 
fact, these States had, to all appearance, to do only 
with fellow countrymen whom they had no right 
to suspect. It was only after many months of war, 
when their criminal action compelled them to take 
off the mask, that the dangerous power of these 
Germans disguised as foreigners appeared in all its 
formidable and insufferable dimensions. 

This state of things explains why, during the first 
months of the war, intoxicated by the powerful 
German propaganda, and ignorant of the disasters 
with which Europe and still more themselves were 
threatened by the Pangerman plot, the States of 
South America were unable to perceive the peril at 
their door and to understand that they had a direct 
interest in the issue of the European war. But now 
public opinion in these countries is advancing 
steadily towards a complete apprehension of the 
truth. 

Peru and Chili, one after the other, are slipping 
through the meshes of the German net. 

In Argentina the movement in favour of the 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 197 

Allies is also growing rapidly. But it is above all 
in Brazil, the southern part of which is most par- 
ticularly coveted by the Germans, that the progress 
of enlightenment is especially interesting to watch. 
For a long time the Germans have concentrated 
their colonial efforts particularly on three Brazilian 
States, to wit, Parana (60,000 Germans), Santa 
Catarina (170,000), and Rio Grande do Sul (220,000). 
In these rich provinces, the Germans, preserving 
the language, the traditions, the prejudices of the 
Fatherland, are almost absolute masters. Only 
47,000 of them are openly citizens of the German 
Empire; the rest, about 400,000, are apparently 
Brazilian subjects, but in virtue of the Delbriick 
law a considerable part of them have in reality 
remained or become once more liegemen of Wil- 
liam II. Moreover, the budget of the German 
Empire included a sum of 500,000 marks to be 
devoted to the establishment or the support of 
German schools in Brazil. In 191 2 Prince Henry 
of Prussia, brother of William II., in the course of 
his cruise, landed at the port of Itajahy to pay a 
visit to his fellow countrymen in Santa Catarina. 
Since the outbreak of the European war the game of 
the Germans in Brazil has been gradually revealed 
in its true colours, and it has been lately discovered 
that the numerous Rifle Clubs were in fact societies 
for mihtary drill and dangerous enough to necessi- 
tate their disarmament. 

In the rest of Brazil, outside the three provinces 
mentioned above, the Germans are not numerous, 
but they fill most of the principal posts in business 
houses and banks. In the first period of the war 
these Germans founded Germanophile newspapers 
pubhshed in Portuguese, and thereby prevented 
Brazil from getting accurate information as to the 
origin and course of the conflict. 
. But despite this clever opposition, ever since the 



198 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

battle of the Marne the cause of the Allies has been 
steadily gaining ground in Brazil. A powerful 
impulse to the movement has been given by the 
action of Portugal in taking up arms, for there are 
600,000 Portuguese in Brazil. 

Thus in South America the tide is clearly running 
in favour of the Allies. A new stage will be reached 
when these States come clearly to understand that 
in view of Pangerman colonial ambitions, which 
threaten them personally, they have a direct interest 
in the complete victory of the Allies, which alone 
can deliver them from the fear of the German peril. 
They will then reach the same definite and sound 
conclusion at which, as I shall show further on, the 
United States is logically bound to arrive. 

When that is so, it is possible, if not probable, 
that these South American States, or at least the 
principal among them, will no longer be satisfied to 
remain neutral. They will then acknowledge that 
a true view of their own interest compels them to 
strike, with all their might, a blow for the common 
freedom. 

V. 

President Wilson, by his note to Berlin of April 
20th, 1 91 6, concerning submarine warfare, which 
had the character of an ultimatum, committed the 
United States to a first act of intervention in the 
European war. The fact that a consideration of 
their interests has compelled the Germans, at least 
for the moment, to bow to the mandate of the 
United States, seems to some people to have already 
closed the American intervention. Those who hold 
this opinion may support it by reference to the 
speech which President Wilson delivered to the 
Press Club at Washington, on May i8th, 1916: 
"There are two reasons," said the President, ''why 
the chief desire of the Americans is for peace. One 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 199 

is that they love peace, and have nothing to do with the 
present quarrel; the other is that they believe that 
the parties to the quarrel have been forced to go to 
such lengths that they can no longer keep within 
the limits of responsibility. Why not let the 
storm go by, and then, when all is over, make up 
the account?" (quoted by Le Temps, May 2 2nci, 
1916). 

The need for reserve, which his official position 
lays on President Wilson, has evidently hindered 
him from disclosing his thoughts fully; for, as we 
shall see immediately, it would be particularly 
dangerous for the United States to imagine that 
they have nothing to do with the present quarrel, 
and to wait for the end of it in order to make up 
the account. 

In reality, the true question for the United States 
goes far beyond that of German piracy in submarine 
warfare. That question really involves two quite 
distinct American interests; one of a moral, the 
other of a material or political nature. 

From the moral point of view the United States 
must consider the barbarity with which Germany 
wages war, not only on the sea, but everywhere. 
Not only does she constantly violate the laws of 
war between belligerents, but also and above all 
the German authorities subject to a frightful reign 
of terror all the civil anti- Germanic populations in 
the territories now occupied by Pangermany from 
the North Sea to Bagdad. The sufferings inflicted 
by the Germans on the Belgians, the Slavs of 
Austria-Hungary, the Serbians, and the Armenians 
(whom they have caused to be massacred wholesale) 
amount to millions of indescribable pangs, of odious 
crimes, of atrocious martyrdoms. The Americans 
have intervened in the submarine warfare in the 
name of humanity. Can they remain neutral in 
face of this ''ocean of crimes" committed by the 



200 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

Germans, without the smallest excuse, over enor- 
mous stretches of territory? 

From the point of view of defending their own 
material interests, it is not certain that enough 
Americans even yet understand the magnitude of 
the formidable problem which the European war 
compels them to face and solve. It is quite natural 
that it should be so. In many circles of France 
and England it is only quite lately that people 
have come clearly to apprehend, as a whole, the 
real, the gigantic objects pursued by Germany in 
the war. Hence it is not surprising that the 
enormity of the German plot has not yet been 
grasped by the Americans of the United States, 
whose ideas about Europe at the beginning of the 
conflict were necessarily just as vague as the ideas 
of Europeans about the United States. 

The accompanying map will enable the reader 
readily to appreciate the basis of the real problem 
which the war presents to the United States. As I 
have explained (p. 194), the Germans set them- 
selves after 1895 to make a regular register of all 
the Germans scattered over the whole world. Our 
map is drawn up in accordance with the data of 
map 5 in the Pangerman Atlas of Paul Langhans, 
which gives the results of the register. The map 
shows what proportion the Germans, who had 
been born in Germany and had emigrated to the 
United States, bore to the American population 
about the year 1890. We can see that the pro- 
portion was considerable, since at some points (see 
the map) it amounted to 35%. Further, the 
general view presented by the map enables us to 
observe that in the United States the Germans have 
planted themselves by preference in the industrial 
and commercial regions of the East and of the 
Great Lakes. We can therefore understand what 
followed. Ever since 1900 the Alldeutscher Verband 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 



20I 




202 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

or Pangerman Union, in obedience to secret in- 
structions from the official authorities in Berlin, 
has laid itself out to select from this mass of 
Germans in the United States all such as might 
best serve the cause of Prussian militarism at any 
given moment, in the most diverse domains, as 
soon as the European conflagrations should have 
broken out. Hence for the last twenty years most 
of the ten to fifteen million Americans of German 
origin have been organized. Little by little, in the 
midst of the great American Republic, there has 
grown up a State within a State, a State endowed 
with the most powerful means of influence. In point 
of fact, among the German-Americans there are 
manufacturers, merchants, and bankers of colossal 
fortunes, who control the Kves of hundreds of 
thousands of workmen or employees living in 
dependence upon them. The German-Americans 
also own many newspapers and associations. 
They have therefore been able to exert a con- 
siderable influence on the policy of the United 
States, and even to secure the election to Congress 
of members devoted to their interests. The 
Delbriick law (see p. 195) has completed the 
German organization in the United States, by 
enabling an influential party of German-Americans 
to preserve the appearance of American citizens, 
while all the time they remain pledged heart and 
soul to forward the Kaiser's scheme of universal 
slavery. 

As the total population of the United States is 
100 millions, it is easy to see what may be the power 
of ID to 15 million German- Americans systemati- 
cally organized for a definite purpose, when these 
are opposed to 90 million Americans who, never 
suspecting the Pangerman peril, have taken no 
kind of special precaution against their fellow citi- 
zens of German origin. 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 203 

This very peculiar state of affairs explains the 
strange position occupied by the United States 
since the outbreak of the European War. From 
that time the German-Americans, in virtue of the 
immense means of influence and of action which 
they had prepared beforehand, have carried on a 
multifarious campaign, with extraordinary audac- 
ity in furtherance of the German game. Thus the 
German Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, and his 
military attaches von Papen, Boy-Ed, etc., have 
aided and abetted in the task of subverting the 
United States by a multitude of German-American 
spies and agents. 

During the first months of the war the German 
propaganda, carried on with extraordinary activity, 
was easily able to deceive a considerable part of 
American opinion as to the true origin of, and the 
responsibility for, the carnage going on in Europe. 
Afterwards, when the war dragged on, and the 
Allies placed considerable orders in the United 
States, the understrappers of the professional 
German spies engaged in an extraordinary series 
of outrages in order to terrorize the American work- 
men employed in executing the orders of the Allies. 
The object of these acts of violence, combined with 
the frivolous and interminable discussions which 
Count Bernstorff carried on with the Government 
of Washington, was first to induce the United 
States to issue an order prohibiting the Allies from 
arming their merchant ships for the purpose of 
self - defence against the German submarines; 
second, to persuade the Americans that the block- 
ade of Germany by England was maintained in a 
manner contrary to the rules of international law; 
third, to slacken or stop the production of munitions 
of war destined for the Allies; and lastly, supposing 
that the principal acquisitions contemplated by Pan- 
germany had been efected in Europe, to induce 



204 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

President Wilson to intervene in favour of peace 
under colour of putting an end to the European 
butchery — an intervention which, if it took place, 
would have the practical result of opening the 
negotiations for peace under conditions eminently 
favourable to the German plans of annexation. 

But at last the crimes of violence committed by 
the Germans in the United States opened the eyes 
of the American people and roused them to anger. 
We must understand that it was only gradually, 
and in spite of great difficulties, that the real citizens 
of the United States, hemmed in by the German 
organization as by a ring fence, were able to acquire 
true notions as to the European war. This progress 
of American opinion was further retarded by the 
circumstance that before the war, for various 
reasons, the Allied countries unquestionably oc- 
cupied a much lower place in the esteem of the 
United States than Germany, which had gained 
for herself very great prestige by her extraordinary 
activity in commerce, industry, and science. 

As to Russia, the Americans knew scarcely any- 
thing about it except the hardships of which the 
Jews in that country complained. As many of 
these people have emigrated to the United States, 
and there exercise a great influence on the press, 
they have naturally fostered anything but a sym- 
pathy for the Empire of the Tsars. The Irish- 
Americans devoted themselves to the similar task 
of blackening England, from which the United 
States had in days gone by to extort her indepen- 
dence. As to France, the Americans, on the faith 
of superficial observations, considered her to' be in 
a state of hopeless decadence. The flagrant atro- 
city of the prodigious German crimes committed in 
the United States; on the high seas against neutral 
passengers; in Belgium against the Belgians; in 
Serbia against the Serbians; in Armenia against the 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 205 

Armenians; and, on the other hand, the magnifi- 
cent resistance of the Allies, these things have at 
last produced a revulsion of feeling. The prejudices 
of the Americans against Russia and England have 
been to a great extent mitigated, and the grand, 
the noble attitude of the people of France, the 
tenacity and the heroism of her soldiers, have 
proved that France is far indeed from decadent. 
To-day we may say, for it is the truth, that France 
has won the deep and enthusiastic admiration of 
all the really independent American citizens of the 
United States. This progressive change of opinion 
has ranged the Americans more and more on the 
side of the Allies. 

But American opinion has still one stage to 
travel. It is this. The American people must 
understand with the utmost clearness that the 
victory of Germany would unquestionably mean the 
end of the independence of the United States. 
Indeed, some Americans, more clearsighted than 
the rest, have already travelled this last stage on 
the road to truth. In March, 1916, Dr. Elliot, 
formerly President of Harvard University, and an 
intimate friend, we are told, of President Wilson, 
declared in the New York Times: ''The quickest, 
the best, the surest means for Americans to defend 
themselves against a German invasion is to conclude 
with France and England a permanent alliance, 
offensive and defensive, having for its aim the main- 
tenance of the freedom of the seas for the Allies, and 
resistance to any maritime attack. It is time for all 
Americans to take sides openly with the European 
peoples who for so many long months have been stand-^ 
ing up against the military despotism of Prussia'' 
(Quoted by Le Temps, 15th March, 1916.) 

Dr. Elliot has thus stated in terms as exact as 
they are complete the real problem which the 
Americans have to solve. Clearly it reached far 



2o6 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

beyond the controversies about the submarine 
warfare. It is not enough, indeed, for the Ameri- 
cans to constitute themselves the champions of 
right and justice against Teutonic barbarity; they 
must understand that the maintenance of the indepen- 
dence of the United States absolutely depends on the 
complete victory of the Allies in Europe. Already 
many Americans come near to accepting this view. 
Thus at Carnegie Hall, New York, at the end of May, 
191 6, Major Putnam, addressing 3000 members 
of the "Committee of American Rights," excited 
great enthusiasm by demanding that America 
should at once take part in the war on the side of 
the Allies. His chief argument was: "If Germany 
wins in this war, her next aggression will be against 
our Republic." (Quoted by Le Temps, May 22nd, 
1916.) 

But these clear ideas, involving immediate and 
decisive action, are as yet shared only by a minority 
of Americans, better informed than the rest. 

The progress of American opinion in general will 
be complete when from a general view of the facts 
of the war, as these have occurred in America as 
well as in Europe, the people shall logically infer 
the formidable consequences which a German 
victory would entail on the United States. 

That general view, which the great American 
Republic will probably take in time, is as follows. 
It will necessarily be based on an exact knowledge of 
the German plan for dealing with the United States, 
a plan, by the way, which is of long standing. 

In 1898, before Manilla, the German Rear- 
Admiral von Gcetzen, a friend of the Kaiser, said to 
the American Admiral Dewey: "In about fifteen 
years my country will begin a great war. . . , Some 
months after we have done our business in Europe 
we shall take New York and probably Washington, 
and we shall keep them for a time. We do not 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 207 

intend to take any territory from you, but only to 
put your country in its proper place with reference 
to Germany. We shall extract one or two billions 
of dollars from New York and other towns." (See 
Naval and Military Record, quoted by UEcho de 
Paris, September 24th, 1915.) These words at 
the time were regarded as mere gasconade. But now 
it is indisputable that even before 1898 the Germans 
of Berlin had, by means of the processes described 
above (p. 200), been systematically laying the 
foundations of a State within the United States, a 
State that has long been silently sapping the ground 
on which stands the American Republic. 

A multitude of recent and striking facts — pres- 
sure brought to bear on politicians, monster strikes, 
plots and outrages against public order executed 
by order of the official agents of the Kaiser, such as 
von Papen, Boy-Ed, von Igel, &c — have abundantly 
demonstrated that the German organization in 
America threatens the independence of the United 
States, and is of a definitely criminal and treasonable 
character. A phrase in a letter of Baron de 
Meysenburg, German consul at New Orleans, 
written on December 4th, 1915, to von Papen, 
German military attache at Washington, who or- 
ganized the principal outrages in the United States, 
proves that in the minds of Germans behind the 
scenes the turn of the United States was to come in 
due course. The latter was lately seized by the 
English: ''May the day of the settling of accounts 
come here also, and when that day comes may our 
Government have found again that will of iron 
without which no impression can be made on this 
country." (Quoted by Le Temps, January 17th, 
1916.) 

On the other hand the Americans cannot shut 
their eyes to the extreme gravity of the recent 
Pangerman manoeuvres in the States of South 



2o8 PAN GERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

America, particularly in Argentina and Brazil, 
which are regarded as destined ultimately to be- 
come German protectorates; also in Nicaragua, 
where the Kaiser's agents have tried to get a con- 
cession of territory for the construction of a canal 
to compete with the Panama canal. Lastly, there 
is the undeniable fact, which brings the danger still 
nearer home, that a few months ago Germany 
plotted the military invasion of Canada, with the 
complicity of her subjects disguised as American 
citizens. Common sense, therefore, tells us that, 
assuming that the Allies were beaten in Europe, 
Germany would be the mistress of Canada, and 
would practically dominate the United States. 
The extraordinary series of formidable outrages 
which the German-Americans have already con- 
cocted and executed on the soil of the great Ameri- 
can Republic, is proof patent that the existence of 
Pangermany would be incompatible with the inde- 
pendence of the United States. 

All that is more or less clearly understood in the 
United States; but what American opinion still 
needs to be enlightened on is the immense danger 
which the United States would incur through the 
formidable Berlin trap called "the Drawn Game," 
the most dangerous trick which the Germans still 
keep up their sleeve. Seeing that many of the 
Allies do not yet understand the enormous peril 
of a Germany yielding temporarily on the East 
and on the West in order to make herself mistress 
once and for all of Central Europe, the Balkans, 
and Turkey, it is natural enough that the Americans 
should not yet have fully "realized" the vast 
bearings of the dodge called "the Drawn Game." 

The map on p. loi enables the reader to see what 
would be the great danger from the American point 
of view. As I have explained in Chapter V, the 
pretended "Drawn Game" would enable Germany 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 209 

to carry out her scheme of domination "from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," and would thereby 
secure for Berlin the means of laying hands suc- 
cessively on all the important strategical points 
which command the seas of the whole world. The 
consequence for the United States would be that 
with the keys of all the seas in her hand, Germany 
would be able to prosecute her intrigues on a much 
greater scale in South America, Canada, and there- 
fore in the United States. 

It is deeply to be regretted that the very dis- 
tinguished American Admiral Mahan is no more. 
If I may judge by his powerful book. The Interest of 
America in Sea Power Present and Future, the tenor 
of which was admirably expounded by M. Jean 
Izoulet some time ago, I believe that I am not 
going too far when I affirm that were Admiral 
Mahan now alive he would, on a review of the whole 
situation, sketch as follows the line of conduct which 
the government of Washington ought to follow 
with reference to the European war. Admiral 
Mahan would doubtless tell his countrymen: "At 
no price, under no pretext, should the United 
States suffer Germany to execute her project 
from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, and that 
because of the consequences which the achievement 
of that plan would entail on sea power all over the 
world. As the only sure guarantee against the 
accomplishment of that plan is to be found in 
Central Europe (see p. 129), the United States has 
a direct and first-hand interest in solving the ques- 
tion of Austria-Hungary on the basis of nation- 
alities, that solution being over and above indis- 
pensable if the world is to see the end of the 
Pangerman peril and of the great armaments." 

Hence, taking everything into account, we 
conclude that, apart from any question of humanity 
and justice, the United States have an absolutely 



2IO PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

vital interest, not only in a partial victory of the 
Allies in Europe, but in their complete victory. It 
is desirable that this truth should be admitted as 
soon as possible, for then the measures, which the 
Government of Washington could not fail to take, 
would signally hasten the end of the European 
carnage. 

Plain good sense suffices to forecast what these 
measures would be. 

It is as clear as daylight that the expedition to 
Mexico is a German trap; hence the United States 
have every reason for awaiting the end of the 
European war before committing themselves further 
in that direction. On the other hand, now that the 
Allies have gripped Germany hy the throat, the 
Government of Washington should avail itself of 
this exceptional opportunity for carrying out with 
the utmost speed the destruction of that criminal 
and parasitic organization which the Germans have 
contrived to plant in the soil of the United States. 
To arrest the ringleaders who have been guilty 
of inciting to treason and crimes against the 
common law, whatever their social position or 
wealth may he; to suppress the associations 
which are nothing but agencies of the Berlin 
government — these are tasks which the Americans 
have every motive for accomplishing without delay. 

Obviously, too, when the United States shall have 
wakened up to the truth, they will acknowledge it 
to be at once their interest and their duty to give 
the Allies all material succour, since nothing but 
their complete victory over Germany can safeguard 
for the future the independence of the United-States. 

In the financial sphere the United States can 
offer the Allies immense facilities for raising loans, 
which would be particularly opportune. 

Mr. Guthrie, Vice-President of the French- 
American Committee at New York, has explained 



STILL NEUTRAL STATES 211 

as follows the method, at once delicate and in- 
genious, whereby the United States could and 
should, according to him, give their financial 
support to France. "The historian Perkins," 
says Mr. Guthrie, "states that the expenses in- 
curred by France in liberating America amounted 
to 772 million dollars. Of this enormous outlay, 
which ruined the Royal Treasury, not a stiver was 
ever repaid to France. She never claimed it, and 
to-day she would proudly refuse to be repaid, 
reminding us that, in the treaty of alliance of 6th 
February, 1778, she stipulated that she should re- 
ceive no indemnity for her help and her sacrifices. . . . 
The generosity of that treaty was unprecedented in 
the history of the world. . . . Would it not be 
supremely just if the American people, a hundred 
and thirty-four years after the battle of Yorktown, 
recognized that service— I will not call it debt — by 
offering the French people commercial credit to the 
amount of the principal, that is to say 772 million 
dollars, to be repaid at France's convenience? It 
would be only the equivalent of a contribution of 
seven and a half dollars from each citizen of the 
United States, much less than the tax that was 
voluntarily and cheerfully paid by the French 
people to help us in the eighteenth century. Would 
it not be noble and glorious, honourable alike to 
head and heart, if the great American bankers 
could have proclaimed to the world that they had ' 
fixed the figure at 772 million dollars in gratitude 
for the past?" (see Revue du XVIII. siecle, 
janvier-avril, 1916). 

In the matter of munitions of war the United 
States might evidently increase her production. 
Lastly, as has been said already, the United States 
would be in a position to furnish the Allies with 
men, since this unprecedented war requires such 
vast numbers of soldiers. But, as we know, the 



212 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

United States have not got a large army, and it is 
not certain that they either would or could rapidly 
improvise one. A much simpler solution might 
enable the United States to furnish a very consider- 
able body of men to the Allies. This could be 
effected if the Government of Washington were to 
grant leave to American citizens to enlist as volun- 
teers in the Allied armies, on such terms as might 
be agreed upon. Not only would English-speaking 
Americans be glad to come and fight the Teutonic 
barbarians, but — and this is a fact not generally 
known — there are among American citizens millions 
of Slavs who emigrated formerly from Austria- 
Hungary and the Balkans. These American Slavs 
are ardent partisans of the Allies, and many a time 
in the last few months these men, working in the 
American munition factories, have frustrated the 
German attempts at outrages. Probably hundreds 
of thousands of these Slavs would gladly come as 
volunteers to fight in Europe for the liberation of 
Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, their native 
land, which they quitted as exiles long ago to 
escape the German-Magyar yoke. We see then 
that by such voluntary enlistments the United 
States could very soon contribute troops for the 
conflict in Europe without laying on its own 
shoulders the enormous burden of creating a great 
army. 

Succours of these various sorts, furnished by 
America, would evidently hasten the course of 
events. We may reasonably treat them as possible, 
since it is certain that a German victory would put 
the independence of the United States in jeopardy. 



CONCLUSIONS. 

WHAT HAS BEEN SET FORTH IN THE PRECEDING 

NINE CHAPTERS APPEARS TO JUSTIFY THE FOLLOWING 

CONCLUSIONS. 

I. 

The temporary achievement of nine-tenths of the 
Pangerman plan in accordance with the programme 
of 191 1 serves to refute the lies disseminated hy the 
German propaganda as to the cause and authors of 
the war. 

The intellectual mobilization of Germany, as 
powerfully organized and carried out as her mihtary 
organization, has enabled her utterly to deceive 
many neutrals in the world as to the responsibilities 
for the outbreak and prolongation of the war. The 
AlHes do not yet fully understand how prejudicial 
to them this German propaganda has been, and 
what dangers it still involves for the conduct of the 
struggle and the conclusion of peace. 

This German propaganda has been all the more 
successful because for a very long time it encoun- 
tered no serious opposition on the side of the Allies. 
For they, ingenuously confident in the justice of 
their cause, which seemed to them self-evident, 
have not attempted any real intellectual mobiliza- 
tion. ^ Only quite lately have the Allies begun to 
organize the propaganda which must and ought to 
be carried on in foreign countries; substantial 
progress may be anticipated in this direction. 

Six main arguments have been employed to back 
the German propaganda. 

213 



214 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

1°. Germany has been forced to wage the war 
in order to resist a coalition treacherously contrived 
by England. Therefore Germany, a country of in- 
tellectual, scientific, and economic activity, obliged 
to fight for its existence, deserves the sympathies of 
the whole world. 

2°. If the neutrals are seriously injured by the 
war and its prolongation the responsibility rests on 
the Allies, who desire to destroy the German people. 
The neutrals should therefore take common action 
and bring pressure to bear on the Allies for the 
purpose of inducing them to acquiesce in the German 
victory, thus ensuring the speedy restoration of 
peace. 

3°. To hasten this result the neutrals, and es- 
pecially the United States, ought to oppose the 
maritime blockade which England is maintaining, 
under conditions the legitimacy of which, from the 
point of view of international law, is open to ques- 
tion. By refusing to supply munitions to the 
Allies, the United States would put an end to the 
butchery and thus serve the cause of humanity. 

4°. Germany is really conciliatory, she wants 
nothing but an equitable peace. "We Germans," 
declared Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 
nth, 1915, ''do not wish to set the peoples by the 
ears; on the contrary each will bear his share in 
the peaceful labour of all and in the progress of the 
nations." 

5°. The neutrals ought all the more to help 
Germany because she is fighting to ensure for all 
the freedom of the seas, which at present hateful 
England keeps in her own hands. The Berliner 
Tagehlatt (quoted by Le Matin of February i8th, 
19 1 6), did not scruple to assert that the achieve- 
ment by Germany of her favourite scheme "from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" would secure for 
all nations the freedom of the sea. "If the econ- 



CONCLUSIONS 215 

omic mission of Germany," said that journal, 
"is to guard the freedom of the road which leads 
from the North Sea through Central Europe 
to Asia Minor, and to render it more and more ac- 
cessible, in the interest of all who reside along the 
road in question, then it is a necessary consequence 
of this our mission that we should have a vital 
interest in the sea likewise, since the Continental 
road in Central Europe is merely its continuation. 
Our interest requires that the sea shall be freed 
from the supremacy of a single people, that it shall 
be open to all honest competition." 

6". The Allies pretended that they made war 
on Germany because we violated the neutrality of 
Belgium. This cant only serves as a cloak for 
their own hypocritical cupidity. It is not for the 
AlHes to reproach Germany, seeing that they have 
themselves violated the neutrahty of Greece. 

To the Allies, who can have no doubt as to the 
premeditated character of the German aggression, 
these main arguments, on which the German pro- 
paganda rests, of course, are nothing more nor less 
than "colossal" lies, as absurd as they are cynical. 
Nevertheless we must bear in mind that repeated 
indefatigably under every form to Germanophile 
neutrals in Europe or to neutrals in America and 
Asia, who naturally have but vague ideas on the 
complex affairs of Europe, they have enabled the 
Germans gravely to prejudice the cause of the 
Allies through the moral, economic, and military 
effects which they have produced. Hence the 
Allies are deeply concerned in frustrating the 
world-wide German propaganda with all possible 
speed. Now that great object, as we shall see later 
on, the Allied Governments could, if they chose, 
very quickly accomplish by pointing to the tem- 
porary success of the Pangerman plot. 

Pangermanism and the dangers which it involves 



2i6 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

for the future are now well enough known in some 
neutral countries, but the knowledge is still some- 
what vague, it still lacks that clear definition and 
that sense of imminent peril which arouse strong 
convictions and prompt actions. But if the Pan- 
german plan of 191 1, in all its definiteness and ex- 
tent, has been ignored down to a very recent date 
in the Allied countries, which nevertheless above 
all others are interested in knowing it, we can 
easily understand that this nefarious plot for en- 
slaving the whole world has not yet been fully 
apprehended by neutral nations. But the tem- 
porary accomplishment of the Pangerman plan in 
Europe, to the enormous extent of nine-tenths, 
furnishes the Allies with demonstrative arguments 
of the utmost cogency, and thus puts it in their 
power speedily to counteract the effect of the Ger- 
man lies all over the world, and to prove the danger 
which Pangermanism creates for all civilized States. 

To achieve this object it would be enough if the 
Allied propaganda, which has begun to be organized, 
were to be co-ordinated and founded on a small 
number of positive arguments drawn from the re- 
sults already attained by Pangermanism; for these 
results would reveal to everybody Germany's long 
premeditation, and therefore her responsibility and 
the scheme of world-wide domination which she 
pursues. 

This Allied propaganda ought to be firmly estab- 
lished by the practical and indisputable proof 
afforded by the geographical superposition of the 
191 1 plan on the territories actually taken possess- 
ion of by Germany in the course of the war; thus 
compared, it will be seen that the plan and its exe- 
cution tally almost exactly. 

The accompanying map exhibits this incontest- 
able truth in a graphic form by showing the outlines 
of the actual German fortress compared with the 



CONCLUSIONS 



217 



outlines contemplated by the 191 1 plan. Accord- 
ing to it the German conquests were to have ex- 
tended to 3,474,288 square kilometres, in addition 
to Germany itself. But these conquests ^ and 
seizures at the beginning of 191 6 were accomplished 
over an area of 3,035,572 square kilometres. This 
geographical proof is confirmed by many manifes- 
toes which have appeared on the other side of the 
Rhine advocating a policy of annexation. Amongst 
these may particularly be noted: — 




RELATION BETWEEN THE PANGERMAN PLAN OF 1911 AND THE 
.PANGERMAN GAINS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916. 

1°. The famous memorial of May 20th, 1915, 
which the Imperial Chancellor caused to be pre- 
sented to himself by the most important associa- 
tions of Germany (see p. 17)- 

2°. Germany's manifest desire to get possession 
successively of Riga, Calais, Verdun, Belfort, and 
Salonika, in order to complete the plan of 191 1 by 
holding the strategical points necessary for the pre- 



2i8 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

servation of the territories over which she has cast 
her net. 

3°. The declarations made in the Reichstag on 
April 5th, 1916, by the Imperial Chancellor, Herr 
von Bethmann-HoUweg, which lend the force of 
demonstration to the geographical proof. 

To any plain man these declarations appear to 
amount to an official avowal of Germany's intention 
to execute the Pangerman plan. The phrases of 
the Imperial Chancellor leave no room for ambiguity. 

"After the war Poland will no longer be the 
Poland out of which the Russian usurers have been 
cleared. . . . No. Never again must Russia be able 
to march her armies to the defenceless frontier of 
East Prussia, nay, of West Prussia {thunders of 
applause). Just as little is it to be supposed that 
in the West we shall give up the lands where our 
people's blood has flowed, unless we receive solid 
guarantees for the future. We mean to create solid 
guarantees in order that Belgium should not become 
a vassal State of England and France, that it should 
not be turned into an outwork against Germany 
from the military as well as the economic point of 
view." {Loud applause.) (Quoted by Le Temps, 
April 8th, 1916.) 

The Imperial Chancellor could not assert more 
categorically the territorial claims of Germany on 
the East and on the West. As for the claims 
towards the South and South-East, consequent 
upon Germany's seizure of Austria-Hungary, Bul- 
garia, Serbia, and Turkey, Herr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg made no allusion to them. His silence is 
intelligible. In the first place, it was too much to 
expect that the Imperial Chancellor should make a 
clean breast of the burglaries which Germany has 
committed on the territories of her own Allies; in 
the second place, Berlin affects to consider these 
forcible acquisitions to the South and South-East 



CONCLUSIONS 219 

as permanent and therefore beyond the reach of 
discussion. 

Moreover, Deputy Spahn, leader of the Centre, 
who on April 5th, 1914, and again on December 
nth, 191 5, took on himself to reply to the Chancel- 
lor and to say outright what the exigencies of office 
obliged that gentleman only to hint at, left no doubt 
as to Germany's intentions with regard to Central 
Europe. *'We must," said Herr Spahn, "bring 
about a lasting union with Austria-Hungary. We 
must have at our command territories larger than 
the German Empire. This war, which has been 
forced upon us, must secure for us a position of 
world-wide power." (See Le Temps, April 7th, 
1916.) 

Thus irrefragable proofs, both material and moral, 
combine to demonstrate, beyond a shadow of doubt, 
that Germany made and continues to wage the war 
for the purpose of carrying out the Pangerman plan 
which she elaborated from 1895 to 191 1. 

II. 

Nine-tenths of the Pangerman plan of 191 1 having 
been for the moment achieved, the Allies can avail 
themselves of this fact as evidence to counteract 
speedily and everywhere, the effects of the German 
propaganda, and to prove to the civilized world the 
legitimacy and the necessity of their military action 
against Prussianized Germany. 

Starting from the practical proofs and the German 
declarations, both of them indisputable, which we 
have just set forth, the propaganda of the Allies 
should be able speedily to demonstrate to neutrals 
the absolute falsehood of the German allegations. 
Hence it should prove that: 

1°. Germany made the war, after very long pre- 
meditation, solely for the sake of executing the 
Pangerman plan of 1895-1911, the aim of which is 



220 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

to effect formidable conquests and to subject in 
Europe and Turkey 127 millions of non- Germans 
to the yoke of 77 millions of Germans (see p. 15). 

2°. If the war is prolonged, it is only because 
Germany has not renounced her plan of universal 
domination. 

3°. In claiming to carry out her scheme "from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf/' Germany by no 
means aims at securing for the world that freedom 
of the seas which, according to her, has been 
usurped by England; on the contrary, the inten- 
tion of the Berlin government is, by means of the 
inevitable consequences of the "Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf" scheme, to get possession of all the 
strategical points necessary to ensure the com- 
mand of the sea all over the world (see p. 106). 

4°. ^ In virtue of these consequences, the 
accomplishment of the "Hamburg to the Persian 
Gulf" scheme would directly threaten the inde- 
pendence of all the civilized States in the world, 
especially of Japan, the States of South America, 
and the United States. 

5°. No comparison is possible between the viola- 
tion of Belgian neutrality by Germany and the 
Allies' occupation of Salonika. 

The Allies did not go to Greece to take possession 
of the country, as the Germans did to Belgium. 
The Allies went to Greece to assist their ally Serbia, 
which, moreover, was the ally of Greece, and to 
oppose the spoliation of Austria-Hungary, the 
Balkans, and Turkey, by Germany. The treaties 
which give Turkey, France, England, and .Russia 
the right of protecting the Hellenic constitution, 
greatly endangered by German influences at Athens, 
are sufficient to justify, on the ground of international 
law, the presence of the Allies in Greece. But it is 
necessary, further, to state clearly that they are 
there in virtue of a still higher right, that of safe- 



CONCLUSIONS 221 

guarding the collective liberty of the nations. A 
comparison will enable us to appreciate this point 
of view, the statement of which is perhaps novel. 
According to the civil law, private property is 
inviolable. But if any man, passing a garden 
which the right of private property forbids him to 
enter, sees on the other side of the garden a rufl&an 
in the act of murdering a person for the purpose of 
robbing him, he not only has a moral right, but is 
in duty bound to cross the garden to help his 
fellow who is in danger of his life. There is not a 
court of justice in the world that would blame the 
worthy and courageous citizen for having violated 
the rights of private property in succouring his 
fellow man. But the Allies went to Salonika with 
exactly the same intention. They have passed 
through Greece in order to seize by the throat the 
Pangerman ruffian who is violently robbing Austria- 
Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey; who is destroy- 
ing by millions in these countries the Antigermanic 
civil populations; who, shrinking from no crimes, 
however heinous, claims to lay hands on riches un- 
told, and to secure his illgotten gains by capturing 
the whole region from Vienna to the Persian Gulf, 
which would furnish Germany with the means of 
maintaining her world-wide dominion (see p. io6). 
Now, as my readers have been able to see for 
themselves, there is, by reason of the temporary 
success of the Pangerman plot, abundance of un- 
impeachable arguments, numerical, geographical, 
ethnographical, in support of these conclusions. 
These irrefragable arguments are therefore calcu- 
lated to make the greatest impression on neutrals, 
because they are of a nature to appeal to their 
higher feelings and at the same time to show how 
their own interests are Jeopardized. If the Allied 
propaganda is once co-ordinated and fortified by 
these arguments, set forth methodically, the moral, 



222 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

economic, and military effects, which the German 
propaganda has undoubtedly produced to the ad- 
vantage of Germany, would soon be annulled, and 
the Allies would justly reap similar advantages, 
which would hasten the victory. 

III. 

Henceforth the Allies and the neutral states must 
hear constantly in mind not only Germany^s present 
gains on the East and on the West, hut also her Pan- 
german gains as a whole. 

The accompanying map furnishes the justification 
of this conclusion. It is obvious that the German 
gains on the West and the East, important as 
they are, are relatively small by comparison with 
the enormous seizures which Germany has effected 
at the expense of Austria-Hungary, of half the 
Balkans, and of Turkey. We must fully under- 
stand that these countries, especially Austria- 
Hungary, though they are allies of Germany, are 
nevertheless as truly under the German heel as 
Belgium, Poland, or the invaded departments of 
France. There is therefore good ground for making 
no distinction between the Pangerman gains 
achieved by Germany at the cost of her open 
enemies (France and Russia) and those which the 
Government of Berlin has treacherously effected at 
the expense of her own allies, like Austria-Hungary. 

What the Allies and the neutral states have to 
consider is the Pangerman gains taken as a whole, 
in order to discriminate those which are calculated 
to upset the balance of power in the world, and con- 
sequently to establish German supremacy. ' 

Now it is certain that if Germany were to give up 
her gains in the East and the West, while maintain- 
ing her seizures in the South and South-East, her 
power would at that moment be formidably in- 
creased as compared with what it was before the 



CONCLUSIONS 223 

war. That, therefore, would be an Indisputable 
and enormous victory for Pangermanism. The 
sketch map, inserted below, represents this truth 
in a graphic form. From Berlin radiate the lines 
on which are stretched the threads of that immense 
spider's web which covers the whole of the enormous 
Pangerman gains achieved by Germany in the 
course of the war. These gains she has been able 
to effect by means of 




Tm r\ LF N 



OF 1916. 



1°. The very skilful political turn which she has 
adroitly given to her military operations. 

2°. The ignorance of the Pangerman plan 
among the Allies. The l^nowledge of it would in 
fact have suggested to them from the very begin- 
ning of the campaign the need of intervening 



224 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

through Salonika and the south of Hungary, which 
would have destroyed the chief part of the German 
plan by rendering impossible the junction of the 
Central Empires with Bulgaria and Turkey. 

IV. 

The temporary achievement, almost in its entirety, 
of the Pangerman scheme "from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf," proves that the complete victory of the 
Allies is necessary for the freedom of the world. 

As it is no longer possible to question either the 
reality or the extent of the plan of universal domi- 
nation pursued by the Germans, it follows that all 
civilized States are undoubtedly concerned in the 
defeat of Prussianized Germany, since a German 
victory would have a most detrimental effect on 
their interests. Accordingly, the Neutral States 
whose independence would be especially threatened 
by the accomplishment of the "Hamburg to the 
Perisan Gulf" scheme, have a really vital interest 
in the continuance of the war by the Allies till a 
complete victory crowns their arms. Such a 
decisive victory is a necessity not only for Europe, 
but for the whole world, since the achievement of 
the "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" scheme would 
have world-wide consequences (see p. 107). That 
victory should have for its main object to deliver the 
world from the Pangerman peril, and therefore to 
prevent any future outbreak of the intolerable am- 
bition of the Hohenzollerns. The victory of the 
Allies involves a pledge to destroy the "Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf" project, which forms the in- 
dispensable but sufficient basis of the whole Pan- 
german plan. 

V. 

The plan of slavery pursued by Germany is now so 
manifest that neutrals or Germanophile groups are 



CONCLUSIONS 225 

henceforth morally responsible for their sentiments 
before the civilized world. 

The neutrals who, in the first part of the war, 
displayed sympathy for Germany, were excusable 
because they were deceived; but now they are in 
a different position. The facts are patent. It is 
no longer possible for anyone to see in Prussianized 
Germany anything but a ferocious burglar and 
assassin practising his trade of robbery and murder 
at the expense of the whole commonwealth of 
nations. In the fine phrase of M. Paul Hyacinthe 
Loyson, Can neutrals be neutral in the face of 
crime? Clearly not. As the Daily Telegraph said 
very justly: "Those who refuse to occupy a vacant 
seat at the Round Table of chivalry will have to render 
an account at the judgment bar of Humanity J' As 
matters now stand, in face of the crimes committed 
by the ''miscreants of Central Europe" — the phrase 
is that of the Dutchman M. Schroeder — neutrals 
cannot support Germany in any way without 
rendering themselves her accomplices. 

This truth is made so manifest by the course of 
events that already a change is coming over two 
neutral countries, which had been thought German- 
ophile. Spanish opinion, a part of which had long 
been deceived by the German propaganda, is coming 
round more and more. Sweden, which the pressure 
and the audacious temptations of Berlin all but 
plunged into the strife, to the great benefit of Pan- 
germany, is now anxious not to separate her cause 
from that of civilization; her responsible leaders 
have just proclaimed that Sweden will maintain a 
strict neutrality. ^ , , 

VI. 

The declarations of the Allies, the accomplishment 
of the "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" scheme, and 
the question of Austria-Hungary. 



226 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

In receiving the French deputies in London, on 
April nth, 191 6, Mr. Asquith declared: "I have 
said already in November that we would not sheathe 
the sword till the military domination of Prussia has 
been destroyed once and for all. In this struggle 
we are the champions not only of the rights of 
treaties but of the independence and the free 
development of the weaker countries." (See 
VCEuvre, April 12th, 1916.) 

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with a corre- 
spondent of the Daily News of Chicago affirmed: 
"We and our Allies are fighting for a free Europe, 
an Europe freed not only from the domination of 
one nation by another, but also from a hectoring 
diplomacy, from the danger of war, etc. The Allies 
cannot tolerate any peace which would leave the 
wrongs done by this war unrighted. We desire a 
peace that will do justice to all." (Quoted by Le 
Temps, May 17th, 1916.) 

M. Sazonoff, speaking in the name of Russia, said: 
"Our victory must be absolute. The Allies will 
continue to fight till mankind is rid of Prussian- 
ism." (Quoted by Le Temps, February 27th, 1916.) 

At Nancy, on May 13th, 1916, M. Poincare 
declared: "France will not surrender her sons to 
the danger of fresh aggressions. We do not wish 
the Central Empires to offer us peace, we wish that 
they should ask it of us; we will not submit to 
their conditions, we will impose ours on them; we 
do not want a peace that would leave Imperial 
Germany free to begin the war again and to hang 
a sword for ever over the head of Europe; ^we want 
a peace which shall receive at the hands of Justice, 
restored to her own, solid guarantees of permanence 
and stability. So long as that peace is not assured 
to us, so long as our enemies shall not confess them- 
selves vanquished, we shall not cease to fight." 
(Quoted by Le Temps, May 15th, 1916.) 



CONCLUSIONS '227 

On May 22nd, 1916, in replying to the members 
of the Russian Duma, M. A. Briand, President of 
the French Council, similarly declared: — 

"I have said, and I repeat, while rivers of blood 
are flowing, while our soldiers are sacrificing their 
lives with such forgetfulness of self, the word peace 
is a sacrilege, if it means that the aggressor will not 
be punished, and if tomorrow Europe shall run the 
risk of being handed over once more to the humours 
and the caprices of a military caste bloated with 
pride and athirst for power. It would be a dis- 
honour to the AUies. What answer should we 
have to make if tomorrow, after having concluded 
such a peace, our countries were again swept into 
the frenzy of armaments? What would the genera- 
tions to come say if we were to commit such a folly, 
and if we let slip the opportunity which now pre- 
sents itself of establishing a lasting peace on a solid 
basis? Peace will result from the victory of the 
Allies, it can result from nothing but our victory." 
(See Le Temps, May 24th, 1916.) 

From all these declarations of the Allies two 
fundamental ideas stand clearly out: — 

Prussian militarism must be destroyed; 
The nationalities of Europe must be liberated 
from the Prussian yoke. 
But, as we have proved, the accomplishment of 
the "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" scheme has 
two essential objects: — 

A formidable extension of Prussian militarism, 
which would have at its disposal an army 
of 15 to 21 million men (see p. 91); 
The enslavement to Germany of all the non- 
German nationalities lying between the 
south of Saxony and the Persian Gulf. 
The objects of^ the war pursued by the Allies 
and those of the government of William 11. are 
therefore fundamentally opposed to each other. 



228 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

This opposition has been by implication excel- 
lently stated by M. Marcel Cachin, Socialist deputy, 
in an article which appeared in VHumanite, of 
May 9th, 1916, under the title "Central Europe." 

*'The general plan of our enemies can be clearly 
defined. In case they were victorious, they would 
establish in the heart of Europe a formidable power 
under the supremacy of Germany, a power which, 
with the annexations avowedly aimed at, would 
comprise more than 130 millions of inhabitants. 

"It needs no big words to show the danger 
which the whole of Europe would run were such a 
design executed. It would be an eternal menace to 
our country. No one can for a moment doubt that 
so long as the existing political systems of Germany 
and Austria endure, such a monstrous combination 
would be a permanent danger against which we 
should constantly be obliged to be on our guard. 
And as for the Slav populations reduced again to 
slavery, as for the Czechs, the Poles, the Yougo- 
Slavs, the Serbians, they would naturally think of 
nothing but of revenge in order to escape from 
serfdom and recover their national rights, which 
had been trampled under foot. Were such a brutal 
unification as is summed up in Mitteleuropa to be 
unfortunately accomplished by fire and sword, we 
might talk of peace after the storm, but it would 
be talk in vain; it would be war again, fatal war." 

There spoke sound sense. It is clear that to 
have done once for all with Prussian militarism is 
the only way open to the Allies to procure a reason- 
able guarantee that so atrocious a war shall never 
be waged again, and that millions of men shall not 
once more be sacrificed to the Moloch of Pangerman- 
ism. Hence the official declarations of the Allies, 
quoted above, are not the product of blind ob- 
duracy, as the German propaganda would make 
some neutrals believe. In view of the formidable 



CONCLUSIONS 229 

plan of universal domination which the Germans 
still cling to, the seeming obduracy of the Allies is 
on their part the highest wisdom. 

VII. 

The question of Austria-Hungary , being the crucial 
point of the whole problem to be solved after the war, 
may become the common ground on which all common 
efforts should be concentrated, not only by the present 
Allies, but also by the still neutral States which are 
virtually threatened by the accomplishment of the 
^^ Hamburg to the Persian Gulf scheme. 

It is probable that Prussian militarism would 
have been already destroyed, or on the point of 
being so, if in the first part of the war the leaders 
of the Allied countries had not committed the three 
capital mistakes which to-day are generally acknow- 
ledged — the Balkan poKcy of 19 15, the Dardanelles, 
the delay in sending reinforcements to Serbia. 

It is evident that these three calamitous mistakes 
have entailed a considerable prolongation of the 
struggle and allowed Germany to build up the 
immense fortress which extends from Dunkirk on 
the north to Egypt on the south, and from the south 
of Riga to Bagdad (see the map on p. 72). In 
order to overthrow the mighty walls of this formid- 
able fortress, the Allies must consent to sacrifices 
much greater and more prolonged than would have 
been necessary if the mistakes now generally ack- 
nowledged had not been committed. These sacri- 
fices the Allied peoples accept with a devotion and 
heroism which will win the imperishable admiration 
of posterity. But just because the faults committed 
have lengthened the duration of the struggle, the 
leaders of the Allied countries are in duty bound 
to do everything they can to accelerate a complete 
victory. That victory would be considerably 
hastened by the accession of the forces, whether 



230 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

economic or military, of the still neutral countries 
which, though they are even yet not fully aware of 
it, would be directly endangered by the success of 
the Pangerman plan. 

I have shown on p. 219 how a systematic propa- 
ganda of the Allies, taking as its text the temporary 
accomplishment of the Pangerman plot, might 
speedily demonstrate to neutrals the falsehood of 
the German sophistries by which they have been 
cajoled. The same propaganda should have for 
its second object to convince these neutrals that 
they have as much to gain as the Allies by the 
destruction of Prussian militarism and of the 
*' Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" project. If once 
this were clearly demonstrated it would be both 
legitimate and possible to request of these neutrals 
that they should contribute, in the measure of 
their power, to the common task of saving the 
civilization of the world. 

In order rapidly to secure practical results from 
a convincing propaganda, it is necessary to define 
very clearly what in the vast welter of the present 
struggle is the point of vital interest common to all 
the States of the World. As I have shown in the 
course of this book, what would provide Germany 
with the means of establishing her universal domin- 
ion would be the accomplishment, whether direct, 
or indirect, of her scheme "from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf." On the other hand, I believe I have 
demonstrated that to prevent the accomplishment 
of that scheme it is enough, but it is necessary, that 
the Latin and Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary 
should be freed, once for all, from the yoke which 
Germany has imposed on them through the op- 
portunity given her by the war. For if the majority 
of these peoples were to be combined as a State in 
place of Austria-Hungary, probably in a federal 
form, there would at once be set up in Central 



CONCLUSIONS 231 

Europe an immovable barrier which would ensure 
the world against any revival of Pangerman ag- 
gression (see the map on p. 43)- On the other 
hand, if the independence of the Slav^ peoples of 
Austria-Hungary were not secured against Berlin, 
the extension of Prussian militarism to the Balkans 
and Turkey would be inevitable; the Allied peoples 
would have made all their unheard-of sacrifices in 
vain, and the struggle against Prussianism would 
be bound to continue. 




EUROPEAN STATES INTERESTED IN THE SOLUTION OF THE 
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN QUESTION. 

From these considerations it follows that the 
question of Austria-Hungary, just because its 
solution implies the downfall of the ''Hamburg to 
the Persian Gulf" castle-in- the-air, constitutes the 
crucial point not only of the European problem, 
but of the whole problem which the Pangerman 
plan of universal domination raises for all civilized 
States. Consequently the solution of the question 
of Austria-Hungary, on the basis of the principle 



232 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED, 

of nationalities, forms the bond of common interest 
not only between the belligerent Allies but also 
between all the still neutral States of the world 
who are threatened in any degree by the accom- 
plishment of the scheme "from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf." 

The annexed maps show clearly the States of the 
world for which the solution of the question of 
Austria-Hungary has an interest greater or less in 
degree but substantially identical. 

It is clear that if Germany could keep her hold 
permanently on Austria-Hungary, Russia would be 
constantly threatened. In consequence of the 
extension of Prussian militarism which would 
result therefrom, England would be forced to 
continue to maintain the formidable armaments 
which she has accepted only as a temporary meas- 
ure. As for France, no restoration of Alsace- 
Lorraine could be lasting, if the vassal regiments of 
Austria-Hungary should give the government of 
Berlin, after a brief breathing-space, the power to 
wrench again from France the provinces which had 
been temporarily ceded. Belgium would be threat- 
ened for the same reason. As for Italy, German 
supremacy over Central Europe would be the end 
of all Italian hopes on the Adriatic, and of all 
Italian expansion over the Eastern Mediterranean. 
As for Serbia and Montenegro, that dominion 
would be a sentence of death without appeal. For 
Portugal, it would imply the loss of her territories 
beyond the sea in virtue of the consequences which 
would follow the achievement of the plan, "from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf." 

But countries still neutral, such as Greece, Rou- 
mania*, Holland, and Switzerland, at which the 



*This passage was written before Rovunania joined the Allies 
in the war. Translator's Note. 



CONCLUSIONS 233 

Pangerman musket is levelled point-blank, ought 
also to be convinced that their most solid interests, 
in complete harmony with their moral obligations 
to the cause of civilization, make it their duty to 
lend the Allies all the support they can, whether 
it be moral, economic, or military. 

The second map shows the group of States in 
Asia and America which, menaced by the world- 
wide consequences of the "Hamburg to the Persian 




THE STATES OF ASIA AND AMERICA, INTERESTED IN THE 
SOLUTION OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN QUESTION. 

Gulf" scheme, have also a high and direct interest 
in the solution of the Austro-Hungarian question. 
Japan is already helping the Allies notably, but 
her assistance might be still ampler, more effective 
and more direct. The strictest view of her interest 
should compel her to enlarge the scope of her 
succour, since nothing but the total defeat of 
Germany in Europe can prevent Japan from wit- 
nessing a long series of disturbances fomented at 
her expense in the Chinese Empire (see p. 98). As 
I have already shown (p. 105) many States in South 
America are directly aimed at by the Pangerman 



234 PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED 

plan of 191 1. But that plan can never be really 
formidable for these States, unless Germany should 
one day have at her disposal the powerful resources 
which would accrue to her from the accomplishment 
of the scheme ''from Hamburg to the Persian 
Gulf." Chili, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bo- 
livia, Colombia, Brazil, have all been the object of 
preparatory Pangerman manoeuvres. That warn- 
ing ought to convince them without delay that 
they have an undoubted interest in co-operating, 
to some extent, in the common cause. They could 
do so, particularly Argentina and Brazil, to good 
purpose in the economic sphere. 

As for the United States, we have seen (p. 208) 
that the accomplishment of the scheme "from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" would really 
jeopardize their independence in the gravest man- 
ner. No doubt that point of view has not yet been 
generally apprehended in the United States, but a 
propaganda which could easily be carried on, since 
the arguments in its favour are abundant, should 
serve to convince the Americans that in fighting on 
the battlefields of Europe the Allied soldiers are 
really safeguarding the future of the great American 
Republic. On the day when that conviction 
becomes general, the Americans will not hesitate 
to lend the European Allies such assistance of 
various sorts as must hasten the coming of complete 
victory. 

To recapitulate, a series of deductions, all based 
on acknowledged facts and all easily verifiable, 
leads to the conclusion that the formidable problem 
with which German aggression has confronted the 
civilized world is summed up in the solution of the 
Austro-Hungarian question, because that solution, 
which can be worked out without prejudice to the 
legitimate interests of the German people (see 
Chapter VI § 111), is the only means of putting an 



CONCLUSIONS 23s 

end to the Hohenzollern plan of universal domina- 
tion, founded on the scheme ''from Hamburg to 
the Persian Gulf." 

But when the question of Austria-Hungary shall 
have been solved, the problems pecuhar to each of 
the Alhes will by way of corollary be solved also 
And in general, by securing the independence of 
the non-German peoples of Central Europe-a 
measure the justice of which is indisputable-we 
shall effectually protect the world as a whole 
against any future eruption of the intolerable Pan- 
german ambition. 



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